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This dissertation examines the continuing role that race plays in the politics 
of the American South. The focus of this study is the concept of racial threat voting, 
which argues that certain conditions conspire that cause white voters to feel 
“threatened” by black voters and black populations. Thus, racial motivations affect 
the ir vote choice. Most of the prior literature on the topic of racial threat voting 
focuses on geographic proximity to large black populations. In this dissertation, we 
examine racial threat voting in three dimensions: physical proximity, culture, and the 
media. W e also explore the role o f racial threat in Republican Party success. 
Finally, the dissertation addresses the question of whether racial threat is a new 
model of voting behavior, or does it fit w ithin existing models? By studying racial 
threat in this manner, we gain a greater conceptualization of the phenomenon.
IX
To study racial threat voting, the dissertation examines selected 
gubernatorial campaigns in Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina in a period from 
1994-1998. A variety of statistical techniques are used in this study. We utilize 
ordinary least squares (OLS) to analyze county-level data in Chapter 4 where we 
examine physical proximity racial threat voting. Chapter 5 uses logistic regression 
to analyze opinion poll data when studying cultural racial threat voting. In Chapter 
6, we use content analysis to analyze the print media coverage of campaigns to 
explore the role that the media plays in the existence of racial threat voting.
Three major findings emerge from this study. First, racial threat occurred at 
varying levels across the three states. Physical proximity racial threat voting 
occurred in South Carolina in 1994 and Georgia in 1998, but it was not present in 
the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election or the 1998 South Carolina election. 
Cultural racial threat voting occurred in Louisiana during the 1995 campaign. 
Unfortunately, the proper polling data was unavailable for the other two states, 
making it impossible to test. When analyzing the media coverage, none of the 
newspapers was portraying campaigns as racial. Thus, we cannot claim that the 
media was driving this phenomenon.
Second, political context is vital to the existence of racial threat voting. 
W ithout the proper political environment and candidates, racial threat voting did not 
occur. Therefore, we would not necessarily expect racial threat to rear its head in 
every election. Rather, racial threat appears only in certain types of elections. 
Claims that racial threat voting always exists in southern elections are unfounded.
This requirement of political context also makes it unlikely that the Republican Party 
can forge a durable realignment solely on race. Whites with negative racial 
attitudes are already predisposed to vote for the GOP. Republican candidates who 
try to appeal to these racially threatened whites and other groups simultaneously 
face a difficult prospect.
Third, this dissertation places racial threat within the context o f existing 
models of voting behavior. Based on this research, racial threat should not be 
considered a separate model of voting behavior. In some ways, racial threat is part 
of the issue literature begun by The American \/o fe r(1960). Racial threat also fits 
within the cultural approach to voting behavior as well, but racial threat does not 
warrant inclusion as a separate model of voting behavior.
By studying the phenomenon of racial threat voting in the South, we make 
discoveries that allow us to understand better the complexities of it. As we see in 
the coming chapters, one best understands racial threat in various dimensions 
rather than a simple geographic phenomenon. By viewing racial threat on different 
planes, we gain a better understanding of how racial threat affects white voters in 
the South. If racial threat does exist in ways besides simple physical proximity, 
then racial threat may influence white voters elsewhere, potentially making this 
problem a national phenomenon instead of a strictly regional one.
XI
CHAPTER 1 
THE RESEARCH PROBLEM
“In Its grand outlines, the politics of the South revolves around the position 
of the Negro” (Key 1949, 5). Fifty years have elapsed since V.O. Key wrote these 
words in the seminal study of the region’s politics. Southern Politics in State and 
Nation. Enormous political and social changes have come to the South over the 
ensuing decades. The region no longer practices de ju re  segregation, and 
minorities are now free to take an active role in politics unlike the past. Despite 
these political and social changes however, scholars continue to study what Key 
argued was the axis o f southern politics: the race question.
Certainly, politics in the southern states at the end o f the 20“’ century 
continues to maintain a racial structure. Black voters still show an overwhelming 
preference for Democratic politicians, and a majority of southern whites routinely 
vote Republican for president (Black and Black 1992). Few blacks run as 
Republicans, and few Republicans candidates openly court black votes. Just 
because elections show a racial structure, however, does not necessarily mean that 
race remains an explicit issue in politics (Bullock and Campbell 1984). Observers 
would need some outward expression o f racial voting to substantiate such a claim 
that race still plays a defining role in the voting behavior o f white voters.
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Such an expression of racial voting reared its head in Louisiana in the early 
1990s. The strong political performance of former Ku Klux Klan leader David Duke 
in Louisiana politics reignited interest in race-based campaign appeals in southern 
politics. During his statewide campaigns fo r the U.S. Senate and later the 
governorship, Duke showed that candidates could still achieve political success in 
the South by appealing to the racial attitudes and biases of white voters. Duke’s 
success in Louisiana raises questions about the role that race plays in the politics 
o f the southern states today.
If race has returned as a political issue, at what level is it likely manifested? 
Black (1976) finds that racial voting was more likely to take place at the statewide 
level than at the local level, because statewide officials were traditionally the 
vanguards of segregation and the racial status quo. Voters were less likely to be 
as concerned about racial issues in local races. Accordingly, this study w ill confine 
itself to the examination of statewide campaigns. To explore the potential role of 
race in southern politics today, this dissertation examines selected gubernatorial 
campaigns to explore the relevance of an old thesis of political behavior which has 
been the subject of renewed interest in the 1990s: the racial threat hypothesis.
THE BLACK BELT THESIS
When V.O. Key analyzed southern politics, he posited the black belt thesis. 
According to Key, the presence of large numbers of blacks influenced practically 
every aspect of southern politics. W hite voters, especially those o f the black belt.
feared black political empowerment. Although southern states had disfranchised 
blacks in the 1890s, blacks still played a pivotal role in determining the structure 
and character o f southern politics. While parts o f the South featured heavy 
concentrations o f blacks, some southern states did not have large black 
populations. How could blacks affect the political system in such a fashion if blacks 
were not a large proportion of the population in some states? The fear o f white 
voters who lived in close quarters with high black populations polarized the white 
electorate into collective action during elections. This collective action resulted in 
the black belt controlling state politics under certain conditions.
The black laelt, rural counties where 40 percent or more of the population is 
black, featured the most conservative white politicians and the most reactionary 
white voters in the South. Key argues that the black belt counties controlled the 
politics of their state, even though black belt counties were not the majority in most 
southem states. As Key states, “the hard core of the political South—and the 
backbone of southem political unity - is  made up of those counties and sections of 
southern states in which Negroes constitute a substantial proportion o f the 
population” (Key 1949, 5).
Although outnumbered, the black belt counties voted as a solid bloc in 
elections, and these black belt counties were usually able to elect officials of their 
choosing in most states. Key presents the example of Alabama as a Deep South 
state that had internal divisions due to race. The central portion of Alabama 
contained the black belt counties, where white voters overwhelmingly supported the
most conservative candidates available. Since north and south Alabama did not 
contain as many blacks as a percentage of the population, these two areas usually 
voted for more progressive candidates. Key argues that this is due to race: white 
voters in the black belt were the most concerned with keeping the status quo 
regarding blacks and therefore opposed progressives who moderated on issues of 
race, while white voters outside the black belt often voted on the basis of issues 
other than the race question. When black belt whites voted as a solid bloc, they 
were usually able to control statewide contests since north and south Alabama 
voters were not as united when casting their votes. The states with the largest 
number of black belt counties are the Deep South states of Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina, and these states were the most 
influenced by racial politics. The other six states of the South are the Rim South, 
which tended to pay less attention to racial matters since they had smaller black 
populations, although these states contained black belt counties as well. The Rim 
South was not as preoccupied with race since their overall black populations were 
relatively small. However, the Rim South was not immune to racial politics. In 
North Carolina, race did influence politics at times, and there is evidence of 
continued racial stimulation of that state’s politics (Eamon 1990; 1994).’
’The North Carolina black belt has a history of political insurgency against 
the establishment leadership of the state. Due to this factor. North Carolina political 
leaders were able to avoid race-baited contests during the period of 
disfranchisement and segregation. On occasion, the black belt was able to elect 
a governor of their own choosing if the more progressive parts of the state split their 
vote among several candidates (Key 1949).
THE ONE-PARTY SOUTH
Key (1949) asserts that the legacy of the one-party Democratic South was 
directly attributable to the political behavior of black belt whites. Since segregation 
and disfranchisement preoccupied black belt whites, the idea of two parties was 
abhorrent to political leaders of these areas. The danger was always present in a 
two-party system that one party might appeal to blacks for support. The Republican 
Party was not the favored choice of most Southerners at this time, due to the legacy 
of Reconstruction. Immediately after the American Civil War, the Republican Party, 
consisting of Northerner carpetbaggers and southern sympathizers called 
scalawags, controlled state governments in the South. When federal troops left the 
region in 1876, white southern Democrats reclaimed political control, and the 
Republican Party became associated with blacks and Northerners. As U.S. 
Senator Benjamin Hill (D, Georgia) once put it, any white supporters of the 
Republican Party “‘should be driven from the white race, as Lucifer was driven from 
Heaven into a social Hell’” (Bartley 1983, 59). Sentiments such as this clearly 
indicate that white civic culture left little room for a Republican Party.
It was in the black belt that political leaders became the most staunchly 
Democratic because a two-party system created the spectre o f black political 
control in these areas given the large black populations in those counties. The 
w orst fears of black belt political leaders concerning a two-party system were 
confirmed in the 1890s when the Populist movement gained strong support in some 
areas o f the South. Manifested in the Populist movement were the fears of these
white Democrats. The main areas of support for the Populists were outside the 
black belt regions of the Deep South. A key to the Populists’ brief success was the 
appeal to  black political support because the Populists resorted to appealing to 
black voters since they could not defeat the Democrats without more electoral 
support.
Despite some initial successes, the Populist revolt eventually died around 
the turn o f the 20^ century. Sundquist (1983) argues that the Populist movement 
ebbed because of two factors. First, the Democrats, under William Jennings Bryan, 
co-opted many of the platforms of the Populists, making the Populist position 
untenable. Second, most of the Populists outside of the South supported a fusion 
with the Democratic Party because it was easier to influence one of the existing 
major parties than mold a third party into a legitimate national power. The triumph 
of William Jennings Bryan and his followers in control o f the Democrats made such 
an absorption more appealing since Bryan was “a Populist in all but name, and the 
Democratic platform had a Populist ring..."(Sundquist 1983, 139). Southern 
populists, however, generally did not support absorption into the Democratic Party. 
The motive behind this southern resistance was the fear that the Bourbon 
Democrats, conservative black belt white Democrats who opposed Populist polices 
and more importantly a two-party system, would quash Populism. As one Populist 
leader put it, “if we fuse, we are sunk” (Pollack 1962, 140).
The Racial Legacy of the Democratic South
W ith the end of the Populist movement around 1900, Bourbon Democrats 
soon regained control of state Democratic Parties into the 1960s. After they quelled 
the Populist revolt, Bourbon Democrats led a successful move to disenfranchise 
black voters. Although Mississippi was the pioneer in barring blacks from political 
life, doing so in its 1890 state constitution, the remaining southern states did not 
successfully prevent blacks from voting until after the Populist movement 
(Woodward 1974).
At the time of Key’s research, few blacks could vote in the southern states, 
leaving no voice for the suppressed minority. Bartley and Graham (1975) suggest 
that only 10 percent of eligible southem blacks were registered to vote as recently 
as 1960. Since states were so successful in disfranchising blacks, the Democratic 
Party was able to ignore the concerns of black voters. During the first half of the 
20*^  century, the Democratic Party in the South stood for ideas and policies that 
were beneficial to white citizens while neglecting black citizens. This, too, was 
another reason that southern Democrats were the vanguards of segregation and 
black disenfranchisement at this point in history. This control o f the electorate by 
white political leaders produced a vicious cycle for black citizens. W hile many state 
policies were harmful to black voters, black citizens were helpless to do anything 
about them given the fact that 90 percent o f blacks could not vote, posing no 
challenge to established political authority.
White domination of southem politics began to change with the coming of 
desegregation. The initial federal involvement in the area o f education soon 
expanded to encompass other aspects of the segregated South including voting 
rights. The 1950s and 1960s saw drastic increases in the number of blacks 
registered to vote, especially in urban areas where blacks found it easier to 
register. The black belt counties were the most recalcitrant to black registration. 
The Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA) directly targeted the rural areas where local 
officials steadfastly denied blacks the right to vote. In the wake of these new 
opportunities for black electoral participation, black voters soon outnumbered white 
voters in black belt counties. W ith this growth in black political empowerment, 
politics in the black belt, and the region as a whole, underwent a massive change. 
Despite the return o f blacks to the electorate, this did not mean that race 
disappeared as a political issue.
EVIDENCE OF CONTINUING RACIAL VOTING
Given the increased political activity of black voters beginning in the 1960s, 
one might assume that Key’s black belt hypothesis would have become dated. On 
the contrary, it survived after blacks registration and desegregation had taken 
place. Even after these two monumental events occurred, scholars continued to 
find evidence that racial voting and racial appeals aimed at white voters by political 
candidates were taking place in the southem states (Black 1976; Knoke and 
Kyriazis 1977; Glaser 1994). Research still supports Key’s hypothesis when one
looks at the southem counties that George Wallace carried in 1968; W allace’s core 
support traced the black belt (Upset and Rabb 1969; Crespi 1971 ; Schoenberger 
and Segal 1971; Wasserman and Segal 1973; Black and Black 1973; W rinkle and 
Polinard 1973; W right 1977).
Since race was continuing to play some role in the voting decisions o f some 
southern white voters, a hypothesis, known as racial threat, was developed to 
frame the dynamics o f race in the post-Jim Crow era. Racial threat Is a variant 
upon Key’s black-belt hypothesis. When Key wrote in the 1940s, white voters in 
the black-belt monopolized political power. Since Key’s time, segregation and the 
disenfranchisement of black voters are no longer legal. Therefore, white voters in 
the black belt are now outnumbered w ithin the electorate. However, racial threat 
contends that white voters in the black belt will automatically cast a vote for 
whomever the Republican candidate is, because the GOP better represents the 
interests of those white voters.
In 1968, Alabama Governor George W allace ran for president on the 
American Independent Party label. By running as a third party candidate, Wallace 
hoped to prevent either the Democratic or Republican presidential candidates from 
winning a majority o f the electoral vote, resulting in an election in the U.S. House 
o f Representatives. Although not successful in this sense, Wallace became the 
most successful third party presidential candidate in history, garnering forty-six 
electoral votes.
Wallace won the Deep South states of Alabama, Georgia, Mississippi, and 
Louisiana as well as winning Arkansas’ electoral votes. If not fo r Senator Strom 
Thurmond’s endorsement o f Richard Nixon, W allace might have carried South 
Carolina as well (Black and Black 1987). Wallace combined a blatant racial appeal 
to black belt whites with a law and order pitch. At the time, the social climate of the 
1960s disturbed many of these conservative black belt whites. W hile Nixon too 
stressed law and order in his campaign, it was the combination o f law and order 
and racial appeals that attracted many black belt whites to the W allace camp.
THE CHANGING POLITICS OF THE BLACK BELT
In many ways, the W allace movement in 1968 was the last gasp of the 
political dominance of whites in the black belt. Although black registration had 
increased since the VRA, white voters still outnumbered black voters in most black 
belt counties in 1968 (Lamis 1988). By 1970, black registration began to surpass 
white registration in most o f the black belt. Many black belt counties have 
supported every Democratic presidential nominee beginning with George 
McGovern in 1972 because o f black political empowerment.
Despite newfound political power by black voters in the black belt, an 
examination of demographic figures reveals that the black belt has been losing 
population both white and black. Black and Black (1987) argue that because of 
population loss the black belt does not hold the pivotal role that it did during Key’s 
day. Simultaneously, the black belt has lost political power due to this population
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loss. Has the racial tone of the area disappeared completely? Perhaps the black 
belt counties have not had an openly racial appeal from political candidates to 
whom to respond. Figures 1.1 through 1.5 illustrate the general decline in the black 
belt between 1960 and 1990.
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The overall pattern of these states during this thirty-year period reveals the 
population loss in the black belt counties of the Deep South. Black and Black 
(1987) state that most o f this population loss is a result of economics. As fewer 
people are directly involved in agriculture in today’s economy, more people have 
migrated from the black belt into metropolitan areas of the region. With this 
migration, the population of black belt counties has declined with each census since 
1950. Along with this population loss, a loss of political power has arrived as well. 
Black belt counties no longer control an election's outcome as they could during 
Key’s day. Although blacks vote in overwhelming numbers for Democrats, 
candidates cannot depend solely on the black belt for political victories because of 
the decreasing population in the region.
The Biraciai Democratic Coalition
If the decreasing population o f the black belt dictates that Democratic 
candidates cannot rely too heavily on the region, how can the Democrats win 
southern elections? As early as the 1950s, Heard (1952) argued that a progressive 
Democratic Party would only emerge if the conservatives in the South bolted to the 
GOP for some reason. Heard states, “it is precisely if and when they lose this 
avenue of [conservative] political expression that they w ill feel the greatest 
compulsion to break away...to the Republican Party” (Heard 1952, 247). As we 
have seen, most conservatives bolted to the Republicans in the 1960s over the race 
issue.
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As these conservatives left the party, it left room for moderates and liberals 
in the Democratic Party to take control. This was evident throughout the 1970s and 
1980s as successful Democratic candidates in the South appealed to a biraciai 
coalition of black and white voters. As blacks re-entered the political process by 
1970, Democratic candidates soon found that they could win elections by appealing 
to black voters plus a sizable minority o f the white vote (Black and Black 1987). 
Appealing to this coalition meant that the Democrats could retain political power 
after a bumpy period between 1964 and 1970. Secondly, this Democratic biraciai 
coalition left little room for Republican success at the state level. Even if a 
Republican candidate carried 40 percent of the white vote in a Deep South state, 
he still might have faced defeat if the biraciai coalition had provided enough votes 
for the Democratic candidate.
Lamis (1988) argues that since the early 1970s the race issue has been in 
abatement. After integration came, some traditionally Democratic white voters 
became less preoccupied with the race issue, which was disastrous for Republican 
candidates in the South during the 1970s and 1980s. During the 1960s, 
Republicans in various Deep South states had enjoyed varying degrees of success 
as a consequence o f Barry Goldwater carrying the Deep South in the 1964 
presidential election. Initially, these statewide Republican candidates attempted 
to play the race card by appealing to disgruntled white voters who traditionally 
voted Democratic. A fter achieving some limited success, the Republicans soon 
found themselves at a disadvantage.
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This biraciai coalition was enormously successful for the Democratic Party 
at the state level In the Deep South during the 1970s and 1980s. W hile most 
Democratic statewide candidates during th is period were white, they appealed to 
black voters by supporting policies and programs beneficial to blacks. 
Simultaneously, these successful candidates kept moderate white voters in the 
Democratic party by not advocating stances that would alienate these voters. In 
this manner, the Republican Party at the state level was not able to capitalize upon 
the new racial environment immediately after the enfranchisement o f black voters.
The biraciai coalition had an ideological effect on the Democratic Party as 
well. Black and Black (1987) argue that this coalition has had a slight moderating 
influence upon the Democratic Party. Because they must appeal to black voters. 
Democrats have been forced to take on some “liberal” stances. Yet, Democrats 
were still able to retain conservative platforms because they are necessary to retain 
white support. Simultaneously, the Republicans found themselves hamstrung by 
ideology. While Democratic candidates had the luxury o f taking moderate 
positions. Republican candidates were forced to take conservative positions to 
hold onto their base of support, which resulted in Republican candidates having 
little success in appealing to moderate white or black voters.
Further exacerbating the problem. Republican candidates at the state level 
had few candidates to offer that had direct experience in government, while the 
Democratic Party had a plethora of experienced candidates. For the Republican
19
Party to achieve great success at the statewide level In the Deep South, some 
event would have to occur that would weaken the Democrat’s coalition.
THE RETURN OF RACIAL-THREAT VOTING
At the state level, the biraciai appeal of southern Democrats was evaporating 
by the 1990s. W hile scholars had questioned how much of the biraciai appeal of 
Democrats still existed In the late 1980s, events In Louisiana provided a shocking 
answer. In 1990, David Duke, a former Imperial W izard of the Ku Klux Klan and 
form er chairman of the American Nazi Party, ran against Incumbent Democrat J. 
Bennett Johnston for the U.S. Senate In Louisiana. Surprisingly, Duke claimed 44 
percent of the statewide vote. In 1991, Duke ran for governor, but he also lost this 
race garnering around 40 percent o f the runoff vote after forcing an Incumbent 
Republican governor out of the primary.
Giles and Buckner (1995) analyze Duke’s statewide races at the parish-level. 
Using socioeconomic variables such as urbanization, education, youth, and In- 
mlgratlon to Louisiana, Giles and Buckner statistically examine Duke’s run for the 
U.S. Senate In 1990 and his 1991 gubernatorial bid. In Duke’s Senate bid, the 
authors found that a black population of 30 percent or more In a parish led to white 
support o f Duke at a rate of 20 percent more than whites In parishes with low 
numbers of blacks. In the 1991 gubernatorial campaign, Giles and Buckner 
discovered that black belt whites were fifteen percent more likely to support Duke 
than non black belt whites.
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While Duke himself never mentioned race in his campaigns, both of the Duke 
campaigns contained an underlying racial element. Much o f Duke’s campaign 
stressed the economic plight of white voters in Louisiana. Duke campaigned 
against affirmative action, and he favored further curbing o f social welfare 
programs. Although such issues have become the mainstay o f the GOP in the late 
1990s, Duke was the first major candidate to advocate such positions.
If an overtly racial candidate like David Duke has such appeal to black belt 
whites, what effect do less blatant candidates have upon these same white voters? 
The authors examine the vote outcome of the 1988 presidential vote among the 
same parishes previously examined to determine the impact o f a candidate who 
makes no open racial pleas. The authors found that support fo r George Bush was 
10 percent greater among black belt whites than their less “threatened” white 
brethren in parishes with fewer blacks. W hile George Bush was hardly a race- 
baiting candidate in the tradition of David Duke, Bush advocated policies, such as 
welfare reform, supported by white voters. Simultaneously, black voters were 
against these same programs. Support for Bush was greater among some of the 
same “threatened” white voters who cast votes for David Duke a few years later.^
Giles and Buckner (1995) conclude from their findings that race has not 
disappeared as a factor in southern politics. Under the proper circumstances.
^Giles and Buckner (1995) attribute some of Bush’s success with Louisiana 
whites to the infamous W illie Horton ads that accused Michael Dukakis of being soft 
on crime. Some whites may have taken a racial cue from the ads since Horton is 
black.
21
overtly racist candidates can expect to find support among white voters who live in 
proximity to large concentrations of blacks. However, fewer whites live in majority- 
black counties than in 1950. Consequently, the David Dukes of the world may die 
a quiet death in the foreseeable future. The rise of a conservative tide against 
entitlement government and the welfare state in 1994 indicates that, in many 
respects, the substance o f Duke’s campaign foreshadowed a successful strategy 
for Republican candidates in the mid-1990s.
The other conclusion is that candidates who are not avowing a racial 
platform can still draw support from white voters based upon race. While these 
candidates would not be of the ilk of Duke, they could still draw support from 
“threatened” white voters. For instance, David Duke was one of the first serious 
challengers for statewide office who called for an end to affirmative action and 
welfare. Many Republican and Democratic officials and candidates today espouse 
these two positions. Giles and Buckner concede that candidates like David Duke 
are increasingly relegated to the past, but that race nonetheless w ill continue to 
play a part in southern elections through the support o f less overtly racial 
candidates.
While Giles and Buckner (1995) argue that racial threat voting is taking place 
in David Duke’s 1990 and 1991 elections, Voss (1996) disputes their findings. Voss 
argues that measurement error led the authors to mistaken conclusions about the 
reality of racial threat. Specifically, Voss criticizes Giles and Buckner for (1) using 
1980 census data, (2) clumping all metropolitan statistical areas (MSA) counties
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together when measuring black density, and (3) utilizing ordinary least squares 
(OLS) regression at the parish-level given the great differences in the populations 
o f individual parishes.^
Voss argues that clumping o f MSA counties fo r the purposes of measuring 
black density of the population was unjustified. G iles and Buckner (1995) take the 
average o f the black population in a MSA and record that average for the black 
population of each metropolitan county. Voss maintains that white voters are more 
concerned about the parishes in which they live. Consequently, Voss does not 
advocate “clumping," which can lead to distorted outcomes.
To control for the differences in population among the parishes of Louisiana, 
Voss uses generalized least squares (GLS) regression.'* By correcting what he 
perceives to be the three shortcomings of the original Giles and Buckner research, 
Voss contends that racial threat is no longer at work in Louisiana or southern 
politics as a whole.
In rebuttal, Giles and Buckner (1996) replicate their original model using 
GLS, and they find that the indication for racial threat is even stronger.
^Due to the great variations in population size o f different parishes, Voss 
argues that it would be more advantageous to undertake an aggregate study of 
racial threat at the precinct-level, since precincts tend to be more racially 
homogeneous.
'‘Autocorrelation occurs when the error terms among variables are correlated 
with each other. When autocorrelation exists, the best linear unbiased estimates 
(BLUE) are not produced. Since OLS regression is not equipped to deal with the 
problems associated with autocorrelation, GLS regression is utilized because this 
method is capable o f correcting for autocorrelation, resulting in BLUE estimators 
(Gujarati 1995).
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Furthermore, the authors argue that “clumping” the MSA data was justified due to 
prior research that shows white voters in metropolitan areas do not simply think of 
a city as ending at county (i.e. parish) boundaries. Rather, these voters think o f an 
entire metropolitan area as contiguous for the purposes o f racial threat.
A goal of the dissertation will be to shed new light upon this debate. Besides 
testing racial threat as an extension o f one's physical proximity, subsequent 
chapters w ill examine racial threat in other dimensions. In addition, this study 
proposes to apply the racial threat model to statewide races in a variety of states, 
not just Louisiana. This should give a more solid perspective for the continued 
usefulness of the racial threat model.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
What determines voting behavior and whether an individual bothers to vote? 
In essence, the racial threat hypothesis is an attempt to understand the voting 
behavior o f certain southern white voters. Namely, white voters who live in close 
physical proximity to large black populations are affected by race when they cast 
a vote. Where does racial threat stand in the voting behavior literature? Some 
scholars argue that racial threat voting is a model o f voting behavior. In past 
research, some authors (Giles and Buckner 1995; Voss 1996), treat racial threat as 
a distinct view o f voting behavior that is separate from other theories. Perhaps, 
existing models of voting can explain racial threat behavior. For example, racial 
threat may not be a separate model, but instead an extension of issue voting in
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which blacks are the Issue. After a brief discussion o f how racial threat may be 
compatible with other voting behavior models, we examine whether racial threat 
should be viewed as a distinct theory of voting behavior.
Racial Threat as a Manifestation of issue Voting
The American Voter (Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes 1960) 
influenced much of the research in the field o f voting behavior. Also referred to as 
the Michigan model, it is a socio-psychological argument that scholars developed 
by studying presidential elections in the 1950s. These scholars studied three 
elements: (1) a voter’s attachment to party, (2) voters’ orientation towards issues, 
and (3) a voter’s orientation towards candidates. The model found that party
identification was the most important factor in a person’s voting behavior. While
issues and candidates are short-term influences, party identification is the important 
long-term factor.
Praise for The American Voter is not universal. Some scholars assert that 
the research portrays Americans as too ignorant concerning politics. Key (1966) 
argues that Americans are not as oblivious to issues as the Michigan model 
suggests. Rather, issues held by the parties are so similar that the voters simply 
have no choice. According to Key, the onus for issue voting lies with the parties, 
not the voters. Another major criticism of the model is the fact that party 
identification has been declining in importance since the 1960s and 1970s.
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One area of research that the Michigan model influences is issue voting. 
The original Michigan model conceptualizes the American electorate as a group 
primarily unaffected by issues. According to the Michigan model, party identification 
is more important in the decision for whom to vote, but identification can indirectly 
influence issues. Issues-influence behavior requires that: (1) voters know an issue, 
(2) voters have some feeling about an issue, (3) voters perceive that one party is 
closer to a person’s belief on an issue. Yet, a majority o f the U.S. population fails 
to meet all three conditions. The Michigan authors survey a sample on issue 
familiarity. Thirty-three percent fail to know an issue and the government’s position 
on an issue. Lack o f knowledge and concern leads to individuals who do not 
distinguish differences between the parties. In sum, the authors find little evidence 
that people care or know partisan stances on many issues.
Issue voting is rare according to the Michigan model. Later scholars began 
to question the absence o f issue voting. Perhaps, the Michigan scholars had not 
been examining issue voting in the proper manner. One of the must notable 
changes in the studying of issue voting was the restatement of it by Carmines and 
Stimson (1980; 1981; 1989). Carmines and Stimson (1980) refine the concept of 
issue voting, by defining two different types of issues: hard and easy. Perhaps, 
voters perceive and act upon some issues and not others. Hard issues are 
complicated and beyond the comprehension of many in the electorate. The authors 
argue that hard issues are the province of political elites and policymakers, not the 
masses. While hard issues are difficult for the average voter to conceptualize, easy
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issues are readily understood by most in the electorate. The following 
characteristics define easy issues: (1) these issues are “symbolic rather than 
technical,” (2) easy issues deal with policy outcomes not implementation, (3) easy 
issues are “long on the political agenda” (Carmines and Stimson 1980, 80).
Based on this classification of issues, easy issues elicit the type of appeal 
that a majority of voters can base their vote. These easy issues are undemanding 
to grasp as opposed to hard issues that are more technical and complicated. Since 
most voters do not spend long hours contemplating hard issues, expecting voters 
to base their vote on hard issues is illogical. Consequently, easy issues are more 
likely to influence individuals in their voting decisions.
Carmines and Stimson (1980; 1981) argue that race is an example of an 
easy issue, and the least educated and lower classes of society are more likely to 
be easy issue voters. Carmines and Stimson (1989) find that more easy issue 
voting takes place in the South than in any other region of the country, and the 
authors believe that the racially-influenced easy issue voters benefit the Republican 
Party.
Since race is an easy issue, one may argue that racial threat is the logical 
extension of issue voting. In this scenario, blacks are the issue upon which 
threatened white voters cast their votes. Instead o f being a new approach to voting 
behavior, racial threat may be part of a school that argues that issues are important. 
However, those issues must be simple enough for the common person to 
understand. Racial threat also fits into the realm of an easy issue because less
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educated whites are more prone to vote Republican based on race (Giles and 
Buckner 1995).
Racial Threat as a Product of Culture
Another view o f racial threat might be that it is a product of culture. The 
Columbia School was one of the first systematic attempts to study voting behavior 
in the 1940s. The Columbia model uses a consumer preference model, which 
perceives political parties as presenting a product to the public. In effect, the 
political campaign is the advertising campaign, and voters choose their preferences 
through elections. The problem with this model is that people often decide how to 
vote before campaigns get under way. Polls from the 1940s reveal that the majority 
o f voters had already decided to vote for Franklin Roosevelt before the 1940 
presidential campaign began.
Instead of a consumer preference model, the Columbia model ultimately 
explains voting behavior with a sociological model that stresses socioeconomic 
analysis. The model argues that individuals’ socioeconomic status, religion, and 
whether one lives in a rural or urban setting is important in understanding people’s 
voting behavior (Niemi and Weisberg 1993). Since socioeconomic factors play a 
role in racial threat voting, perhaps it can be part of this sociological model as well. 
Racially “threatened” white voters are less educated and among the lower 
socioeconomic class (Campbell 1971; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). In
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addition, a majority of these white voters live in the black belt counties of the South 
that are overwhelmingly rural (Giles and Buckner 1995).
Another aspect of the Columbia model is the cultural explanation of voting 
behavior. In essence, one’s culture Influences the way in which one is raised. 
Again, examining prior research reveals that the majority of cases in which racial 
threat is in operation occurs in rural areas where tradition plays a large role. 
Consequently, we might expect to see voters’ opinions mirror those o f their parents 
in large part. This idea that tradition and culture leads to individual’s voting 
behavior is a contention of The American Voteras well.
Perhaps, we can understand racial threat as a product of one’s culture and 
upbringing. Sears and Funk (1999) find in a longitudinal study conducted on four 
occasions between 1940 and 1977 that the racial attitudes of their parents influence 
respondents. In the 1960s and 1970s as race became a polarizing issue, the 
authors discover that respondents’ latent racial views are activated as a response 
to the racially-charged political environment. When race became an issue, the 
majority o f these voters reacted in a manner that was consistent with their long-held 
racial views. Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman (1997) also find that white 
voters’ racial attitudes are long-standing. In an analysis of white respondents' 
answers on various racial policies and racial candidates, the authors ascertain that 
race is the primary determinant in their beliefs. For example, an individual who is 
bom and raised in the black belt w ill likely absorb the racial attitudes and mores of 
his parents. In tum, this Individual may cast his votes guided by his racial attitudes.
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On this basis, racial threat may be a logical extension o f political culture. If 
so, racial threat could be part of a sociological approach of voting behavior that the 
Columbia study began when studying the 1940 presidential election. If true, one 
must raise the question of how reliable racial threat can be for political candidates, 
because white voters would need some cue to spark latent racial tendencies into 
vote choice. If the proper political context was not present, it may not matter the 
stances that candidates actually take. If so, this raises the question of how 
effective candidates can be in using race as a winning issue from election to 
election.
The Effect of Physical Proximity on Racial Threat
Another dimension to racial threat may have to do with physical proximity to 
large concentrations of black voters. This aspect of racial threat can be related to 
the Columbia model's contention that one's place of residence affects voting 
behavior. The idea of physical proximity is the basis o f Key's (1949) black belt 
thesis, which argues that white voters who live in close physical proximity to blacks 
are the most racially conservative of southern white voters. This preoccupation 
with race led black belt whites to be the most loyal Democratic bloc voters in the 
region. In the regions that had less black residents, however, white voters were not 
as concerned with the race issue. Thus, their support for racial candidates was 
less extreme.
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Prior research demonstrates that the strongest support for racial candidates 
continued to originate from black belt whites through the 1960s. As mentioned 
previously, the last gasp for black belt whites in the Deep South was their 
overwhelming support for the George Wallace presidential bid in 1968. After this 
election, black voters gradually began to outnumber white voters in much of the 
Deep South due to the implementation o f the Voting Rights Act of 1965. As time 
passed, the white population of the black belt began decreasing due to population 
shifts (Black and Black 1987).
Prior to 1964, Carmines, Huckfeldt, and McCurley (1995) find that physical 
proximity did have an effect upon white voters at the presidential level. The long- 
held Democratic presidential loyalty o f black belt whites evaporated due to Lyndon 
Johnson’s advocacy of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. This desertion of the 
Democratic Party continued after 1964, although much of the Deep South cast their 
votes for the independent Wallace in 1968. Carmines et al. (1995) find that the 
Democratic presidential loyalty among black belt whites has disappeared since 
1964 at a level higher than that of southern whites living outside the black belt. 
Here, the actual physical proximity of high concentrations of blacks appears to have 
a significant influence upon the voting behavior of whites in those areas.
As mentioned previously, Giles and Buckner (1995) find the highest support 
for David Duke among whites in the black belt. Simultaneously, whites outside the 
black belt did not demonstrate the same levels of support for the Duke candidacy.
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This appears to be another indication that physical proximity may play a large role 
in racial threat.
Why can racial threat be seen in terms o f physical proximity? Past research 
indicates that whites near high black populations demonstrate more racially 
motivated voting than their counterparts outside of high black population areas. If 
culture influences racial threat, perhaps physical closeness also plays a factor in 
not only racial threat, but also influences the culture in which one is raised, a 
culture in which racism is reinforced by physical proximity to another race. For 
instance, white voters in the black belt are reared with certain attitudes about race. 
Given the choice to vote for a candidate supported by black voters or another 
candidate, these hypothetical individuals may choose the candidate not favored by 
black voters solely on the basis o f racial attitudes, which physical proximity has 
influenced.
Such an interpretation of racial threat raises interesting questions. First, is 
it possible that racial threat only exists among whites in heavily black counties, or 
could racial threat take place in other areas like predominately white suburbs near 
cities with a high black population? Second, if racial threat is dependent upon the 
white population in tfie black belt, how much longer w ill racial threat exist? If racial 
threat is based solely upon black belt whites, then it may not have much life left 
because the white population in the black belt counties is decreasing due to 
intergenerational replacement and migration to urban and suburban centers in the 
South.
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RACE AND REALIGNMENT IN THE SOUTHERN STATES
A modem application o f racial threat assumes that whites who live in areas 
o f high black concentration w ill automatically vote for Republican candidates. As 
stated before, most black voters and black candidates are Democrats. This leaves 
“threatened" white voters with the Republican Party. Has there been a realignment 
of white Southerners to the GOP?
Types of Realignments
Before attempting to answer the question concerning race and the 
Republican Party in the South, it is necessary to operationalize the concept of 
realignment. Traditionally, scholars define realignments as either critical or secular 
(Key 1955, 1959; Sundquist 1983; Bullock 1988). Critical realignments involve a 
mass shift among voters from one party to the other. Corresponding to these 
critical realignments, critical elections lead to this massive shift in party loyalties. 
These critical elections hinge upon a highly salient issue that disrupts previous 
party coalitions and leads to a realignment. Most of the acknowledged critical 
elections involve economic issues. For example, the pro-Republican realignment 
o f 1896 revolved around the question o f monetary standards. The most recent 
critical election was that o f Franklin Roosevelt in 1932. FDR’s election ushered in 
the New Deal coalition that brought together various groups that favored an activist 
govemment, particulary with respect to interventions in the private economic sector.
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Secular realignment is the antithesis o f critical realignments. The nature of 
secular realignments is that electoral change is slow and gradually occurs over 
decades. Key (1959) argues that secular realignments featured generational 
replacement rather than critical and abrupt changes in the partisan make-up of the 
electorate. Consequently, particular elections are irrelevant to the progress of 
secular realignments. Subsequent research seems to support Key's assertion 
concerning realignments (Burnham 1970; Sundquist 1983; Brady 1988; Shafer 
1991).
W hile Sundquist (1983) offers some support to Key's assertion regarding 
secular realignments, he is critical of Key’s contention that realignments occur 
every 28-36 years in the United States. Examining the history of the party system 
in this nation, Sundquist finds little evidence that realignments fit such a neat 
cyclical pattern. Rather, partisan stances on major issues dictate the occurrence 
of realignments. Instead o f realignments being completely dependent on voter 
preferences, parties also play a role in realignments. If a party takes the “wrong” 
stance on an issue like racial or economics, then voters may abandon one party for 
the other.
Although racial issues were extremely divisive in the 1960s, Sundquist 
(1983) argues that race cuts across partisan lines, making a realignment based 
upon racial issues unlikely. If a realignment were to take place based on race, then 
race would have to become an issue that either the Democratic or Republican party 
would have to seize as their own. Based on Sundquist’s discussion of realigning
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issues, perhaps the Democratic Party lost control of the race issue not during the 
1960s but in the late 1980s and early 1990s. As demonstrated above, prior 
research discusses the potent Democratic biraciai coalition that subsequently 
disintegrated in some southern states during the 1990s. If Sundquist’s model is 
accurate, this might help to explain the relationship between racial threat voting and 
realignment.
Nardulli (1995) argues that critical realignments have validity, but he 
believes that political scientists have examined realignments in the wrong manner. 
Instead of treating realignments as national events, we should perceive them as 
subnational events. Nardulli provides evidence that there has never been a true 
national realignment. Even the vaunted New Deal realignment was not national in 
scope. Rather, it was a series of realignments between 1928 and 1936 in which 
the New England region and the West switched to the Democratic Party. The 
South did not align Democratic because it had already done so in the 1870s. 
Nardulli asserts that various regional realignments have taken place since 1836.
Race and the GOP in the South
The crucial issue for a southern realignment in favor o f the GOP would be 
the issue of race. As mentioned above. Carmines and Stimson (1980) argue that 
race is an example of an easy issue, and the least educated and lower classes of 
society are more likely to be easy issue voters. The authors believe that the 
racially-influenced easy issue voters benefit the Republican Party. Carmines and
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Stimson (1980) find that realignment is the most likely to hinge on an easy issue. 
The authors also argue that realignment has taken place among the two parties 
over the issue of race (Carmines and Stimson 1989).
Few political scientists disagree about the role o f race and the growth o f the 
southern Republican Party in the 1960s. Black and Black (1992) argue that the 
1964 presidential election was a pivotal election for the Republican Party in the 
South. Barry Goldwater drew support from middle and lower class whites based 
on race (Cosman 1966). Prior to 1964, a minority o f upper class, urban whites 
voted Republican. Beginning in 1964, many rural white voters began voting 
Republican at the presidential level (Bartley and Graham 1975). Prior to 1964, 
some blacks still harbored support for Republican candidates, but the combination 
o f the Goldwater candidacy and Lyndon Johnson’s civil rights stand drove most 
black voters to the Democratic Party (Cosman 1966; Carmines and Stimson 1989).
Carmines, Huckfeldt, and McCurley (1995) not only find evidence that black 
mobilization led to southem whites to abandon of the Democratic Party in 1964, but 
the authors also discover that the southem white desertion of the Democratic Party 
in presidential elections has continued in all post-1964 presidential elections. 
Interestingly, the heaviest desertion rate comes among white voters in the black 
belt.
Divergence exists among other scholars about whether racial or social 
issues have stimulated the rise o f the Republican Party in the South. Some 
research reports that it was not a white backlash but the Great Society that led
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many white voters to the Republican fold (Beck 1977; W olfinger and Arseneau 
1978; Wolfinger and Hagan 1985; Stanley 1987; Stanley and Castle 1988). 
Schulman (1991) contends that the Republican Party also needed the influx o f 
Northerners into the South, which has taken place since the 1960s to sustain any 
long-term growth.
Other scholars argue that the rise of the GOP in the South is directly 
attributable to racial issues (Carmines and Stimson 1981; Lamis 1988; Black and 
Black 1992). The Republican Party needed to cultivate the average white middle 
and lower class Southerners to have any kind o f success in presidential elections 
(Edsall and Edsall 1991).
M iller and Shanks (1996) argue that a combination of factors has led 
southern whites to become increasingly Republican. W hile the Goldwater 
candidacy and Johnson’s push for civil rights led to the initial southern white 
migration to the GOP, other factors kept southern whites away from the Democratic 
Party. During the 1970s and 1980s, Democratic positions on economics and 
foreign policy led to a secular realignment among white Southerners in favor of the 
Republican Party. Despite the fact that Jimmy Carter won all of the South in 1976 
and part of the region in 1980, his presence was not enough to lead a majority o f 
southern whites back to the Democratic fold.
Carmines and Stimson (1989) assert that a fundamental requirement o f 
realignments is a change in party loyalties among the electorate, and party loyalty 
changes in two ways. First, an issue must fit the classification of an easy issue
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previously mentioned. Furthermore, a plethora of Impulses such as major political 
events, shifts in public opinion, and input o f party elites combine to produce 
defection from one party to the other. Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue that 
race is just such an issue that has caused a majority o f white voters in the South to 
convert to the Republican Party. Initially, the Goldwater shift and the move among 
Republicans to a plank o f racial conservatism led to such a shift at the national 
level. Eventually, this move to the GOP has been fe lt at the state and local level. 
The authors posit that race has been the prime, possibly the sole ingredient in the 
growth o f the GOP not only in the South but to the nation as a whole.
Before any conversion can take place, voters must have some catalyst to 
switch parties. Carmines and Stimson (1989) argue that political candidates are the 
individuals who help lead to change in party affiliations. For instance, the 1958 
U.S. Senate elections were critical for the Democratic Party to move to the left on 
the racial issue. The senate freshman class of 1958 featured northern Democrats 
who were racial liberals. Thus, the stage was set for the eventual passage of the 
1964 Civil Rights Act (Carmines and Stimson 1989). Simultaneously, the 
nomination of Barry Goldwater for the Republican ticket began an unabated trend 
to the Republican Party becoming the home of racial conservatives. These 
developments led to a change among many voters in party loyalties. As Black and 
Black (1992) note, the Goldwater candidacy is an illustration of a candidate 
revolutionizing partisanship. Barry Goldwater’s conservative stance on civil rights 
policy led many southern white voters to associate with the GOP.
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Part of the focus o f this study involves determining whether racial threat 
voting is drawing certain white voters into the Republican Party. The emphasis is 
on white voters who traditionally vote Democratic. Is there a breaking point at 
which these types of voters go to the Republican Party? If racial threat is operating, 
then one would expect this breaking point to occur when a Republican candidate 
is making appeals to race. In the next section, we explore the relationship between 
racial threat voting and a possible Republican realignment in the South.
Racial Threat’s Role in a Republican Realignment
As discussed previously, much attention has focused upon the role that race 
played in the rise o f the Republican Party in the South. Based on the prior 
literature, it would appear that race definitely played a large role in the initial 
Republican breakthrough in the Deep South. How far did race affect the political 
loyalties of southern white voters beyond this? Debate abounds on the answer to 
this question. If race has played a role in southern white voting behavior below the 
presidential level, how pervasive is this racial impact? Is racial threat enough to 
sustain a true realignment o f southern whites to the Republican Party at all levels?
Undoubtedly, the South has become a two-party region, but it would be 
hazardous to proclaim that racial threat is leading this shift without a closer 
examination of available data. It is possible that the Republican Party can only go 
so far in appealing to white voters on the basis of race. Then, the Republicans are 
faced with the inevitable task of trying to attract the support of other voters. Since
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the numbers of white voters influenced by racial threat are unlikely to be a majority 
of an electorate in a state, the prospects for the GOP become even dimmer.
While race was the issue that led to the Republican Party being viable in the 
South, could it be that the GOP has to move away from this issue to remain a 
perennial challenger to the dominance o f the Democratic Party? As we have seen 
from prior research, the Republicans were eventually blocked from great political 
success at the state level in the South due to the effectiveness of the Democrats 
forging a biracial coalition of moderate white and black voters. Even as this biracial 
coalition has shown fractures in the 1990s, it seems reasonable that the 
Republicans can still only appeal to a limited number of whites on the basis o f race. 
Possibly, the Republicans cannot build a true realignment on the basis of racial 
threat considering these factors. The findings from the following chapters should 
help give us a clearer answer to these questions.
METHODOLOGY
Unit of Analysis
The intent of fliis  research is to provide an overarching framework by which 
we examine the role of race in statewide campaigns for governor. Prior research 
shows that race historically influences statewide campaigns (Key 1949; Black 1976; 
Black and Black 1987). This research examines selected gubernatorial campaigns 
from 1994-1998, because these contests occurred during a reemmergence o f racial 
tensions in the 1990s. Gubernatorial elections from three of the five Deep South are
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included; Georgia, Louisiana, and South Carolina. These Deep South states are 
the areas where racial threat has the greatest potential impact upon elections given 
the much higher black populations as compared with the Rim South. Unfortunately, 
due to the lack of readily available data, Alabama and Mississippi are not included 
in this analysis.^ As we w ill see, this data limitation seriously constrains the 
application a racial threat model in these states.
Time Frame for Examination
As mentioned previously, this study examines gubernatorial campaigns 
between 1994 and 1998. Black and Black (1987) as well as Lamis (1988) find that 
successful southern Democratic politicians were able to forge a biracial coalition 
made up of moderate to liberal whites and blacks during the 1970s and 1980s. In 
most o f the South, except Tennessee, South Carolina and Virginia, no viable 
Republican Party existed. Consequently, little opportunity was present for viable 
race-baiting politicians during the period. However, some Republican candidates 
now may be making racial appeals in gubematorial campaigns, warranting inclusion 
in this study. Accordingly, we examine the contests presented in Table 1.1.
^Neither Alabama nor Mississippi maintains racial turnout data which 
excludes both states from the analysis in Chapter 4. Additionally, no statewide 
opinions polls are conducted during gubernatorial election years in Mississippi. 
W hile some polling data does exist for Alabama, none o f the questions queries 
respondents about race or racial attitudes, making it impossible to test for racial 
threat based on the polls. Consequently, these states are eliminated from the 
dissertation completely since including it in the analysis o f Chapter 6 would not 
provide any baseline with which to compare those findings.
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Table 1.1 
Cam paigns To Be Examined
Year State Candidates Percentage 
o f the  Vote
1998 Georgia Roy Barnes (D) 52.5
Guy Milner (R) 44.1
1995 Louisiana Mike Foster (R) 63.5
Cleo Fields (D) 36.5
1994 South Carolina David Beasley (R) 50.4
Nick Theodore (D) 47.9
1998 South Carolina Jim Hodges (D) 53.1
David Beasley (R) 45.1
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Framework for Analysis
To explore whether race still structures the voting behavior of southern 
whites, this research conceptualizes the topic of racial threat in different ways. 
Chapter 2 provides a brief overview of the historical role of race in the South, while 
Chapter 3 provides a brief history of the political development in the  three individual 
states since the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In Chapter 4, we examine racial threat 
as a product o f whites living near large populations of black voters. Accordingly, 
this chapter analyzes the issue o f racial threat as previous authors have done.
Can racial threat be a source of culture and not proximity? In other words, 
do southern whites have to live in a black belt county or an inner city to have their 
vote influenced by race? This is a question that scholars relying solely on election 
analysis often neglect. Therefore, Chapter 5 approaches the problem from a 
cultural premise, and we study racial threat in the context of a cultural explanation.
Is it possible that the media trigger racial threat voting? Chapter 6 explores 
the media coverage from the appropriate statewide newspapers to  ascertain if the 
media are portraying certain campaigns as racially based. The analysis 
investigates whether threat voting is based upon cues from the media or whether 
threat voting is an internal mechanism that needs no cues from the media.
Finally, Chapter 7 provides a conclusion to this elim ination and summarizes 
the findings. Perhaps, we can better understand racial threat by viewing it in 
different dimensions. Instead o f racial threat existing solely as a localized 
phenomenon based on physical proximity, one’s culture might spark racial threat
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voting or by media coverage o f the campaigns. In the concluding chapter, we 
examine the findings to see what they say about the dimensions o f racial threat. 
Finally, we discuss the applicability o f these findings to the country as a whole.
Research Design
Using any type of experimental design where the researcher has a control 
group and administers race to an experimental group is not plausible, since it is 
impossible to change individuals’ long-held racial attitudes. As past research 
indicates, individuals are raised with certain racial attitudes that can potentially 
affect their voting behavior later in life (Sears, Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman 
1997; Sears and Funk 1999). Consequently, the research design is non- 
experimental in nature. Furthermore, the research design is a combination of a 
cross-sectional design and case studies. We examine all of the variables in the 
framework at the same point in time. However, this study explores only certain 
elections from certain states. This allows the researcher to have a quasi- 
experimental design since certain cases are excluded from analysis (Johnson and 
Joslyn 1995). In this study, we exclude non-southern states.
Much of the analysis is quantitative in nature, and this study utilizes various 
statistical techniques to examine the selected campaigns. Based on past research, 
this study analyzes available data at the county-level using OLS regression.® This
®Voss (1996) argues for the use of a generalized least squares technique on 
the 1990 Duke contest in Louisiana, in order to correct for heteroskedasticity in the 
model. Tests o f heteroskedasticity revealed no threat in the data examined in this 
dissertation. Therefore, OLS regression is sufficient fo r this analysis.
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technique is appropriate, and the most often used, to analyze the relationship 
between physical proximity and racial threat voting. W ith the advent o f black 
political empowerment, the campaigns In the 1990s do not feature an exclusively 
white electorate as they did prior to 1960. To net out the black vote to study white 
voting behavior, we need racial turnout data. This technique allows the researcher 
to derive the white vote for Republican candidates. Georgia, Louisiana, and South 
Carolina provide racial turnout data, which Is used to compute a white Republican 
vote. Using the white vote for Republican candidates as the dependent variable 
allows us to get a more precise understanding of the relationship between race and 
the Republican vote. This variable Is especially helpful when determining the 
strength o f racial threat voting at the county-level.
When testing racial threat as a consequence o f one’s culture, the 
dissertation utilizes political opinion polls from the appropriate states when 
possible. By analyzing the raw opinion poll data, the researcher can attempt to 
ascertain the Impact that culture has upon the prevalence o f racial threat voting. 
In this case, a combination o f OLS and logistic regression Is used to analyze the 
polling data. Since we are trying to discern the Impact of culture and the decision 
to vote for a Democrat or a Republican, OLS regression Is not appropriate In all 
cases. When dependent variables are dichotomous, logistic regression Is utilized 
because It provides a probability of the relationship between the Independent 
variables and a dependent variable. In this circumstance, we use logistic 
regression to test the relationship between a variety o f Independent variables,
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including race, and the decision to vote for a Republican or Democratic 
gubernatorial candidate.
Raw polling data from statewide opinion polls is available in Louisiana. 
Unfortunately, polling data could not be obtained from elections in Georgia and 
South Carolina. Therefore, these states are not included in that analysis. To 
supplement the polling data from Louisiana, data from the National Elections 
Studies (NES) in 1994 and 1998 is used to examine the relationship between the 
culture of racial threat and GOP identifiers.
By analyzing media coverage, this dissertation explores the motivations 
behind racial threat voting. Does racial threat voting take place as an internalized 
function of certain whites who need no outside impetus, or is racial threat voting 
enhanced when the media depicts a campaign as racial in nature? Various 
statewide newspapers are analyzed using a content analysis codesheet which 
examines the newspaper coverage from various states. In Chapter 6, I present 
research that shows that newspaper coverage plays a larger role in informing 
voters about statewide campaigns, leading me to focus on the coverage of selected 
newspapers in the selected states. From this content analysis of newspaper 
coverage, I investigate whether external cues trigger or enhance racial threat 
voting. Does newspaper coverage lead to racial threat voting, or are newspapers 
simply reporting the Issues stances of candidates and their campaigns? By 
exploring this question, I should obtain a clearer comprehension o f the relationship 
between racial threat voting and the media.
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Qualitative methods, especially historical context, also plays an extensive 
role in this research. One problem with an overreliance on quantitative methods 
is anomalous findings that cannot be readily explained. For example, the theoretic 
framework might state that race should have an impact that does not appear in 
statistical output. Historical context can help explain statistical findings that 
othenwise seem contradictory or incoherent. To use the previous example, history 
can tell the researcher that for whatever reason race has never played a large role 
in a state or county.
RELEVANCE OF THIS RESEARCH
The goal of this research proposal is to answer two questions. W hat role, 
if any, does race play in southern politics today? Has race been a major factor in 
the growth of the Republican Party ir^the South? Evidence exists that race has not 
disappeared as an issue in the South. In this research, I ascertain the extent to 
which race is still a political issue. Related to the issue o f race, are racial issues 
facilitating the growth of the Republican Party in the southern states? I also intend 
to address a broader question: is it possible that racial issues are a potential 
hindrance to future Republican growth?
Furthermore, much attention has focused on David Duke’s candidacies for 
the existence of racial threat voting. Is a particular set o f elections in Louisiana 
representative of the forces at work in other southern states? Another contribution 
o f this dissertation is exploring further the role of racial threat voting outside of
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Louisiana as well as another Louisiana gubernatorial election which did not feature 
David Duke as a major candidate. By applying the racial threat model in this 
manner, we obtain a more precise view of the pen/asiveness of racial threat voting.
Perhaps racial threat is only at work when an openly racial candidate like 
David Duke. Perhaps, though racial threat voting is not dependent upon racially 
divisive candidates like Duke. It is possible that candidates who make less blatant 
appeals to race may also find fertile ground among some white voters. The coming 
chapters examine the issue o f racial threat in greater depth.
Beyond these two larger questions, the dissertation tests racial threat within 
the context o f other mainstream theories of voting behavior. Some research in the 
past has a tendency to view racial threat as a distinctly different model of voting 
behavior. In this dissertation, we examine whether such a distinction is appropriate. 
Instead of existing as a separate model of voting behavior, is it possible that racial 
threat voting fits within other traditional models o f voting behavior?
Finally, in the coming chapters, this study explores the role that political 
context plays in the prevalence o f racial threat voting. Is racial animus o f selected 
white voters enough to lead to the presence o f racial threat voting? In all 
probability, racial threat voting needs the proper political environment in which to 
operate. This does not correlate to a candidate always being a David Duke-done 
either. Rather, candidates, who run in a racially-charged atmosphere caused by 
an opposition to social welfare programs and affirmative action, controversy over 
Confederate symbols, or other factors, may benefit or hurt candidates from such a
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context. Also, candidates may couple with this atmosphere issue stances which 
appeal to certain white voters. Yet, how vital is the political context for racial threat 
voting to operate in a large enough scale for Republican candidates to benefit? All 
o f these questions are explored in the following chapters.
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CHAPTER 2 
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE IMPACT OF RACE ON SOUTHERN POLITICS
To understand the South and its politics, one must recognize the role that 
blacks occupied both historically and contemporarily in the region’s politics. This 
chapter presents a brief description of race relations in the South. The time frame 
for this chapter ranges from the slavery era to the dawn of the 20“’ century, by 
which time all southern states instituted formal segregation of society (Kousser 
1974; Woodward 1974). During this chapter, we see how race relations evolved 
overtime. This evolution is sometimes surprising because the relationship between 
whites and blacks did not always take an easily predicted path, especially from 
Reconstruction until the 1890s.
In the end, a basic comprehension of the evolution of race relations in the 
South is necessary to realize the importance that race has played upon politics in 
the region. The rigid caste system established in the decade between 1890 and 
1900 helps to explain the atmosphere that led state Democratic officials before the 
1960s to defend segregation at all costs. As we see in this chapter, segregation 
was only the first step in legalized discrimination o f black citizens. Once formal 
segregation was installed, white political leaders moved to disfranchise black voters 
as well. Further, a basic understanding of the evolution o f southern race relations
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during this period helps to explain partially the reaction of many white Southerners 
In the 1960s, especially those In the black belt, when outside forces pressured fo r 
an end of legal segregation In the region. Ultimately, this resistance to societal 
change Ironically led many southern whites to the Republican Party as the 
Democrats began to change their position on race.
HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS
The history of race relations In the South, and the nation as a whole. Is 
characterized by several crucially different phases: slavery, emancipation, 
segregation, and civil rights. Events during each of these periods had drastically 
different Impacts on the nation’s politics, but It Is In the South where the Impact o f 
race was the most profound. Of these four phases, none shares much relationship 
to the other three, except that the principal political and policy questions revolved 
around the status of blacks In society, and the role of the government In 
determining that status.
Slavery
Slavery was first Introduced In this country soon after English colonization. 
W hile slavery Initially existed In the entire nation, debates began to rise about 
slavery as early as the American Revolution. By the time of the Constitutional 
Convention in 1787, some northern delegates wanted to end slavery through 
constitutional means. Southern delegates opposed such an Initiative, and the 
resolution of this debate was the 1808 Compromise, which allowed Congress to
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outlaw the foreign slave trade no earlier than 1808. Nevertheless, the Constitution 
did not give Congress the power to end slavery domestically, although most 
northern states abolished slavery by the mid-1830s.
The practice of slavery continued in a variety o f states until the American 
Civil W ar. W hile the agrarian economy o f the southern states made it especially 
dependent upon slavery, abolitionist sentiment was rising by the midpoint o f the 19“’ 
century. With the rise of this growing social movement, slavery came under 
increasing assault. In response to this challenge, the position of the South 
hardened. It would take the secession of the South and their eventual 
reincorporation into the Union before the slavery issue was settled. The ratification 
of the Thirteenth Amendment in 1865 made slavery illegal in the entire United 
States.
W hile slavery was practiced in the South until the mid-1860s, slavery did not 
go hand-in-hand with segregation. In his seminal study of segregation. The 
Strange Career o f Jim Crow, C. Vann Woodward (1974) demonstrates that 
segregation did not always exist in the South. The very nature of segregation is to 
have public facilities, residential areas, and populations separated by race. Slavery 
was the antithesis of segregation. W oodward states that whites and blacks had to 
be in close contact with each other in order for slavery to work, and this proximity 
did not stop at the end of the workday. This interrelation between white and black 
structured all aspects of southern society and life although blacks were hardly on 
an equal plane with whites. During th is antebellum period, segregation was not
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conceivable. Contact with black slaves was mandatory for two reasons. First, most 
slave owners worked with their slaves in the fields (Woodward 1974). Second, 
white owners could not have known what was going on in the fields without this 
contact. Of course, this relationship between master and slave was hardly 
egalitarian. Still, the separation of white and black was not characteristic of the 
South at this time.
Ironically, the north was the home of segregation at this time. While most
northern states abolished slavery by the middle of the 19*^  century, this did not
mean that the region was any more supportive o f equality for blacks (Woodward
1974). On the contrary, many politicians north o f the Mason-Dixon line made it a
habit to argue against black equality. One o f the more famous o f these political
leaders who advocated the inequality of blacks was Abraham Lincoln. One o f
Lincoln’s 1858 speeches contained the following passage
I will say then that I am not, nor ever have been in favor 
of bringing about in any way the social and political 
equality o f the white and black races that I am not nor ever 
have been in fovor o f making voters or jurors of negroes, 
nor o f qualifying them to hold office, nor to intermarry 
with white people, and I w ill say in addition to this that 
there is a physical difference between the white and black 
races which I believe w ill for ever forbid the two races living 
together on terms o f social and political equality. And 
inasmuch as they cannot so live, while they do remain 
together there must be the position of superior and inferior, 
and I as much as any other man am in favor of having the 
superior position assigned to the white race 
(Woodward 1975, 21).
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The bias of some Northerners towards blacks did not escape the attention of 
foreign observers either. In his classic study o f American politics and society, 
Alexis de Tocqueville observed that “the prejudice of race appears to be stronger 
in the states that have abolished slavery than in those where it still exists" 
(Woodward 1974, 20).
Woodward argues that American segregation began in northern cities. 
When northern states abolished slavery, a majority o f these newly freed slaves 
moved to northern cities for economic opportunities. W ith this influx of blacks, 
practically all northern cities began creating laws that forced segregation of public 
facilities and residential areas (Wade 1964). Woodward (1974) states that the 
South borrowed directly from the North the segregation model employed during the 
first half of the 20*^  century. Another consequence o f segregation in northern cities 
was the ghetto. Since most northem cities severely restricted blacks in terms of 
residence and economically, they were forced to live in certain areas of a city. This 
led to the growth o f ghettos that were nonexistent In southern cities of the time 
(Wade 1964).
None of this is to say that the North had a monopoly on the discrimination of 
blacks. The subjugation of blacks in the slave states was hardly desirable, but a 
consequence of the maltreatment o f blacks in northern cities gave southern states 
an example to follow  during the formation of segregation laws in the 1890s.
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Emancipation and Reconstruction
An outcome of the postbelium period was the emancipation of black slaves 
where slavery still existed. Until 1877, the southern states endured a legacy that 
it shares with no other region of the nation: military conquest and occupation. 
During the Reconstruction period of 1865-1877, federal troops were present in all 
southern states. W hile Union Armies occupied the states that had seceded and 
formed the Confederacy, the occupation took on varying degrees of severity during 
this time. Conclusions about the impact o f Reconstruction on race relations in the 
South differ wildly.
Boles (1999) argues that three different phases of Reconstruction existed. 
The firs t phase was Lincolnian Reconstruction that was in force from 1863 to 
Abraham Lincoln’s death in 1865. The second phase of Reconstruction occurred 
between 1865 and 1867, in which Lincoln's successor, Andrew Johnson, followed 
the course that Lincoln had wished of peaceful reconciliation with the South. While 
both phases of Reconstruction under Lincoln and Johnson advocated a warm 
welcome for the South’s return to the Union, the Reconstruction phase that lasted 
from 1867 to 1877, the Congressional phase, was far less lenient. The “Radical" 
Republicans in the U.S. Congress directed this phase.^ Congressional
^Boles (1999) defines Radical Republican as a group of Republican 
congressmen whose primary intention was “to remold the South so a future 
secession would be impossible” (365). The Radicals believed that Lincoln’s 
attitude toward Reconstruction had been too forgiving. Initially, the Radicals were 
a minority among Republicans in Congress, but Moderate Republican congressmen 
formed a coalition with the Radicals after Johnson became president.
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Reconstruction treated the southern states harshly before the southern states re­
entered the Union, and Congress justified their control over Reconstruction by citing 
that the Constitution gave Congress the power of admitting new states into the 
Union.
Under congressional direction, Reconstruction took on a harsher tone. 
Congress divided the South into five military districts, and a military governor 
controlled each district. These military governors had the power to overrule any 
actions of state or local courts or proceedings. For a state to gain readmission to 
the Union, the military governor conducted a census of eligible registered voters, 
which included all black males and those white males who had taken an oath of 
allegiance to the U.S. Constitution and then later sworn allegiance to the 
Confederacy. This census resulted in about 90 percent of all potential white voters 
in the South being disqualified from voting (Boles 1999). After the census had 
established the number o f eligible voters, the military governor would call a state 
convention to draft a new state constitution that had to forbid slavery, disavow all 
Confederate debts, and promise the franchise to black citizens. By 1868, Congress 
readmitted eight of the Secession states, but it would take until 1870 for Georgia, 
Mississippi, and Texas to rejoin the Union.
Since the military was present in the southern states during Reconstruction, 
white Southerners did not have complete freedom over the conduct of race 
relations. With the ratification of the Fifteenth Amendment, all black males gained
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the right to vote.^ During Reconstruction, these newly franchised blacks allied with 
northern “carpetbaggers” and southern “scalawags” to control southern state 
governments, leading to Republican control of all southern states.^ Black 
sympathies laid with the Republican Party since a Republican administration had 
overseen their emancipation.
Perman (1984) views southern politics during Reconstruction differently from 
this conventional wisdom. He sees politics at this time as various factions 
competing for political power. Within the Democratic and Republican parties, rival 
factions attempted to gain control o f the respective parties. Initially, two factions 
divided the Democrats between those who wanted to appeal to  black voters, the 
conservatives, and those who opposed an appeal to black voters, the Bourbon 
Democrats. Among Republicans, “regular” Republicans were mainly carpetbaggers 
and scalawags tied to federal patronage, and the ones who actively sought to 
recruit black voters. “Moderate” Republicans were native Southerners who 
opposed secession and had been pro-Whig before the war. Perman (1984) argues 
that by 1872, conservative forces defeated the moderates in both parties. 
Sundquist (1983) states that the defeat of moderate forces in one or both parties
^ o m e n  of all races were denied the right to vote in federal elections until the 
passage of the 19“’ Amendment in 1919.
^Carpetbaggers were northern Republicans who came to the South to take 
advantage of the impoverished conditions in the South, and they sought to take 
control of state governments with the aid o f newly franchised blacks. These 
Northerners were named carpetbaggers because they carried all o f their belongings 
in carpet bags. Scalawags were white Southerners who cooperated with the 
carpetbaggers.
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leads to realignment. W ith the defeat o f moderates in both parties, the Bourbons 
were firm ly in control of the Democratic Party, while the regulars had pushed 
moderates out o f the GOP. The result was two parties controlled by conservative 
factions who sought to appeal exclusively to one race or the other.
W hile the Republican Party remained in power during Reconstruction by 
appealing to black support in a region where few whites could vote, the 
Republicans’ days were numbered. Once federal troops left the region in 1877, 
forces conspired to doom the southern Republican Party to extinction. During the 
penultimate decade o f the 19"' century, Bourbon Democrats took control of all 
southern state governments, and they began a slow process o f disfranchising black 
voters. The result was a politically impotent Republican Party that would cease to 
exist in most o f the Deep South until the 1960s.
Race Relations Post-Reconstruction
It took the disputed presidential election of 1876 to end Reconstruction in the 
South. The two presidential candidates. Democrat Samuel J. Tilden and 
Republican Rutherford B. Hayes, ran an extremely close race. In three southern 
states, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Tennessee, a dispute erupted as to who the 
winner was due to massive political fraud. In exchange for supporting the 
Republican candidate, Hayes agreed to end federal occupation of the South. In 
1877, the last federal troops left the region, giving political control back to native 
white Southerners. This withdrawal of troops became known as “Redemption,” and
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the Redeemers were southern Democrats who presided over this agreement since 
they had given the region back to its citizens (Woodward 1974).
Yet, race relations did not immediately go sour (Woodward 1974). 
Throughout the remainder o f the 1870s and 1880s, the status o f race stayed 
remarkably unchanged from the Reconstruction period. Although some segregation 
had begun during Reconstruction, southern political leaders did not immediately 
attem pt to expand legal segregation for fear that the federal government might 
intervene once again. Many northern observers and former slaves traveling 
through the South after Redemption remarked at the tranquility between white and 
black. Former slaves often commented that they encountered no mass 
discrim ination, nor were they forbidden from public facilities or transportation. 
During the 1880s, many former abolitionists remarked that the close contact and 
proximity between white and black in the South repulsed them (Woodward 1974).
Contrary to popular myth, states did not instantly strip blacks of voting rights, 
although this process did have its meager beginnings in the 1880s. It was not until 
the 1890s that disfranchisement o f blacks took place on a systematic basis. In 
some states, blacks continued to hold public office as they had during 
Reconstruction. Most black officeholders were members of the Republican Party, 
and they drew their strength from blacks and a few white voters. All southern states 
had black officeholders at some point from Reconstruction to 1900. Even 
M ississippi, which became the vanguard of segregation in the 20*^  century, had 
black Congressmen and one black U.S. Senator during this period.
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Clearly, racial discrimination did exist in the southern states. The 1880s and 
1890s saw the highest incidence of black lynchings than any other era (Cash 
1941). Some whites intimidated blacks from voting, although blacks did vote in 
large numbers until disfranchisement, it was not until Mississippi took the lead in 
the 1890s that legally mandated segregation, or de jure  segregation, began to 
operate in the South.
Woodward (1974) describes three different theories that existed to address
black political involvement in the South until the advent of Jim Crow laws. The first
philosophy was the white conservative view. The conservatives did not stand for
segregation perse, but white conservatives sought to preserve the political system
as it was. In the conservative viewpoint, whites should cultivate black voters to
support this cause. Underlying the white conservative viewpoint was a paternalistic
noblesse oblige attitude. White conservatives of the period believed history taught
that all civilizations consisted of a superior and subordinate class, and in this
instance blacks were the subordinated class. W hile white supremacy was a major
feature of white conservatism, most white conservatives felt that degradation of
blacks was unnecessary. Instead, whites should educate blacks and make them
into “better individuals.” Thomas Jones, a conservative Democratic governor of
Alabama in the 1890s best articulated the paternalistic philosophy o f these
whiggish Southerner,
The Negro race is under us. He is in our power. We are 
his custodians . . .  we should extend to him, as far as 
possible, all the civil rights that w ill fit him to be a
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decent and self-respecting, law-abiding and intelligent 
citizen . . .  If we do not lift them up, they will drag us down 
(Woodward 1974, 49).
White conservatives appealed to black voters for political support by arguing 
that other white leaders were not as concerned with the welfare o f black citizens. 
The white conservatives did not support segregation laws, nor did they advocate 
disfranchisement of blacks. Through the 1890s, white conservatives enjoyed 
support in most southern states.
The white liberals articulated the second viewpoint concerning race 
relations. These individuals advocated complete civil rights and equality for black 
citizens. Unlike the conservative paternalism, white liberals sought to demolish all 
barriers of inequality both formal and informal. This liberal movement supported 
equality not only in politics, but also in the private sector and in the Judicial system. 
W hite liberals vehemently opposed the establishment of segregation laws in any 
form, believing that all citizens should enjoy the same access to public facilities. 
In contrast to white conservatism, the liberal philosophy did not support white 
supremacy in any form, the myth of the slave plantation, or noblesse oblige 
(Woodward 1974). While some white liberals did win political office in urban areas, 
their influence in rural areas was nonexistent. Unlike the patriarchal beliefs of white 
conservatism, this liberal viewpoint never enjoyed statewide support in any 
southern state.
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The third doctrine of race relations during this period was that of the radicals, 
who called for a platform of white supremacy that stripped blacks of political power. 
The southern radicals also supported a system that placed blacks into a social 
category sim ilar to the infamous apartheid system of South Africa (Woodward 
1974). It was the viewpoint of these radicals that ultimately won out and 
predominated in southern race relations until the 1960s. Unlike the first two 
viewpoints, radicals felt no obligation to treat blacks with any respect, and the idea 
of equality between the races was anathema to adherents of radicalism. In the 
1880s, southern radicals did not gain widespread success. One reason for the lack 
o f success of the radicals was the fear among most southern whites that the 
Republicans would send federal troops to reoccupy the South if they persecuted 
blacks. As the appeal to the bloody shirt o f secession waned and southern radicals 
fe lt secure from northen intervention, segregation took hold, especially in the Deep 
South. In black-belt counties, segregation became total, complete, and inviolate 
(Key 1949).
The event that allowed the radical view to ultimately prevail was the Populist 
movement in the 1890s. The Populist movement was a widespread agrarian revolt 
that began in the Midwest during the 1870s due to a drop of commodity prices 
which led to an economic depression for farmers (Sundquist 1983). By the final 
decade of the 19*’ century, populism had arrived in the South. Due to the 
combination of a weak economy and bad farm harvests, many poor white farmers 
in the South began to support populism and the People’s Party that preached
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populist rhetoric. For the era, populism was color-blind. It appealed both to whites 
and blacks for political support. The populists advocated policies that challenged 
both the conservative and radical viewpoint concerning race.
Inherent in populist rhetoric was an attack on the elite o f southern society:
large landowners, industrialists, and financiers (Woodward 1973; 1981; Goodwyn
1976). Populist leaders attacked these individuals for living off the labor of the poor
and farmers. The populists appealed across races, and some populists preached
o f a conspiracy that existed among the upper echelons of southern society to
maintain the racial status quo. Tom Watson, who ran for President on the Populist
label in 1896, detailed this belief in the following speech
You are made to hate each other because upon hatred 
is rested the keystone of the arch of the financial despotism 
which enslaves you both. You are deceived and blinded that 
you may not see how this race antagonism perpetuates a 
monetary system which beggars you both (Woodward 1974, 63).'*
Populism gathered support at first before dying out around the turn o f the 
century (Sundquist 1983). Yet, this movement was enough to send Shockwaves 
through the ranks of both southern conservatives and radicals. The populists 
attacked not only the welfare o f upper class whites, but they also advocated true 
equality between white and black. In the view of both conservatives and radicals, 
this equality could not take place. Thus, the lasting impact o f the Populist
'*lt is worth noting that Watson went into a state of political isolation after making 
these comments. He would not be elected to any political office again until the 
1920s when he won election to the U.S. Senate from Georgia. By this point, 
W atson had reconverted to the Democratic Party, and he proclaimed white 
supremacy.
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movement in the South was the establishment o f segregation laws and the 
disfranchisement o f not only blacks, but also poor whites.
Segregation
The final outcome of the Populist revolt was formal segregation o f the black 
and white races through the 1960s. While white conservatives remained in political 
power after they quelled the populists, the conservatives adopted the racial beliefs 
of southern radicals. The westem states of the Deep South were the firs t states to 
enact segregation laws in the 1890s. Mississippi was the pioneer of de jure 
segregation. Even before the Populist movement, the Magnolia State began 
segregating public facilities such as schools, hotels, restaurants, hospitals, 
restrooms, and even water fountains (Woodward 1974). So engulfing was 
segregation in Mississippi that the state required Jim Crow Bibles in courtrooms. 
W hile Mississippi was the earliest state to initiate segregation laws, it was hardly 
the only southem state eventually to segregate society. W ith time, all o f the South 
would segregate, although the states of the Atlantic coast were the last states to 
succumb to the segregationist fever of the era. By the early 20“’ century, all 
southern and border states had enacted legislation mandating segregated public 
schools (Price 1957).®
®The border states included Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, 
and W est Virginia. All of these states required statewide segregation as o f May 
1954 (Price 1957).
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Woodward (1974) asserts that besides the Populist movement another 
reason existed for the initiation of segregation laws. By the 1890s, the United 
States was becoming an imperial power. On the eve of the 20“* century, the U.S. 
controlled several territories such as Cuba, Hawaii, the Philippines, and Puerto 
Rico, and all of these holdings contained majority nonwhite populations. Many 
leaders in the federal government began to acquiesce quietly to the idea of white 
supremacy and manifest destiny. In this sense, the preoccupation with colonies 
worked to the advantage o f the southern radicals who wished to segregate all o f 
southem society. In addition, the U.S. Supreme Court cleared the way for southern 
states to segregate public schools in the Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) decision in 
which the Court ruled that segregated schools were constitutional if they were 
“separate but equal...”
The first institution to fall under Jim Crow was the railroad industry. By 1900, 
all southem states required separate cars for rail travel, and separate waiting areas 
fo r black travelers. Streetcars were no exception either. By 1905, all southern 
states required that separate seating be set aside for blacks. Alabama began to 
mandate completely separate cars for blacks by 1906 (Woodward 1974).
Transportation was only the first sector to come under the jurisdiction o f Jim 
Crow laws. Segregation quickly regulated employers and industry as well. Most 
southem states mandated that white and black workers could not work in the same 
room, nor could they use the same doorway, pay window, or bathroom. The only 
exceptions to this separation of the races in a work environment were firefighters
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and repairmen, but only In cases of extreme emergency (Woodward 1974). Textile 
mills were practically the only form of industry in the South during the early 20**’ 
century, and these m ills hired blacks to perform only the most menial of jobs at 
grossly low wages.
Hospitals also fell under the segregation leviathan. The entire South had 
segregated hospitals, nursing homes, and orphanages by 1910. Alabama even had 
a law that prohibited white nurses from caring for black patients and vice versa. 
Ten southern states segregated prisons as well. Even the infamous chain gangs 
of the era practiced segregation. Jim Crow laws also mandated separation of the 
races at sporting events, circuses, and fairs. By the 1940s, most southern states 
prohibited college teams from playing opposing teams with black players. Georgia 
even went so far to segregate certain state parks.
It was in urban residential areas that segregation was the most rigid. Certain 
sections of cities were either white or black, and no intermingling took place in 
these areas. If they agreed to help them at all, realtors would simply not show 
blacks housing in white neighborhoods. A consequence of this caste system 
among housing was the proliferation o f ghettos in southern cities, harking back to 
the northern experience in the mid-19*** century. As mentioned previously, ghettoes 
were almost unheard of in the South before 1900, but the new segregation fever led 
to the increase of ghettoes. Some towns even had an exclusively black populace 
due to the separation o f the races.
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By 1920, Jim Crow had segregated the South In almost every conceivable 
way from transportation to housing to courtroom bibles even to telephone booths. 
Yet, this bipolar society had not existed before the 1890s. It took the Populist 
movement for the southem radicals to win control o f the political system. One of 
the tragedies of Jim Crow was that blacks did not enjoy a stable position in society. 
W ith each passing year, new segregation laws were placed on the books that 
pushed blacks even further down the societal ladder. This Jim Crow era would last 
until the 1960s before outside forces led to its abolishment. The irony of the entire 
segregationist era was that by the 1960s most southern whites defended the 
system as one of Divine creation begun in the aftermath of the W ar Between the 
States, but legally mandated segregation had in actuality existed for only fifty to 
sixty years.
Civil Rights
One can ultimately trace the beginning of the civil rights movement to the 
end of World War II. W hat began initially in the late 1940s would gather 
momentum in the 1950s and 1960s. The eventual outcome of this movement was 
not only the elimination of de jure  segregation, but also black citizens slowly 
regained the political rights that southern states had stripped from them in the 
1890s.
Upon returning home, many black soldiers returned expecting better 
domestic treatment after helping to defeat the Axis powers, but the southem states
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were still committed to segregation despite the events that had unfolded on the 
world stage. Several highly publicized events demonstrate the resistance of the 
southem white power structure to a lessening of Jim Crow. In one case, a returning 
black veteran was assaulted and blinded by a South Carolina police chief after an 
argument with a white bus driver (Berman 1970). W hile such events were barely 
covered before the 1940s, the federal govemment was again interested in the issue 
o f equal treatment of blacks during the postwar period. The first victory for civil 
rights was the integration of the armed forces by Harry Truman. The recalcitrance 
o f some in Congress forced Truman to issue an executive order to achieve 
integration. The particular resistance of southern members o f Congress revealed 
that the civil rights movement was destined to be a lengthy, torturous battle.
The landmark case in the struggle for civil rights was Brown v. Board o f 
Education o f Topeka, Kansas, heard by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1954. In an 
unanimous decision written by Chief Justice Earl Warren, the Court ruled that 
segregation in public schools was unconstitutional. The Court reversed itse lf and 
overturned the Plessy v. Ferguson decision of 1896. Chief Justice Warren wrote 
the opinion that stated “segregated schools are inherently unequal...” (347 U.S. 
483). As one might imagine, an instantaneous uproar arose in the southem states 
most affected by this ruling.
This ruling by the Supreme Court had different implications to the South. On 
the surface, the decision struck at the heart of the caste system that was present 
in the region. A t another level, however, the decision sparked an awakening for
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black citizens. In this ruling, black leaders saw that one o f the branches o f the 
federal govemment was supportive o f increased black rights. Likewise, white 
leaders could see that the Supreme Court was steadfastly against the Jim Crow 
system that regulated social and political life in the South (Black and Black 1987). 
A disruption of this system had differing outcomes depending upon one's position. 
For white citizens, the demise of Jim Crow meant the end of white dominance of the 
region, especially in the black belt, while black citizens could see the end of Jim 
Crow as a rebirth for black interests and rights.
To combat the Brown decision, Harry Byrd, the senior U.S. Senator from 
Virginia, devised a plan that initially had great success before the South was forced 
to integrate. Senator Byrd developed the doctrine of massive resistance that stated 
that all southern states should stand together and massively resist federal 
integration policies (Bartley 1969; W ilhoit 1973; Black 1976). In the minds of 
southern politicians, the federal government had lost interest in southern afb irs 
after Reconstruction. Therefore if the South stood together, then the federal 
government would again lose interest.
Originally, massive resistance worked remarkably well, because two events 
allowed the doctrine and policy to enjoy initial success. First, the Supreme Court 
had only stated that segregation was unconstitutional, but it had not set up a 
framework for desegregation. In fact, the Court was rather slow in enforcing 
desegregation. Second, President Eisenhower did not favor using federal power 
to force the race issue (Lamis 1988). Eisenhower took the viewpoint that the states
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should handle race relations. Additionally, Eisenhower felt that the equal treatment 
o f the races was a moral issue, not a political one. Therefore, it was necessary to 
appeal to people’s nrxjrality, which was not the role of government in Eisenhower’s 
view (Sundquist 1983; Bass and DeVries 1995).
Massive resistance reached its zenith in Norfolk, Virginia during the 1958- 
1959 school year. So that none of the public schools would be desegregated, 
school officials in Norfolk closed all public schools for one year. As the academic 
year passed, it became obvious the ultimate implication of ending public education 
in the city. Without public schools, Norfolk and potentially the rest of the South 
faced the possibility of having a generation of illiterates. After one year, Norfolk re­
opened the public schools. Various surveys showed that a majority of white 
citizens came to the realization that desegregated schools were better than no 
schools at all (Campbell 1961).
Gradually, the civil rights movement did receive help from the federal 
government. In 1957, Eisenhower sent federal troops to enforce a court order 
requiring that the Little Rock high school integrate. Also, Congress passed the Civil 
Rights Act of 1957, making it the first civil rights bill to pass since 1875 (Carmines 
and Stimson 1989). W hile the bill was weak, for the first time it gave the U.S. 
Attorney General the ability to investigate civil rights violations in the South.
It was the election o f John Kennedy in 1960 that gave an enormous boost 
to civil rights. Despite having some reservations about pushing civil rights too hard, 
Kennedy’s attomey general, Robert Kennedy, had no such qualms. Coinciding with
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the election of Kennedy, a large number of northern Democrats had been elected 
to Congress in 1958 and 1960. All of these newly elected Democrats were racial 
liberals as opposed to their southern counterparts (Carmines and Stimson 1989). 
Historically, southern members of Congress served extremely long tenures due to 
the one-party system in the South. With reelection, members gained seniority 
which gave them committee chairmanships. Through 1960, southern members of 
Congress disproportionately controlled key committee chairs. This enabled the 
South to kill most civil rights proposals without a floor vote. The new influx of 
racially liberal Democrats began to place pressure on southern members who were 
no longer able to control civil rights measures as they once had.
Congress passed another civil rights law, the Civil Rights Act of 1960, which 
gave the attorney general more freedom to investigate discriminatory practices in 
the South. It also created the Equal Opportunity Commission which Investigated 
civil rights violations. Congress passed the most comprehensive civil rights bill in 
1964. The Civil Rights Act of 1964 ended segregation of public facilities. Despite 
the Brown decision, this case did not apply to anything but public schools.
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 (CRA) applied to all aspects of society (Rodgers 
and Bullock 1972). No longer could restaurants or hotels refuse service to blacks. 
Gone also were the Jim Crow Bibles and separate restrooms. Congress enforced 
this act by utilizing their constitutional duty of regulating interstate commerce. If a 
public facility was engaged in interstate commerce, then the CRA covered it. Since
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interstate commerce covered practically everything related to public facilities, 
owners were forced either to integrate or go out of business.
Reaction among a majority of southern whites to the CRA was full of vitriol 
(Black and Black 1987; 1992; Lamis 1988). None of the civil rights acts until 1964 
had been popular among most southern whites, but the CRA was enough to push 
many whites to vote for a Republican presidential candidate. In the general 
election of 1964, the Republican presidential candidate, Barry Goldwater, carried 
all of the Deep South states. Furthermore, Republican congressional candidates 
fared quite well. In some states. Republicans were elected to represent their 
respective states in Congress for the first time since Reconstruction.
Although the CRA was a landmark civil rights law, it did not cover 
discrimination in politics. It would take a separate act of Congress to address this 
problem (Bass and DeVries 1995). In the next chapter, we turn our attention to the 
disfranchisement of black voters and their eventual return to the electorate.
CONCLUSION
This chapter provides a brief overview of the importance that race has 
played in the politics of the South. By examining race relations from Reconstruction 
through today, one can get a flavor for how much the race issue has changed over 
time. Contrary to many misconceptions, it was not an inevitable outcome that the 
blacks in the South would undergo racial discrimination and political alienation after 
Reconstruction. As detailed previously, race relations remained remarkably good
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immediately after Reconstruction (Woodward 1974). However, it was the triumph 
o f southern white radicals that led to the rigid caste system for which segregation 
was known by the mid-20^ century.
These radicals won control of the Democratic Party from conservatives and 
liberals who had sought a different accommodation with blacks. The force that led 
to the triumph of white radicals was the Populist movement. As the populists 
became more popular and more competitive w ith the Democrats, some populists 
appealed to black voters for support. At this point, many white voters became 
frightened at the prospect o f black voters choosing candidates over the choice of 
white voters. The radicals within the Democratic Party moved to disfranchise 
blacks and segregate society to prevent any possibility that blacks could enjoy 
political empowerment.
The impact o f the radical view led to the system o f discrimination that the 
South continued to practice through the 1960s. When Key (1949) discusses the 
power of the black t>elt, it was almost sixty years after the triumph of the radicals in 
the Democratic Party. As time passed, many white citizens assumed that 
segregation and disfranchisement had always been entrenched in southern politics 
and society. When challenges came to this system in the 1950s and 1960s, some 
white Southerners reacted violently, while others fought change in every way 
possible. The tragedy and irony of this hostility to change was that the system of 
segregation had formally and legally existed only since the 1890s. By the 1960s, 
external forces, led in part by two Democratic presidents and non-southern
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members o f Congress, were challenging southern white society. These events 
were enough to force many white Southerners into an unthinkable position: voting 
Republican. As already discussed, much of the greatest change at the presidential 
level since 1964 has occurred among black belt whites. Given this profound shift 
in party loyalties, it is helpful to understand the rise and fall of de ju re  segregation 
and how it relates to this change in white southern voting behavior.
The southern states did not stop with the implementation of legal 
segregation, the radical elements o f the Democratic Party in the South moved to 
disfranchise black voters in the 1890s. All states of the South gradually prevented 
blacks from voting or registering to vote. Through intimidation and legal 
requirements, many blacks gradually found it impossible to meet registration 
requirements. W hether it was grandfather laws, literacy tests, or poll taxes, all of 
these legal prohibitions on black registration were extremely effective. It would take 
the implementation o f federal civil rights acts in the 1960s to restore the political 
rights of black citizens. However, all o f the South, especially the Deep South, was 
resistant to any changes in the political status quo for blacks. As the next chapter 
illustrates, it took the passage o f the Voting Rights Act o f 1965 (VRA) to bring 
blacks back into the political system for the first time since the latter 19“’ century.
An era of race-based subjugation and the reinforcement of the latent racial 
disharmony cannot be set aside with ease. The end of de Jure segregation did not 
cast off the race issue. For a white southem population ingrained with the inherent 
rightness of segregation and economic subjugation, black political empowerment
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was anathema. Simply because federal law struck down the technical maneuvers 
to limit black political influence, it did not follow that racial issues would disappear 
from the political debate. Instead, white fears, whether real or imagined, would 
manifest from time to time in the new biracial politics.
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CHAPTER 3 
OVERVIEW OF RACE AND POLITICS IN THE DEEP SOUTH STATES
While Chapter 2 examines the evolution o f race relations in the South, this 
chapter studies the role o f race upon the politics o f the Deep South states. 
Traditionally, a minority group shaped no other region’s society and politics to the 
extent that blacks did in the South. Ironically, the very segment o f the population 
that had such an impact on the South for most of American history did not enjoy the 
full benefits o f citizenship. Through intimidation, and at times violence, white 
political leaders systematically denied blacks the right to vote and other means of 
political participation.
It is important to understand the role that race played on the voting behavior 
of Deep South whites as well as the role of disfranchisement. As blacks began to 
re-enter the political system in the 1960s, many white Southerners abandoned the 
Democratic Party which most blacks identified with after the 1930s (Kousser 1974). 
As discussed in Chapter 1, race led this white flight to the GOP in large part. In this 
chapter, we see how race had such a large impact upon the politics o f the Deep 
South Finally, we examine the three states that serve as units o f analysis to see 
how the issue of race played differently across these states.
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IMPACT OF RACE UPON VOTING IN THE DEEP SOUTH
While Jim Crow laws dealt primarily with segregation, Bourbon Democrats 
enacted other laws that limited the involvement of blacks in politics. First, all 
southern states took steps to establish voting requirements. Second, state 
governments created stringent registration requirements that effectively kept blacks 
out o f southern politics until the 1960s. The discussion of how the South 
disfranchised black voters follows. Then, we examine how federal legislation 
brought blacks back into the political system through federal intervention.
Disfranchisement
While southem states were enacting Jim Crow laws around the turn of the 
20“  ^century, the methodical disfranchisement of black voters was taking place in 
the South. Again, Mississippi was at the forefront o f the disfranchisement 
movement (Woodward 1974). All southern states used a combination of property 
and literacy qualifications and poll taxes (Kousser 1974). These were three hurdles 
created as barriers to black voting power. Often, these requirements were “bent” 
for whites, though Virginia was a state noted for its use o f the poll tax to prevent 
poor whites from voting in significant numbers (Key 1949). Kousser (1974) argues 
that the overwhelming pressure to disfranchise blacks came from whites in the 
black belt, while moves to exclude poor whites from political life came from counties 
that were majority white.
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An examination of the disfranchisement movement in Louisiana illustrates
this phenomenon. In 1896, Governor Foster J. Murphy pushed through a state
constitutional amendment to allow literate voters and voters who owned property
to retain the right to vote, but the amendment also gave the state legislature the
power to change voting qualifications by a 2/3 vote (Kousser 1974). With the
amendment passed, the state legislature passed a law that restricted the franchise,
and the state legislature called a constitutional convention to restrict voting rights
even further. Foster argued that
The aggregation o f the mass of ignorance, vice and 
venality, without any proprietary interest in the State, 
real or personal, is a standing menace to good 
government, when thrown as a body into the scales 
of popular elections. The elimination of this force of brute 
members is, and must be the paramount question on the 
solution of which the success o f a truly representative 
government must turn (Kousser 1974,160).
Such an attitude reveals the fear behind Democratic calls for 
disfranchisement of most potential voters in society. Some poor whites and black 
voters had joined together to oppose the Louisiana Democrats in 1896, and the 
Democrats narrowly retained control of state govemment. By 1900, the Democratic 
governor and legislature had disfranchised a majority o f voters in the state. Table 
3.1 illustrates the decline in black and white registration after the passage of 
disfranchisement laws in Louisiana.
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Table 3.1
Effect of Disfranchisement Laws on Louisiana Voter Registration,
1896-1904
Year Percentage of White 
Males Registered
Percentage of Black 
Males Registered
1896 96.3 93.0
1897 103.2 95.6
New Registration Laws
1898 46.6 9.5
New State Constitution
1902 58.9 2.9
1904 52.5 1.1
Source: J. Morgan Kousser. 1974. The Shaping o f Southem Politics: Suffrage 
Restrictions and the Establishment o f the One-Party South, 1880-1910. New Haven: 
Yale University Press.
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As the table demonstrates, these laws limited not only black registration and 
participation, but also the political activity of some white voters as well. W hile other 
southem states achieved similar results during this time, it is difficult to get precise 
numbers in many states since registrars did not keep permanent records.^
In order to vote, one must be registered to vote. However, registration does 
not guarantee that a person actually votes. For the rare blacks that remained on 
the registration lists, few actually voted (Key 1949). Through the use of 
intimidation, and at times violence, blacks were effectively prevented from voting 
in many rural bailiwicks well into the 1960s (Kousser 1974). Cities were the only 
areas in which any sizeable amount of blacks voted, and this number was 
minuscule through the 1940s (Bartley and Graham 1975).
Another device used as a deterrent to black voting was the white primary. 
As the name suggests, this primary was for white voters only. By 1915, most 
southem states had instituted the use of the white primary.^ When the Democratic 
Party enjoyed one-party dominance, elections were effectively settled in the
’The exact number o f black registrants Is d ifficu lt to discern. All southern states 
kept inaccurate records during this time. In addition, there were no federal laws 
requiring states to keep registration data for a specified amount of time. 
Consequently, registrars would often destroy records after an election. Mississippi 
holds the record for being the worst record-keepers in the South. In 1965, when 
federal registrars began combing the records o f southern states looking for black 
registration data, they found in Mississippi that the records had been destroyed “by 
fire” in 72 of Mississippi’s 82 counties (Political Participation 1968).
^Key (1949) elucidates that all southern states with the exception of Florida, 
North Carolina, and Tennessee required by state law the use of a white primary. 
Virginia’s white primary law was struck down by a lower federal court, but the state 
had not appealed this decision.
80
Democratic primary. The occasional exceptions to this rule were North Carolina, 
Tennessee and Virginia, but even those states hardly featured a vibrant two-party 
system.
Despite being targeted at blacks, Price (1957) and Kousser (1974) argue 
that the white primary had a negligible effect on black turnout during the early 20“’ 
century since most blacks considered themselves Republicans until the New Deal. 
While states barred blacks from the Democratic primary, usually those few blacks 
who had the franchise had no Republican candidate for whom to vote for in the 
general election. States justified the use of this type o f primary by arguing that the 
Democratic party was a private entity that could establish its own criteria for 
exclusion (Key 1949; Black and Black 1987).
The success of the disfranchisers was overwhelming during this period. As 
the previous discussion revealed, the disfranchising movement was extraordinarily 
successful in all of the South. While stripping blacks o f the franchise was foremost 
in the minds of some, the Democratic Party also championed disfranchisement to 
preserve their power in the South (Kousser 1974). Along with this push to strip 
blacks of the right to vote, many poor whites also found it difficult, if not impossible, 
to vote as well. This fact led to an oligarchy of middle and upper class whites 
controlling the region’s politics (Key 1949; Kousser 1974). The extraordinarily low 
turnout rate for which the South was known continued until the midpoint of the 20"’ 
century.
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Refranchisement
The first breakthrough in the refranchisement of black voters came via a 
Supreme Court case. In Smith v. Allwnght (1944), the U.S. Supreme Court ruled 
that the white primary was unconstitutional. This case originated in Texas which 
had used the white primary since the early 20“  ^century (Key 1949). The Smith case 
had two important outcomes on southem politics. First, the case served as a major 
impetus to black registration. Since the Supreme Court abolished the white 
primary, blacks could now vote in elections provided they met qualifications to 
register. Although blacks had originally identified with the Republican Party, the 
New Deal led many blacks to the Democratic fold, which promised increased black 
activity, if blacks could register. To understand the enormity the Smith case, 
comparing black registration figures between 1940 and 1960 is helpful.
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Table 3.2
Estimated Number and Percentages of Blacks Registered 
to Vote in the South, 1940-1960
Year Estimated number Percentage
1940 250,000 5
1947 595,000 12
1952 1,008,614 20
1956 1,238,038 25
1958 1,266,488 25
1960 1,414,052 28
1964 1,907,279 38
1966 2,306,434 46
Source: Donald R. Matthews and James W. Prothro. 1966. Negroes and the New 
Southem Politics. New York: Harcourt, Brace, and World.
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The total number of black registrants in 1940 stood at 151,000 in all eleven 
southern states. By 1952, that number had skyrocketed to 1,009,000 black 
registered voters (Matthews and Prothro 1966). Despite this jump in registration, 
roughly four-fifths of the southern black population remained unregistered (Bartley 
and Graham 1975).
Black and Black (1987) argue several reasons explain why the abolition of 
the white primary had such a comparatively small effect on black registration, the 
most prominent being the stringent qualification laws present in the southern states. 
From 1900 through the 1960s, the entire South used a combination of literacy tests, 
“good character” tests, and poll taxes to thwart black political empowerment 
(Kousser 1974). At the midpoint o f the 20“  ^century, Alabama, Mississippi, South 
Carolina, and Virginia all required literacy tests and poll taxes to vote (Key 1949). 
Georgia, Louisiana, and North Carolina mandated the use o f literacy tests alone, 
and three states, Arkansas, Tennessee and Texas used poll taxes alone (Black and 
Black 1987).^ Only Florida use neither a poll tax nor a literacy test (Black and Black
1987). Key (1949) attacked the literacy test as “a fraud and nothing more” (579),
^Until the 1940s, Georgia used a cumulative poll tax in addition to the literacy 
test. If a potential voter failed to pay the poll tax in a particular year(s), then the 
voter was required to pay the back taxes and interest in order to vote (Kousser 
1974). In Louisiana, the grandfather clause was first used beginning in the late 
1890s, and soon a majority of southern states followed Louisiana’s lead. Key 
(1949) argues that the grandtather clause was used more to disfranchise poor 
whites than black voters who were already excluded through other means such as 
poll taxes, literacy tests, or intimidation and violence. The grandfather clause was 
declared unconstitutional in all states in litigation originating in Oklahoma (Key 
1949; Kousser 1974).
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because county registrars applied these tests unevenly across the South. Often, 
registrars did not give white voters these tests, while potential black voters always 
fell victim to them.
The second major impact o f the Smith case, however, had more long-term 
consequences for southern politics. The Rim South states (Arkansas, Florida, 
North Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, and Texas) were less resistant to abolishing 
the white primary than their Deep South cohorts (Key 1949). Alabama, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina all were hostile to the abolition of the 
white primary, and a second round of court decisions ultimately ended the white 
primary in the Deep South (Black and Black 1987). Key (1949) discerned this 
division within the supposedly “Solid South.” Here, one begins to see that the 
impact of race was slowly beginning to change in the Rim South by the 1940s. The 
Rim South was much less concerned with race when compared with the Deep 
South, a trend that has continued to this day. This crack in the racial resolve of the 
South had profound implications for the future of southern politics.
A 1946 congressional special election in Atlanta illustrates the impact of the 
white primary on white control of politics. In early 1946, Georgia held a special 
election in Georgia’s Fifth Congressional District to replace Robert Ramspeck who 
had resigned his seat. Instead of calling for the traditional “whites only” primary, 
the Democratic Party simply called for a general election. This allowed black voters 
in Atlanta to vote in this special election. According to Rick Allen (1996), black
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registration was around 3,000 at the outset o f 1946. By February 1946 when the 
state held the special election, black registration had risen to 7,000.
On the basis o f high black support, Helen Douglas Mankin won election to 
fill the remainder of Ramspeck’s congressional term. The fact that Mankin had won 
with the help of black support sent many white political leaders and voters into a 
frenzy. By the summer o f 1946 when the Democrats held their primary, voters 
defeated Mankin In her bid to win the nomination to serve for two more years, 
mainly on the basis o f white backlash.
While the abolition o f the white primary was the beginning of a gradual 
refranchisement of black voters in the South, black voter participation was still 
negligible in many rural counties in the early 1960s (Matthews and Prothro 1966; 
Voter Participation 1968; Black and Black 1987). It would take the Voting Rights 
Act o f 1965 (VRA) to open the floodgates o f black voter registration (Bartley and 
Graham 1975; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). Through a variety of voting 
tests, southern states kept a majority o f the black voting age population 
unregistered. The VRA was the first legislation invoked by Congress that allowed 
the federal government to take an active role in the registration of blacks.
Under provisions of the VRA, federal registrars were sent to southem states 
to ensure the registration o f eligible voting age black citizens. One portion o f the 
VRA was section V, which became known as the “trigger" mechanism. Among 
other requirements, if less than 50 percent of the voting age population was 
registered to vote and turnout was less than 50 percent in the last election, then
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those localities would be subject to the VRA. At this point, federal registrars could 
intercede and oversee voter registration. Under provisions o f section V, the VRA 
covered the entire states of Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South 
Carolina, and parts o f North Carolina and Virginia. Besides the supervision of voter 
registration, affected areas were also subject to preclearance, meaning that any 
proposed changes to election laws had to be precleared with the United States 
Justice Department before states could implement the changes.
We again can see a pattern to the political subjugation o f black citizens. In 
the Rim South, black registration rates were generally higher, although variation 
existed across the region. Tennessee boasted the highest stated black registration 
rate of 59 percent, while Virginia had lower registration rates primarily because of 
the use of the poll tax. The Deep South featured even lower registration rates, 
especially in rural counties. Table 3.3 demonstrates the differences in black 
registration rates before the passage of the VRA, while Table 3.4 illustrates the 
immediate effect of the VRA by presenting the post-Act registration figures.
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Table 3.3
Patterns of Voter Registration by State Prior to 1965
1960 Voting Age 
Population 
W hite Nonwhite
Number
White
Registered
Nonwhite
Percentage 
White Nonwhite
Rim South
Arkansas 848,393 192,629 555,944 77,714 65.5 40.4
Florida 2,617,438 470,261 1,958,499 240,616 74.8 51.2
N. Carolina 2,005,955 550,929 1,942,000 258,000 96.8 46.8
Virginia 1,876,167 436,718 1,070,168 144,259 61.1 38.3
Deep South
Alabama 1,353,122 481,220 935,695 92,737 69.2 19.3
Georgia 1,796,963 612,875 1,124,415 167,663 62.6 27.4
Louisiana 1,289,216 514,589 1.037,184 164,061 80.5 31.6
Mississippi 751,266 422,273 525,000 28,500 69.9 6.7
S. Carolina 895,147 371,104 677,194 138,544 75.7 37.3
Source: United States Commission on Civil Rights. 1968. Political Participation. 
Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office.
Note: Registration figures in 92 of 100 North Carolina counties were missing, while 
county-level figures were destroyed “in a fire” in 52 of Mississippi’s 82 counties.
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Table 3.4
Patterns of Voter Registration by State Immediately after the VRA
1960 Voting Age 
Population
Number Registered Percentage
White Nonwhite White Nonwhite W hite Nonwhite
Rim South
Florida 2,617,438 470,261 2,131,105 299,033 81.4 63.6
N. Carolina 2,005,955 550,929 1,602,980 277,404 83.0 51.3
Deep South
Alabama 1,353,122 481,220 1,212,317 248,432 89.6 51.6
Georgia 1,796,963 612,875 1,443,730 322,496 80.3 52.6
Louisiana 1,289,216 514,589 1,200,517 303,148 93.1 58.9
Mississippi 751,266 422,273 589,066 181,233 91.5 59.8
S. Carolina 895,147 371,104 731,096 190,017 81.7 51.2
Source: United States Commission on Civil Rights. 1968. Political Participation. 
Washington, D C.: Government Printing Office.
Notes: A ll of the post-Act registration figures represent data gathered by federal 
election examiners under authority delegated by the Voting Rights Act o f 1965. 
Examiners gathered data in 1967, but data was not available in 1967 for either 
Arkansas or Virginia.
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The VRA was successful in its goal of registering large numbers o f black 
voters as well as increasing white voter registration. However, this growth in black 
registration did not automatically equate to a corresponding influx of voter 
participation rates in these states. W hile the date varied from state to state, it was 
not until the early 1970s that newly registered black voters began to vote in large 
numbers in southern elections. Once blacks entered the electorate in large 
numbers, they began to have an impact upon political candidates in the Democratic 
party (Black and Black 1987).
Changing Democratic Representation
Although the Democratic party had been the protector of racial discrimination 
since the 1890s, the party began to shift with the reality of large numbers of black 
voters in the southern electorate. Democratic candidates after 1970 began to make 
appeals to black voters for political support. Lamis (1988) describes the biracial 
coalition that Democratic candidates formed to win office in the new post-VRA 
atmosphere. No longer could the Democrats afford to alienate and persecute black 
citizens. Now, Democratic candidates began making overtures to black citizens.
Simultaneous to the Democratic party reaching out to blacks since the 
1970s, the Republican party began to emerge as a political force in the South (Bass 
and DeVries 1995). As discussed in the first chapter, the Goldwater candidacy was 
crucial to the GOP in the South. Goldwater’s opposition to the civil rights acts of 
the 1960s had a twofold consequence. First, it led to greater southern white
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support for the party (Cosman 1966; Miller and Shanks 1996). Second, it drove the 
few remaining black supporters out of the party (Carmines and Stimson 1989). 
W hile Democrats were courting black voters after 1965, Republicans were not 
(Bass and DeVries 1995). The lone exception to this was W inthrop Rockefeller 
who won the governorship of Arkansas In 1966 and 1968 on a biracial coalition of 
mountain white voters and Delta black voters (LamIs 1988). Once Arkansas 
Democrats saw the success of appealing to black voters, they too began to court 
black voters." In the entire South, the biracial coalition of the 1970s and 1980s was 
a recipe of success for the Democrats, with the Republican Party In the South left 
to court those white voters who were often dissatisfied with the political gains made 
by blacks In the 1960s (Black and Black 1987; Lamis 1988).
From this discussion of the Impact o f race on voting, several themes become 
clear. First, the abolition of the white primary In 1944 revealed fractures In the 
“Solid South” (Key 1949; Black and Black 1987). While the South historically stood 
together on the race Issue, one began to see cracks In the resolve of some 
southern states on what Key (1949) termed “the question of the Negro” (5). 
Second, the passage o f the Voting Rights Act In 1965 fundamentally changed 
southern politics. No longer were blacks systematically denied the right to vote as 
they had been previously. The VRA not only expanded the voting rolls In the South, 
but It also led to a profound change for each party In the region.
"This biracial coalition propelled the careers of three successful Arkansas 
governors In the 1970s: Dale Bumpers, David Pryor, and Bill Clinton.
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The Democrats were successful In adapting to this new era by winning 
offices on the basis of a coalition o f white and black voters (Black and Black 1987; 
Lamis 1988). Also, the Democratic Party at the national level began to abandon the 
southern white vote (Carmines and Stimson 1989; Black and Black 1992). Yet, the 
Republicans were not immediately successful in the South below the presidential 
level until the 1990s, because most white southemers in the postwar era have been 
more anti-Democrat than pro-Republican (Sundquist 1983).
EXAMINATION OF THE DEEP SOUTH STATES SINCE THE VRA
We now turn our attention to the political environment of the Deep South 
states included in this dissertation after the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 
1965, which entirely covered these states under section 5. According to Black and 
Black (1987; 1992), the 1960s were a crucial time for southern politics. It is during 
this decade that the Republican Party begins to carry the Deep South states at the 
presidential level, a trend that has continued through the 1990s. Yet, Republican 
success below the presidential level was not instantaneous. In feet, the Republican 
party had a difficult time below the presidential level throughout the 1960s and 
1970s in most of the Rim South and all of the Deep South (Bartley and Graham 
1975; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995).
By the 1990s, however, a majority of southern whites had converted to the 
Republican Party (Miller and Shanks 1996). Tables 3.5 and 3.6 demonstrate the 
gradual success of the Republican Party at the gubernatorial level in both the Rim
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and Deep South, while Table 3.7 illustrates the changing partisan Identification of 
white Southerners during the same period. By briefly examining the politics of 
these states from the mid 1960s, we can get a sense o f what the political 
environment was like In each state before the 1990s and how such a Republican 
conversion took place over the past th irty years.
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Table 3.5
Partisan Gains at the Gubernatorial Level In the Rim South, 1965-1998
Victor's Party and Percentage of the Vote
Year Arkansas Florida North Carolina Tennessee Texas Virginia
1965 — ------------ — -------— — D 47.9
1966 R 54.4 R 55.1 — D 81.2 D 72.8 ------------
1968 R 52.4 ------------ D 52.7 ■ ' D 57.0 ■ ■ ■ ■■ “
1969 ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ ------------ R 52.5
1970 D 61.7 D 56.9 ------------ R 52.0 D 53.6 — —
1972 D 75.4 R 51.0 ' ■ D 47.9 ------------
1973 — — — — — — R 50.7
1974 D 65.6 D 61.2 — D 55.4 D 61.4 —
1976 D 83.2 — D 65.0 — — —
1977 — — — — — R 55.9
1978 D 63.4 D 55.6 — R 55.6 R 50.0 —
1980 R 51.9 ' D 61.9 — — —
1981 — — — — — D 53.5
1982 D 54.7 D 64.7 — R 59.6 D 53.2 ------------
1984 D 62.6 — R 54.3 — — ------------
1985 — — — — — — D 55.2
1986 D 63.9 R 54.6 — D 54.2 R 52.7 —
1988 — — — R 56.1 — — —
1989 — — ■ ......... — — — D 50.1
1990 D 57.5 D 56.5 D 60.8 D 49.5 —
1992 — — — D 52.7 ------------ ------------ —
1993 ------------ ------------ ------------ — ------------ R 58.3
1994 D 59.8 D 50.8 ------------ R 54.3 R 53.5
1996 — — D 56.0 — —
1997 1 — — — — R 55.8
1998 R 60.0 R 55.0 — R 69.0 R 69.0 — -
Source: Alice V, McGiliivray, Rhodes Cook, and Richard M. Scammon. 1999. America Votes 23: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election 
Statistics. Washington, D C.: Congressional Quarterly.
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Table 3.6
Partisan Gains at the Gubernatorial Level In the Deep South, 1966-1998
Victor’s Party and Percentage of the Vote
Year Alabama Georgia Louisiana Mississippi South Carolina
1966 D 63.4 D 46.2" D 58.2
1967 — — - — - - - D 61.9
1968 - - - - - D 100.0
1970 D 74.5 D 59.3 ————— D 51.7
1971 — ------- ------------ D 77.0
1972 - — - D 57.2 — — —
1974 D 83.2 D 69.1 — — R 50.9
1975 - - - - - —— —- D 100.0 D 52.2
1978 D 72.6 D 80.6 D 61.4
1979 - - - - - R 50.3 0  61.1
1982 D 57.6 D 62.8 0  69.8
1983 - - - - - —— — - D 100.0" D 55.1 ------------
1986 R 56.3 0  70.5 - - - - - R 51.0
1987 - - - - - ------------ R 100.0 D 53.4
1990 R 52.1 D 52.9 — - - - - - - - - R 69.5
1991 ------------- ------------ D 61.2 R 50.6
1994 R 50.3 D 51.1 R 50.4
1995 - - - - - —— —— R 63.5 R 55.6 --------- --
1998 D 57.7 0  52.5 ------------ D 53.1
"Although the Republican candidate won a plurality, the Democratic candidate won because the election was decided by the Democratic- 
dominated legislature.
“’In 1983 and 1987, there was no primary runoff.
Source: Alice V. McGiliivray, Rhodes Cook, and Richard M. Scammon. 1999. America Votes 23: A Handbook of Contemporary American Election 
Statistics. Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly.
Table 3.7
Party Identification of Non-Black Voters in the South, 1952-1988
Years of
Democratic Independent Republican
Education Generation 52-60 64-68 72-80 84-88 52-60 64-68 72-80 84-88 52-60 64-68 72-80 84-88
0-11 Pre-New Deal 62 76 50 * 9 8 16 * 29 16 35 ★
New Deal 70 64 64 54 17 22 20 26 13 14 17 20
Post-New
Deal
* (54) (48) * (36) (44) * (10) (8)
12 Pre-New Deal (52) * (39) it (21) * 18 * (27) * 44 *
New Deal 75 50 47 46 12 27 32 35 13 24 21 19
Post-New 
Deal
* 39 42 27 28
” ■
* 30 29
13+ Pre-New Deal 65 (52) (32) * 25 (20) (20) it 11 (28) (43) *
New Deal 61 54 35 36 17 30 33 36 23 16 33 29
Post-New — - ★ 34 31 * 37 34 — - * 29 36
0 50>N>20.
* N<20.
Source: Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks. 1996. The New American Voter. Cambridge; Harvard University Press, 
p. 174.
As one can see from the Tables 3.5 and 3.6, the Republican Party has had 
Increasing success In gubernatorial elections In the South since the mid-1960s. 
The lone exception to this Is Georgia, where no Republican has won control of the 
governorship.® As Sundquist (1983) argues, a realignment of southern whites to 
the Republican Party Initially took place at the presidential level, while a 
realignment at lower levels did not come Immediately. Table 3.7 Illustrates the 
growing Republican partisan Identification among white southemers. W hite voters, 
socialized politically after the New Deal generation, fueled this Republican 
conversion (M iller and Shanks 1996). A ll three of these tables underscore the 
massive changes In party Identification among southern whites since the mld-20“’ 
century. Therefore, we first examine the Republican growth In these states at the 
presidential and congressional level. Then, we explore gubernatorial politics of 
these three Deep South states.
GEORGIA
V.O. Key (1949) characterized Georgia politics as the “Rule o f the Rustics." 
In Georgia, the rural regions of the state have traditionally dominated the state’s 
politics (Key 1949; Bartley 1970; Bartley and Graham 1975; Lamis 1988; Bass and 
DeVries 1995; Bullock 1998). W hile rural sections In other southern states 
dominated politics as well, Georgia had an unique system o f ensuring rural
®ln 1966, the Republican candidate won a plurality o f the vote, but failed to win 
50% of the vote. This allowed the overwhelmingly Democratic legislature to choose 
the governor. This Incident Is explained further later In the chapter.
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dominance.® This ruraiism affected the Republican Party as it developed in the 
1960s (Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). Although Republicans have done 
well in the state’s urban and suburban areas, the Democratic Party remains 
dominant in rural areas (Bullock 1998). As illustrated in the following discussion, 
the Republican Party has not always been able to parlay the natural conservatism 
o f rural white Georgians into GOP success (Lamis 1988; Bullock 1998).
Republican Growth, Decline, and Renaissance
As in all of the Deep South states, the Goldwater candidacy was a 
breakthrough event for Republicans in Georgia (Black and Black 1987, 1992; Lamis
1988). Any illusions that white Georgians were suddenly loyal Republicans were 
smashed four years later. In 1968, independent candidate George Wallace won 
the state’s electoral votes, while Richard Nixon received only 30 percent of the 
vote, down from his 37 percent share of the vote in 1960 (Bass and DeVries 1995). 
Lamis (1988) stresses the fact that most of Georgia’s white voters who voted for 
Goldwater in 1964 abandoned the party for Wallace in 1968. Though most of these 
white voters retumed to the GOP fold in 1972, they abandoned the Republicans in
®Georgia used a method of nominating statewide Democratic nominees know as 
the county-unit system until a federal court order banned its used in 1962. Under 
the system, the rural counties were able to dominate the urban and suburban 
counties through control of unit votes. The system was sim ilar to the Electoral 
College in the sense that the unit vote was more important than the popular vote. 
Each county received a set amount of unit votes no matter their geographic size or 
population. By the 1960s, the rural counties only consisted o f 32 percent of the 
statewide population, but they controlled 59 percent of the total number of unit 
votes (Buchanan 1997).
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favor of native son Jimmy Carter in 1976 and 1980. Since 1980, Georgia has 
become increasingly Republican at the presidential level, deviating only in 1992 
when Bill Clinton won the state's electoral votes (Bullock 1998).
At the congressional level, the Republicans have taken much longer to 
convert this presidential success into any large gain. Aistrup (1989) argues that the 
Republican Party, below the presidential level, is the weakest in Georgia when 
compared with any other state in the region. In 1964, Howard “Bo” Callaway 
became the first Republican since Reconstruction to win a congressional seat, and 
the Republicans managed to carry two Atlanta districts in 1966 (Bartley and 
DeVries 1995). Despite these initial successes, the 1970s and 1980s were not kind 
to the congressional hopes of Georgia Republicans. The total proportion of 
Georgia Republican congressmen never reached more than 20 percent during 
these two decades (Bullock 1998).
In the early 1990s, the Republicans fared better at the congressional level 
when they added three U.S. seats besides the one already held by Newt Gingrich. 
In 1994, the Republicans picked up an additional three seats, giving them their first 
majority in the state’s congressional delegation since Reconstruction, and in early 
1995, Democrat Nathan Deal converted to the Republican fold. External forces 
undoubtedly helped Georgia Republicans, though. Bullock (1998) asserts that the 
Republicans would not have won so many seats without federal control of the 
state’s congressional map. The VRA requires that all southern states, except 
Arkansas and Texas, must receive approval on any proposed change in
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congressional districts. During 1991 and 1992, the Georgia General Assembly
went through three rounds o f redistrlcting before the Department o f Justice, who
oversees this portion o f the VRA, approved the changes. The result was three
majority-black congressional districts, which resulted in eight predominately white
districts. This change in racial composition benefitted the Republicans. Although
Georgia redrew congressional districts, minus the majority-black 11'*’ District, in
1995 after the U.S. Supreme Court ruled the 1992 map to be unconstitutional,
Georgia Republicans have held onto their advantage through the 1998 elections.^
In the U.S. Senate, the GOP has won only three elections since 1964
(Bullock 1998). The initia l Republican break at this level came in 1980 when
political novice Mack Mattingly defeated longtime Senator Herman Talmadge, the
son of four-time governor Eugene Talmadge. The Republican victory was not so
much a vote for Mattingly as a vote against Talmadge, whose personal problems
contributed to his defeat (Lamis 1988). Coupled with this was a belief that
Talmadge had lost touch with the explosive growth of the Atlanta metropolitan area
(Bullock 1998). A Talmadge speech criticizing Republican Mattingly during the
campaign illustrates this point
My opponent came down here from Indiana a number 
of years ago. Now we’re glad he came down here to settle.
But he wasn’t content with that. He got a hired gun from 
Washington, D C., to serve as his campaign manager.
Then he got an advertising man all the way down from Detroit.
The whole thing has been an invasion sim ilar to Sherman’s
^When Newt Gingrich resigned his seat in early 1999, Republican Johnny 
Isakson won his seat in a special election.
1 0 0
march to the sea. A  long time ago, they were called 
carpetbaggers (Lamis 1988, 103).
Apparently Talmadge was oblivious to the fact that much of the population 
explosion in metropolitan Atlanta had come from an influx of northern residents. 
W hile Talmadge’s rhetoric was popular among his traditional bloc o f rural voters, 
voters in the Atlanta area swept Talmadge from office, where Mattingly won by 
margins of two to one (Bullock 1998). En route to victory, Mattingly was able to 
carry a majority o f the black vote in the state, a new phenomenon for Georgia 
Republicans (Lamis 1988). Arguably, Talmadge’s historical baggage on the race 
issue caused blacks to have no great affection for Talmadge, resulting in a vote for 
Mattingly.
Proof o f how fragile the Republican coalition was in the 1980s came in 1986 
when Mack Mattingly ran for reelection to the Senate. In that campaign, Democrat 
Wyche Fowler defeated Mattingly. Although a majority of black voters had voted 
for Mattingly in 1980, they abandoned him for Fowler in 1986. Fowler, whom 
Republicans often accused for being too liberal for Georgia, was unable to hold 
onto the seat in the 1992 elections.
In an odd fluke, Fowler found himself in a general election runoff with 
Republican challenger Paul Coverdell. Due to the presence o f a Libertarian 
candidate, Fowler was unable to gamer 50 percent o f the vote, which was required 
according to Georgia election laws at the time. In the runoff, Coverdell defeated 
Fowler, primarily due to a low black turnout in the runoff (Bullock and Furr 1994).
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In Georgia, low black turnouts drastically improve the chances of the Republican 
Party (Bullock 1998). In 1998, Coverdell was able to win reelection to Talmadge’s 
old seat in the U.S. Senate, something that no individual had done since 1974.
In 1996, Democrat Sam Nunn retired from the U.S. Senate, creating an open 
seat election for this seat. W hile the Republicans were hopeful of winning an 
additional Senate seat. Democrat MaxCleland narrowly defeated 1994 Republican 
gubernatorial candidate Guy Millner. Again, a Libertarian candidate was present 
which resulted in Cieland winning less than 50 percent of the vote. Due to the 
Democrats’ loss of the Senate in 1992, the state legislature changed the general 
election runoff law so that a runoff only occurred if nobody received 45 percent of 
the vote. As Bullock (1998) states, as Republicans become stronger in the state, 
the Democratic state legislature has a propensity to change election laws to 
damage Republican chances.
In the state legislature, the Republicans have made steady gains after the 
nadir o f the 1970s. Most of this Republican growth has come in urban and 
suburban areas of the state, while the rural areas have remained the most loyally 
Democratic regions (Bullock 1998). As recently as the 1960s, only 1 percent o f the 
state legislature consisted of Republicans. Now, Republicans make up 40 percent 
of the legislature. Bullock (1998) argues that the GOP is poised to take control of 
the legislature by 2002 at the present rate o f growth, with some conservative 
Democrats willing to jump ship to the Republican fold if the Democrats lose enough 
seats.
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As we prepare to examine the gubernatorial scene in Georgia since the VRA, 
the Republicans made some gains in 1964 and 1966, but the 1970s and 1980s did 
not hold much promise for the state GOP. The Democratic Party managed to 
remain the dominant party in state politics into the 1990s via the biracial coalition. 
In fact, Lamis (1988) argues that in the South, the biracial coalition is the strongest 
in Georgia. Even at the dawn of the 21®* century, the Democrats remain dominant 
at the county-level, although their strength has eroded at the presidential level. 
Still, the Republicans have made substantial inroads at the congressional level and 
in the state legislature. As the next section illustrates, the Republicans still have 
not had a breakthrough at the gubernatorial level, however.
Gubernatorial Politics
Due to the tremendous success of Goldwater who carried 54 percent of the 
vote in Georgia and the election of a Republican congressman, Georgia 
Republicans were confident in their ability to win the governorship in 1966. The 
Republican gubernatorial nominee was Howard “Bo” Callaway, wealthy son of the 
founder of Callaway Gardens, a prestigious resort in Pine Mountain, Georgia. 
Callaway had won a congressional seat in 1964, and he was an advocate of 
continued segregation (Bass and DeVries 1995).
In the 1966 gubernatorial contest, the Democrats nearly opened the door for 
the Republican Party (Bartley 1970). Two frontrunners vied for the Democratic 
nomination. James H. Gray, owner of a television station in Albany, was the former
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chairman o f the state Democratic Party, and Gray was considered the front running 
conservative candidate. The other frontrunner was Ellis Arnall, a former governor 
who had served between 1942-1946. Am all was a liberal, and he was making a 
political comeback that most observers had expected for the last several 
gubernatorial elections (Henderson 1991). Besides Gray and Arnall, two other 
major candidates were seeking the nomination: Lester Maddox, and Jimmy Carter. 
One o f these remaining three, Maddox would eventually become the governor 
through a bizarre series of events.
Lester Maddox was an Atlanta restaurant owner who had dabbled in politics 
since the 1950s. Maddox was famous for the fried chicken that he served at his 
restaurant, the Pickrick. He also dispensed his extremely conservative political 
philosophy in restaurant advertisements in the Atlanta Journal. Maddox had 
unsuccessfully run for mayor of Atlanta in 1958. In 1962, Maddox had won a spot 
in the Democratic runoff for lieutenant governor, but he again lost.
In 1966, Maddox ran for governor, but he was no longer the laughingstock 
that he had been before 1964. When Congress passed the Civil Rights Act of 1964 
requiring all public facilities to integrate, Maddox, a fiery segregationist, refused 
service to black customers. He ran blacks out of his restaurant w ith a pick handle 
in one hand and a pistol in the other. In defiance of the federal government, 
Maddox closed his restaurant and began selling pick handles know as “Pickrick 
Sticks.” Maddox’s popularity soared among rural, white Georgians who were 
disgruntled with the civil rights gains o f black citizens (Bartley and Graham 1975;
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Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). Maddox’s campaign platform was one of 
segregation and states’ rights.
As the Democratic primary drew near, Maddox was becoming increasingly 
popular among rural, white Democrats, which was harming Gray’s basis o f support 
(Bartley 1970).® A few weeks before the primary, Gray reportedly offered to buy off 
Maddox by paying his campaign debts in return for Maddox dropping out of the race 
and endorsing Gray (Henderson 1982). Maddox, who had a reputation o f being 
brutally honest, denounced Gray’s attempt to buy him out on television. When the 
primary rolled around, Maddox shocked everyone by winning a majority o f the vote 
among the five candidate field, with Amall coming in second. In the runoff, Maddox 
defeated Arnall for the Democratic nomination.
In the general election, voters were presented with Lester Maddox and Bo 
Callaway, both o f whom were conservatives and staunch segregationists. Some 
urban voters undertook a write-in campaign for Ellis Arnall. Apparently, enough 
urban voters were upset with the two party nominees for governor. On Election 
Day, Callaway won a bare plurality of 3,000 votes over Maddox, but Arnall’s write-in 
campaign prevented Callaway from having more than 50 percent of the vote. 
Georgia law at the time required that general election winners receive one more 
vote than 50 percent to win the office (Bullock 1998). If no candidate attained 50
®Maddox would go about rural Georgia nailing onto telephone poles campaign 
signs proclaiming, “THIS IS MADDOX COUNTRY.” When his opponents began 
taking down the signs, Maddox re-attached them at a great height standing on his 
car using an extra-long handled hammer.
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percent, the Georgia legislature decided the winner. Since the General Assembly 
was overwhelming Democratic, Maddox won the governorship.
Unlike Arkansas and Florida, the Republican party In Georgia had not 
appealed to newly enfranchised black voters to win the governorship (Bullock 
1998). While Georgia Republicans had been so close, the 1970s and 1980s were 
torturous decades for Republican candidates. The biracial coalition, which all 
successful Democratic gubernatorial candidates were effective In using, was such 
that the Republican Party made no substantial gains at the gubernatorial level 
during this period, despite the Increasing Republicanism of these same states at the 
presidential level (Lamis 1988).
Contrary to the fears of some, Maddox’s tenure as governor did not set back 
the state In terms of racial relations. Integration continued to take place, and 
Maddox oversaw the largest Increase of black employment In the state workforce 
in history (Bartley 1970). In 1970, former Governor Carl Sanders and state Senator 
Jimmy Carter sought the Democratic gubernatorial nomination. Sanders had a 
reputation as a progressive who sought more business investment In the state 
(Cook 1993). Carter’s main platform was the reform of state government, and he 
promised to reduce the number of state agencies through consolidation. Although 
most political pundits saw Sanders as the frontrunner. Carter managed to win a 
plurality of the primary vote and force a runoff with Sanders. During the campaign. 
Carter began calling Sanders “Cuff-Links Carl” because of Sanders’ great wealth, 
and Carter’s moniker was extremely effective among rural, Georgia voters (Lamis
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1988). In the runoff, Carter defeated Sanders for the Democratic nomination by 
winning 59.4 percent of One vote conpared with Sanders’ 40.5 percent in the runoff.
The Republican candidate in 1970 was Hal Suit, an Atlanta news anchor.
Suit had won the Republican nomination over Jimmy Bentley, then the state
comptroller general. Bentley, along with four other statewide constitutional officers,
had converted from the Democratic to Republican party in 1968. Bentley
apparently had the potential o f forging a Republican coalition. He was from rural
Georgia and had great support in his election to comptroller general (Lamis 1988).
Although he was also well-liked by urban voters (Bass and DeVries 1995), Bentley
was unable to win the gubernatorial nomination in 1970.® Echoing some
observations about the southern Republican Party that V.O. Key had made in 1949,
a disgruntled Bentley later remarked
The Republicans in this state...keep themselves restricted to 
small groups and small pockets. They’re far more interested 
in internal Republican politics than in external Republican 
politics. I didn’t give a damn who the state chairman o f the 
Republican Party was...The Republicans just couldn’t see that.
They could never grasp that vision.. .I told them they’d 
either take over the state government in 1970 or they’d 
lose it for twenty years....(Lamis 1988, 97).
As it tums out, Bentley’s words were prophetic. Between 1970 and 1990, 
no serious Republican candidate challenged the Democrats for control of the 
governor’s chair. In 1974, former state legislator George Busbee easily defeated 
his Republican challenger, and Georgia voters reelected Busbee in 1978 under a
®The other four defectors all lost re-election bids in 1970.
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new constitutional amendment that allowed Georgia governors a maximum of two 
terms. During Busbee’s tenure, more business investments began coming to the 
state. Both moderate to conservative white voters and black voters supported 
Busbee (Lamis 1988).
In 1982, the state constitution forbade Busbee to run for a third term, but the 
Republicans had no legitimate chance o f capturing this gubernatorial election 
either. Joe Frank Harris, another former state legislator, easily won election over 
his Republican opponent. Much like Busbee, Harris successfully forged a coalition 
of both black and white voters, and Harris easily won reelection in 1986 (Lamis 
1988).
By 1990, Georgia politics were again undergoing change, and the 
Republican Party was gaining more strength (Bullock 1998). Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, the urban sprawl o f Atlanta led to the spread o f suburbia in a ring 
known as the Atlanta Doughnut. In these suburban regions, Georgia Republicans 
made the ir first substantial gains at the state level. Also, fewer white Georgians 
lived in the rural areas as compared with the 1960s and 1970s. Many o f these 
voters had moved to suburban regions and were beginning to vote Republican as 
well (Lamis 1988).
In 1990, the Democrats nominated Zell Miller, the lieutenant governor since 
1974, and the Republicans nominated Johnny Isakson, the minority leader in the 
Georgia House of Representatives. M iller was the frontrunner for the Democratic 
nomination although former Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young was also a strong
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candidate. Being Georgia’s first black candidate for governor in this century, Young 
drew support from Georgia’s black voters, but M iller pulled even greater support 
among black voters because of his support of a state lottery to fund education 
(Bullock 1998). Even though Miller and Young were in a runoff. Miller still pulled 
extraordinarily high black support over the lottery issue.
Isakson was the first legitimate chance for the Republican Party at the 
gubernatorial level since Callaway in 1966. Despite running a hard campaign. 
M iller defeated Isakson with 55 percent of the vote, mainly riding a crest of 
popularity over a proposed state lottery. The Republicans were optimistic after the 
1990 election. Isakson had garnered 45 percent o f the vote against a popular 
Democrat, which represented the highest levels o f support for a Republican 
candidate since Callaway’s run.
In the 1990s, the partisan balance of Georgia voters is nearing an 
equilibrium. Since Georgia does not maintain registration data, one is forced to rely 
on survey data to gauge party identification among the state’s voters. According 
to recent surveys, 38 percent of Georgia voters considered themselves Democrats, 
34 percent Republicans, and 29 percent Independents (Bullock 1998). Blacks 
remain overwhelmingly Democratic, and successful statewide Democratic 
candidates can win election by carrying the black vote and 40 percent or more o f 
the white vote (Bullock 1998). In 1994, M iller was able to win reelection on the 
basis o f this coalition against a surprisingly strong Republican candidate, Guy 
Millner.
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In 1998, Georgia Republicans again nominated Guy Millner for governor. 
By this time, Millner was now a veteran of statewide elections, having been the 
gubernatorial nominee in 1994 and the Republican nominee for U.S. Senate in 
1996. Although he lost to Democrat Max Cieland by a very close vote, Millner was 
still considered strong enough to win the governorship in 1998. Although opinion 
polls showed Millner defeating any of the potential Democratic nominees early in 
1998, he eventually lost to the Democratic nominee, state House member Roy 
Games, who had run for govemor in 1990. In a campaign that was especially bitter, 
many Georgia voters seemed dissatisfied with both men. In the end, Barnes 
defeated Millner soundly. Crucial to Barnes’ victory was an extraordinarily high 
black tumout statewide. We analyze this campaign in depth in Chapters 4 and 6.
Georgia is a state that had a tradition o f rural domination of statewide 
politics. Unlike her sister states in the Deep South, Georgia had a mechanism, the 
county-unit system, that maintained this domination o f statewide elections in an 
extreme form until 1962. Like the other Deep South states, 1964 was a 
breakthrough year for the Republican Party in Georgia, but Georgia was arguably 
the most Democratic southern state until the 1990s (Lamis 1988; Aistrup 1989; 
Bullock 1998). The Republicans have yet to elect either a governor or lieutenant 
governor. Georgia’s black population, which is around 30 percent, plays a large 
role in this continued Democratic success. If a candidate can win a majority of the 
black vote and 40 percent or more of the white vote, then the Democrats have been 
able to maintain their superiority over the Republicans. The Republican Party’s
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best chance at winning the governorship came in 1966. When they lost, the 
Republicans began a downward spiral at the statewide level. In the 1990s, the 
Republican Party has gradually become competitive with the Democrats at the 
congressional and state levels.
LOUISIANA
Undoubtedly, Louisiana is the most colorful state in the South, if not the most 
colorful state in the Union. To understand Louisiana politics, one needs to 
understand two factors. First, Louisiana is the most religiously diverse state o f the 
South (Key 1949). Unlike the other southern states, a substantial m inority o f 
Louisiana citizens is Roman Catholic. Most of the Roman Catholics are in the 
Acadiana region of the state and New Orleans, where displaced French settlers 
from Newfoundland settled in the IB*^ century. North Louisiana looks like the rest 
o f the South, Protestant and primarily Baptist. Figure 3.1 illustrates the Acadiana 
region of the state.
I l l
Figure 3.1 
Acadiana Region of Louisiana
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Acadiana
This religious division has profound implications for state politics. 
Historically, north Louisiana was the haven of conservative, segregationist 
candidates, while Acadiana was more tolerant and less supportive o f segregation 
(Bass and DeVries 1995). If one examines the registration o f blacks in Louisiana 
at the parish-level, blacks registered in much greater numbers in the southern 
parishes than in the northern ones (Lamis 1988).
The second factor that drove Louisiana politics for several decades was the 
Long machine. Huey P. Long was first elected governor in 1928. Long's message 
was that o f the populist, and he avoided racial issues in his rhetoric (Bartley and 
Graham 1995). He campaigned for the support of the downtrodden, while attacking 
big business, mainly the oil industry. Long was a polarizing figure in Louisiana 
politics. For the next thirty years, these two factions divided state politics into Long 
and Anti-Long factions. V.O. Key (1949) discussed this factionalization of state 
politics arguing that “Louisiana factionalism more nearly approaches the 
organizational realities of a two-party system than that of any other southern state” 
(301). By the 1960s, this factionalism of state politics had begun to dissolve into 
multiple factions (Landry and Parker 1982; Lamis 1988).
Initial Republican Growth
The Republican Party developed into a viable presidential party more quickly 
in Louisiana than any other Deep South state, with the state going Republican for 
the first time in a presidential election in 1956 (Parent and Perry 1998).
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Elsenhower’s win was not a protest based on civil rights. Rather, the Elsenhower 
administration believed that offshore gulf oil deposits belonged to the states not the 
federal government. This position was the main reason that Louisiana voters cast 
Its electoral votes for Elsenhower (Black and Black 1992). In 1964, Louisiana cast 
her electoral votes for Barry Goldwater, as did all Deep South states (Black and 
Black 1987; 1992; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995).
Like the remainder of the Deep South, George W allace carried Louisiana In 
1968 based largely on the support o f white voters In north Louisiana. In 1972, 
Louisiana cast Its electoral votes for the Republicans. Richard Nixon won 70 
percent of the vote statewide, mainly on the support of those who voted for W allace 
In 1968 (Bass and DeVries 1995). Although the state went narrowly for Jimmy 
Carter In 1976, Louisiana supported Republican presidential candidates during the 
1980s. The 1990s have seen a shift In Louisiana presidential politics, with the state 
being the only one In the Deep South to cast Its votes for the Cllnton-Gore ticket In 
both 1992 and 1996 (Bullock and Rozell 1998). While Louisiana was the firs t Deep 
South state to go Republican at the presidential level. Its future as a GOP 
presidential stronghold remains In question.
At the congressional level, the Louisiana Republican Party has enjoyed the 
most success (Parent and Perry 1998). Although Louisiana In 1975 was the last 
southem state to elect a Republican to the U.S. House, the GOP track record since 
then has been more favorable (Lamis 1988). During the 1970s, the Republicans 
won three seats, and that number gradually rose during the 1980s. In the late
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1990s, of the seven congressmen from the state, five are Republican (Parent and 
Perry 1998).
In the U.S. Senate, Louisiana Republicans have not fared quite as well. The 
first serious Republican senatorial candidate placed third in the general election of 
1972, winning 20 percent o f the vote. Louisiana’s other U.S. Senator at this time 
was Russell Long, son of Huey Long. Long never received a Republican challenge 
during his career. When Long retired in 1986, the Republicans had their best 
opportunity to that point to win a seat in the Senate. Democratic Congressmen 
John Breaux won election to this seat, although his Republican opponent, fellow 
Congressman Henson Moore was leading Breaux in the late into the campaign. 
The state’s black electorate helped in large part to get Breaux elected after a news 
story broke late in the campaign that the Republicans were trying to purge black 
voters from the voting rolls (Parent and Perry 1998).
During the 1990s, controversy has surrounded U.S. Senate races in the 
state. In 1990, incumbent Bennett Johnston received a stiff challenge from former 
KKK member-turned-Republican David Duke. During that election, Duke won 
nearly 44 percent of the vote against Johnston, raising questions about the role that 
race played in the decision of white Louisiana voters (Kuzenski, Bullock, and 
Gaddie 1995). In 1996, Republican Woody Jenkins came within 6,000 votes of 
becoming the first Republican senator from Louisiana in the 20*  ^century. Despite 
charges of massive vote fraud in favor of Democrat Mary Landrieu, the Senate 
allowed her election to stand (Parent and Perry 1998).
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In the state legislature, the Republican Party has faced a long uphill climb 
sim ilar to the experience of Republicans in Georgia. Over the years, the 
Republicans have gradually won seats, mainly in the state’s urban and suburban 
areas, but the Republicans only account for 28 percent of the total legislative seats 
(Parent and Perry 1998). In the state Senate, the GOP controls 14 of 25 seats, but 
the numbers in the state House are less encouraging, where Republicans occupy 
27 of 77 seats. Still, the Republicans have been claiming more seats in the 1990s, 
with a pickup of eight seats in the 1996 elections.
The Louisiana Republican Party is one of early success in the Deep South 
with the state going Republican for the first time in 1956, but the Democratic Party 
has won the state’s electoral votes in the last two presidential elections. At the 
congressional level, the Republicans first gained notable success in the 1970s. 
Although the state has yet to elect a Republican senator, the Republican Party 
holds five of seven U.S. House seats. Increasingly in the last decade, the 
Republicans have begun to enjoy greater success at the state level. We can see 
the gradual success of the state GOP when we examine the gubernatorial level in 
the next section.
Republican Fortunes at the Gubernatorial Level
Unlike her sister states, it did not take Goldwater to prompt strong 
Republican candidates to run for governor. In March 1964, Republican Charlton 
Lyons ran against Democrat John J. McKeithen, garnering only 38.5 percent o f the
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vote (Lamis 1988)/° W hile Louisiana was one o f the first states to have a serious 
Republican gubernatorial nominee, it would be 1972 before another serious 
Republican opponent appeared on the gubernatorial scene.
The 1971-1972 gubernatorial campaign featured two candidates who 
dominated state politics for the next two decades. Edwin Edwards, the flamboyant 
Cajun from south Louisiana, won the Democratic nomination for governor. His 
opponent was David Treen, a conservative Republican from suburban New 
Orleans. Edwards defeated Treen by a 52-48 percent margin, with Edwards 
primary support coming from black voters and poor white voters, while Treen was 
more successful at winning the middle and upper class white vote (Lamis 1988; 
Bass and DeVries 1995).
The 1972 gubernatorial election, however, was technically the last 
Democrat-Republican election. Governor Edwards proposed a change to 
gubematorial elections in Louisiana that the state legislature accepted (Bass and 
DeVries 1995). The change in election laws benefitted the sitting governor 
because, beginning in 1975, all gubematorial candidates run against each other in 
a nonpartisan open primary (Hadley 1985). W hile they do not note partisan 
affiliation on the ballot, politically attuned individuals know the partisan affiliation
’°At this time, the Democratic gubernatorial primary in Louisiana was held in 
December preceding a presidential election year, w ith the runoff taking place one 
month later in January. The general election was held two months later in March 
of the presidential election year.
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of the candidates. If no candidate wins a majority o f the vote in the open primary, 
then the top two candidates, regardless of party, face each other in a runoff.
The potential exists that the top two candidates could be of the same party. 
Governor Edwards advocated this system in the name o f fairness. Bass and 
DeVries (1995) write that to Edwards it was unfair “for Democrats to fight through 
two politically bloody primaries and then face a fresh Republican opponent” (181). 
Another consequence of tiiis  system, however, has been the tendency for political 
moderates to be excluded with the runoff featuring candidates on the opposite ends 
of the political spectrum (Parent and Perry 1998).
In 1975, Edwards easily won reelection, but 1979 became the breakthrough 
year for the Republican Party in Louisiana. In that year, David Treen was elected 
governor in what Lamis (1988) states “in the annals o f recent southern elections, 
there is none stranger” (115). Treen was the lone Republican in a field o f six 
candidates. Treen barely won a plurality o f the vote in the primary, and he narrowly 
defeated his Democratic opponent in the runoff. The other four losing Democratic 
candidates all openly endorsed Treen against his Democratic runoff opponent. 
Upon entering office, Treen appointed all four to posts in his administration.
Despite Treen’s election in 1979, one can interpret his victory in different 
ways. The Republican Party saw Treen’s election as a major boost for their party, 
while the Democrats pointed out that Treen had won by only 9,000 votes statewide. 
Also, the defection o f the four Democratic opponents to Treen had some impact. 
Lamis (1988) points out that an analysis of the voting returns reveals a definite
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patter of friends and neighbors politics. In Jefferson Parish, Treen rolled up a huge 
majority in his home parish of 37,000 votes. Nevertheless, the election of Treen 
boosted the Republican Party.
The 1983 election shattered any illusions about the strength of the GOP 
when Treen lost his reelection bid. His opponent, Edwin Edwards, won almost 62 
percent of the vote against Treen. The prime factor in Edward’s ovenwhelming 
victory was the black vote. Although Treen attempted to win black support, he 
received practically none (Lamis 1988). Edwards was simply too popular with black 
voters, and they helped propel him past Treen in the election.
In 1987, Buddy Roemer, a Democrat, won election as governor. During his 
term, he converted to the Republican Party. Although initia lly popular, Roemer 
alienated the more conservative wing of the GOP because o f his refusal to sign a 
b ill restricting abortions in the state (Parent and Perry 1998). In 1991, Roemer 
drew opposition from Edwin Edwards and another new political face, David Duke. 
The 1991 election became watched nationwide due to the presence and possible 
election of David Duke, a former member of the Ku Klux Klan. In the primary, 
Roemer placed third to Edwards and Duke. In the runoff, David Duke faced Edwin 
Edwards, but neither candidate was well-liked. Edwards had ethical problems 
while Duke had problems with his past, but Edwards won easily when voters were 
given the choice of Edwards or Duke. An important outcome of this election was 
the support for Duke by white voters living in black belt counties and suburban
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areas leading to claims that race was still a prominent factor in southern politics 
(Giles and Buckner 1995).
The 1995 gubematorial election, which we examine at great depth, saw the 
victory of a Democrat-tumed-Republican, Mike Foster.^’ His Democratic opponent 
was former Congressmen Cleo Fields. Foster defeated Fields in a landslide. Two 
factors led to this Republican victory. First, Fields and Mary Landrieu, another 
Democratic candidate, feuded during the open primary. Second, the Republicans 
were able to win the support o f both pro-business Republican voters and socially 
conservative religious voters (Parent and Perry 1998).
This campaign between Foster and Fields is important to the racial threat 
literature because Fields was a black candidate. Racial threat argues that white 
voters may vote in a highly racial mindset because this election featured a white 
candidate in Foster versus Fields (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; 
Sears and Funk 1999). If racial threat voting is taking place among white Louisiana 
voters, one would expect to find such behavior accentuated due to the 
circumstances of this particular election.
In closing, the Republican Party has faced a slow, uphill climb to power in 
Louisiana (Lamis 1988). W hile the Republicans won at the presidential level in 
Louisiana in 1956, statewide power mirrored the unevenness found in other Deep 
South states. The Republicans scored an early gubernatorial victory in Louisiana
"Foster was a member of the state House of Representatives. Foster did not 
switch to the GOP until the day that he filed for candidacy (Parent and Perry 1998).
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when David Treen won in 1979, but voters defeated him soundly in 1983. In the 
1990s, the success o f the Republicans at the gubernatorial level has rested upon 
the ability to nx)bilize pro-business voters and socially conservative religious voters 
(Parent and Perry 1998). The election of Mike Foster in 1995 revealed the force 
that these groups of voters represent.
SOUTH CAROLINA
In South Carolina, Republicans gained their earliest and strongest foothold 
at the state level than any other Deep South state (Lamis 1988). In 1964, not only 
did Goldwater carry the state, but also U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond converted to 
the Republican Party. Undoubtedly, Thurmond’s conversion gave the growing 
Republican Party a sense o f legitimacy at the state level that it lacked in other 
states (Bass and DeVries 1995). Kuzenski (1998) describes the South Carolina 
Republican Party as one which has “two birthdays.” The first birthday was the 
group of white voters who had come to the party in the 1950s because of the 
appeal of the fiscal conservatism o f the Eisenhower administration (Sundquist 
1983; Nardulli 1995). The second birthday was the migration of traditional white 
Democrats whom the civil rights movement disgruntled. Strom Thurmond’s 
conversion led this migration to the GOP. Topping, Lazarek, and Linder (1966) 
describe these new converts to the Republican fold as “mad Democrats” who came 
overwhelmingly from small towns and the rural portions o f South Carolina. Thus, 
South Carolina was at the forefront o f growing Republicanism in the South. O f all
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the Deep South states, South Carolina was the only one to cast its electoral votes 
for Richard Nixon in 1968 (Bartley and Graham 1975; Bass and DeVries 1995).
South Carolina has a tradition of regionalism between the Piedmont section, 
those counties north of the fall line where industry employed a majority o f whites in 
industry, and the black belt section of the state. After the Republican breakthrough 
in 1964, the Republican Party at the state level started to gain a greater following. 
Traditionally, voters of the Piedmont had been among the most loyal to the 
Democratic Party, in large part because o f working-class concerns (Bartley and 
Graham 1975). While working-class voters in the Piedmont had traditionally been 
more progressive, white voters of the Black Belt had been among the most 
conservative and reactionary in the state. This was accentuated by the fact that 
South Carolina had historically low turnout rates for white voters (Kuzenski 1998). 
After 1964, one begins to see a shifL The Piedmont has become arguably the most 
conservative region of the state, while the Black Belt has become the most loyally 
Democratic section. This transformation o f the Black Belt came In large scale after 
the implementation of the VRA in which black voters began to make their voice 
heard. Figure 3.2 illustrates the Piedmont counties and Black Belt counties.
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Figure 3.2
South Carolina Urban and Piedmont Counties in 1960
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Early Republicanism
W hile things were beginning to look promising for South Carolina 
Republicans, the Democrats began to recover. Unlike Mississippi, where the state 
Democratic Party remained split over race. South Carolina Democrats made a 
conscious effort to form a biracial coalition to combat the growing Republican Party 
(Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995; Kuzenski 1998). The Democrats have 
attempted to appeal to black voters and moderate to  liberal white voters. Kuzenski 
(1998) argues that this has not been a winning combination in the state, although 
the Democrats are certainly in no danger of dying. The 1998 election demonstrates 
that the Democrats can still win gubernatorial elections, but white voters have 
become Republicans en masse since the 1960s. It now takes some fundamental 
misstep by the Republicans to lose statewide elections.
At the presidential level. South Carolina has become a bedrock state for the 
Republican Party. Since 1964, only Jimmy Carter in 1976 has carried the state for 
the Democrats. Even during this victory. Carter only narrowly won the state (Lamis 
1988; Black and Black 1992). Most observers attribute the high success of the 
Republican presidential tickets in the state to the early conversion o f Thurmond to 
the GOP (Lamis 1988; Graham and Moore 1994; Bass and DeVries 1995; Kuzenski 
1998).
In the U.S. Senate, South Carolina has had a Republican member since 
Strom Thurmond’s 1964 conversion. In fact, Thurmond still serves in the Senate, 
but the Republicans have not won the state’s other Senate seat. Since 1966,
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Democrat Ernest (Fritz) Hollings has been the junior senator from the Palmetto 
State. Although Hollings is in his 70s, he still is not the senior senator from the 
state due to Strom Thurmond’s longevity. During the 1970s, Thurmond moderated 
on the race issue to the point that blacks have no real reason to vote against him, 
even if they have no great love for him (Bass and DeVries 1995). By contrast, 
Hollings started his Senate career as a conservative on the race issue. In 1967, 
Hollings even voted against the nomination of the first black member to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, Thurgood Marshall (Bass and DeVries 1995). W ithin a few years 
though, Hollings moderated on the race issue. Over time, Hollings has built a 
remarkable biracial coalition that he has ridden to reelection for over thirty years 
(Lamis 1988; Kuzenski 1998).
In congressional elections, the Republicans saw an early gain in the U.S. 
House when Democrat Albert Watson converted to the Republican Party in 1966. 
Due to his support o f Barry Goldwater in 1964, House Democrats stripped Watson 
o f his seniority (Bass and DeVries 1995). Watson resigned and successfully ran 
for election as a Republican (Kuzenski 1998). During the 1970s and 1980s, the 
state GOP made gradual inroads in congressional elections. The 1990s have been 
kind to the fortunes of the Republicans in the South Carolina House delegation. 
Much like Georgia, federal intervention in redistricting had a positive impact on the 
Republican Party. After redistricting, Republicans occupy four o f the six 
congressional seats. Due to the majority-black O®’ Congressional district, four of the 
state’s other districts contain white majorities of over 70 percent. Only the S®’
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Congressional district has a white majority of less than 70 percent. Significantly, 
the four Republicans all come from the overwhelmingly white districts (Kuzenski 
1998).
Republican growth in the state legislature has been more successful than 
in any other Deep South state. In the early 1960s, no Republicans controlled 
legislative seats. Since the early 1970s, the numbers of Republicans in both the 
state House and Senate have increased with each election. Since 1995, the 
Republicans have controlled a majority of seats in the state House, and the GOP 
was only four seats short o f controlling the state Senate after the 1998 elections 
(Partisan Composition o f State Legislatures 1998). This Republican control of the 
state legislature is even more important in South Carolina because the state 
legislature possesses great power in controlling state government (Key 1949; Bass 
and DeVries 1995). Comparatively speaking. South Carolina has a history of weak 
governors while the state legislature has considerable power.
While the Republican Party enjoyed greater success much earlier than the 
other Deep South states, the Democratic Party did not go away. Like the other 
southem states, the state Democratic Party began appealing to a biracial coalition. 
Unlike her sister states. South Carolina Democrats began appealing to moderate 
whites and blacks in the late 1960s (Bass and DeVries 1995; Kuzenski 1998). 
Such a move prevented a split of the Democrats between white and black, like in 
Mississippi (Lamis 1988). Although the Republicans have had greater success at 
the state level, Kuzenski (1998) reports that South Carolina Republicans are facing
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the challenge o f appealing to voters both economically and socially. If the social 
conservatives take control of the party, then the Democrats might t>egin to win more 
elections. As we examine the gubernatorial politics o f the state, we see that the 
1998 gubematorial election reveals the fiactures in the state’s Republican coalition.
Mixed Republican Success at the Gubernatorial Level
The Republicans ran their first gubernatorial candidate in the 20“’ century In 
the 1966 election. Republican nominee Joseph Rogers, Jr. lost his bid to defeat the 
Democratic nominee. Lieutenant Govemor Robert E. McNair. In his losing effort, 
however, Rogers received almost 42 percent of the vote. Rogers ran a campaign 
that was conservative and pro-business but avoided exploiting the issue of race.
In 1970, the state Republican Party faced a momentous trial. The GOP 
nominee was Albert Watson, the segregationist Democrat congressman turned 
Republican, and Watson was the last gubernatorial candidate to run an openly 
racial campaign (Graham and Moore 1994). Watson's racial appeal did not work 
for him, and the Democratic nominee, Lieutenant Governor John West, defeated 
Watson. Results of this election show that the pro-business wing of the Republican 
Party abandoned Watson, who did the best among rural whites and low-income 
whites in urban areas. This served as a lesson to the state Republican Party. They 
could count upon the support of middle and upper class white voters if they avoided 
the race issue (Lamis 1988; Kuzenski 1998).
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The remainder of the 1970s and 1980s saw Republican gubernatorial 
nominees who ran as fiscal conservatives avoiding the race issue (Graham and 
Moore 1994). In 1974, South Carolina became the first Deep South state since 
Reconstruction to elect a Republican govemor. Foreshadowing the experience in 
Louisiana discussed earlier in this chapter, this initial Republican gubernatorial 
victory came at the misstep of the Democratic Party. The Democratic nominee was 
a young Charles (Pug) Ravenel, who had defeated ten-term Congressmen W illiam 
Dom in the primary, but the state Supreme Court ruled in September that Ravenel 
did not meet residency requirements. Consequently, the nomination went to Dorn 
by default. Republican nominee James Edwards, a Charleston oral surgeon, 
managed to defeat Dorn by winning 50.9 percent o f the vote (Bass and DeVries 
1995).
In 1978, the Democrats regained the governorship. The Democratic 
nominee was Richard Riley, who was well respected among the black community. 
The Republican nominee was Edward Long, but Long could not carry over the 
success of 1974. Riley won 61 percent of the vote. Lamis (1988) argues that Riley 
demonstrated what the biracial coalition in South Carolina could do with the right 
Democratic candidate running. Despite making appeals to black voters, Long was 
unable to sway many blacks to the Republican fold. Carroll Campbell, a young 
Congressman at that point, stated that the Democrats had to have a moderate 
candidate to win statewide elections, and Riley was a perfect example o f a 
moderate candidate who was able to appeal to enough moderate voters to win the
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election (Kuzenski 1998). In 1982, Riley won a sweeping reelection bid in which 
he won nearly 70 percent o f the vote. The Republicans nominated a sacrificial 
lamb who received the remaining portion of the vote. Potentially strong candidates, 
like Campbell, declined to make a run against Richard Riley.
The state constitution did not allow Riley to run for a third term as govemor. 
The 1986 gubernatorial election was a Republican year in South Carolina with 
R iley’s departure. Former Congressman Carroll Campbell received the GOP 
nomination for governor and faced Democrat Mike Daniel. In his victory over 
Daniel, Campbell appealed to whites of all classes through his fiscal conservatism. 
As governor, Campbell preceded to build further upon the reforms enacted in the 
Riley years. Education, business development, taxes, and health care were all 
reformed during Campbell’s first administration. In 1990, Campbell won reelection 
in a landslide winning 69 percent. Even more significant was that Campbell pulled 
in 25 percent of the black vote (Lamis 1988). In South Carolina, Republicans have 
built a large coalition when they avoid the race issue (Kuzenski 1998).
In 1994, the Republicans maintained their control of the governorship. 
However, the Republican candidate in 1994 was unlike Carroll Campbell. David 
Beasley was a Democratic convert to the GOP. In the mid-1980s, Beasley became 
a born-again Christian, and his politics reflect this religious experience. He 
appealed more to Christian conservatives than past Republican candidates 
(Kuzenski 1998). While Beasley won the governorship, he did so only with a scant 
50 percent. This relatively weak showing, coming in the year that Republicans
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were doing very well across the region and the nation, indicates that the 
Republican conversion among white voters down the ticket is far from complete. 
We examine this election in greater depth in the coming chapters.
CONCLUSION
The Republican Party in all Deep South states experienced a rapid burst of 
political power in 1964. Barry Goldwater became the first Republican candidate to 
carry all five Deep South states, and this fundamentally changed the Republican 
Party. After the Goldwater candidacy, the Republican Party moved towards a 
stance of racial conservatism and outward opposition to civil rights laws (Carmines 
and Stimson 1989). However, as we have seen, the Republicans found it difficult 
to follow up on this initial 1964 success. W hile Republican gubernatorial 
candidates ran in all three states examined after 1964, no Republican candidate 
won a governorship until 1974. In Louisiana and South Carolina, the breakthrough 
for Republican gubernatorial candidates depended in large part to some 
fundamental misstep among the Democratic Party, while Georgia has yet to elect 
a Republican governor in the 20“  ^century.
Once federal registrars, authorized by the VRA, began registering black 
citizens, blacks began to make an impact on the Democratic Party. W hile the 
Democrats had become the vanguards of the Jim Crow system during the one-party 
South era, they had to adapt quickly to maintain office. By examining Georgia, 
Louisiana, and South Carolina in the post-VRA era, we see that the Democrats
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were more effective In some states than others. Overall, however, the Democrats 
maintained political control of all three states well into the 1980s and 1990s. One 
of the reasons for this is the biracial coalition that brought together black voters and 
moderate white voters (Lamis 1988). By running moderate candidates who 
appealed to voters of both races, the Democrats were able to maintain their grip on 
power.
it is only in the 1990s that one begins to find any sustained Republican 
success below the presidential level in these three states. As detailed in the first 
chapter, some observers see the success of southern Republicans in the 1990s as 
dependent upon the race issue. According to this view, the Republican Party is 
dependent on the support of white voters who vote for Republican candidates on 
the basis of race. In the coming chapters, we explore the gubernatorial elections 
in these three states to discern the impact that race may or may not have played in 
the fortunes of Republican gubernatorial chances in the South.
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CHAPTER 4 
STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGNS IN GEORGIA,
LOUISIANA, AND SOUTH CAROLINA
This chapter examines the most recent gubernatorial elections in Georgia, 
Louisiana, and South Carolina to determine the role that physical proximity plays 
in racial threat voting. The analysis in this chapter is primarily quantitative in 
nature. We perform research at the county-level in all three states. In the next 
section, we explore the proposed hypotheses and then discuss the results of the 
quantitative analysis that follows.
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
As discussed in the firs t chapter. Key (1949) posited the black belt 
hypothesis which states that white voters in black belt counties, rural counties 
whose black population totals 40 percent or greater of the population, are the most 
adamant about maintaining the status quo with regard to segregation and race 
relations due to the presence o f large black populations. Consequently, the most 
reactionary white voters, with regard to race, came from the black-belt counties.
A t the core of Key’s black belt thesis is physical presence. W hites who live 
in close proximity to large concentrations of black voters are the most influenced 
politically by those black citizens. During Key's time, black citizens, who had such
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an impact upon the voting behavior o f white voters, did not enjoy the right to vote. 
Bartley and Graham (1975) estimate that black registration region wide was at a 
maximum of 10 percent before the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA).’
Since the time of Key, vast changes have come to the South. Civil rights 
laws protect blacks from discrimination, and blacks can now freely vote unlike forty 
years ago. Even after these two events, scholars continued to find evidence that 
racial voting and racial appeals aimed at white voters by political candidates were 
taking place in the southern states (Black 1976; Knoke and Kyriazis 1977; Glaser
1994). Research has shown that Key’s hypothesis is still valid when one looks at 
the southern black belt counties that George Wallace carried in 1968 (Lipset and 
Rabb 1969; Crespi 1971; Schoenberger and Segal 1971; Wasserman and Segal 
1973; Black and Black 1973; W rinkle and Polinard 1973; W right 1977).
When one examines demographic figures, the black belt has clearly been 
losing population both white and black in recent years. Black and Black (1987) 
argue that because of population loss the black belt does not hold the pivotal role 
that it did during Key’s day. Has the racial tone of the area disappeared completely 
though?
’The exact number of black registrants is difficult to discern. All southern 
states kept inaccurate records during this time. In addition, there were no federal 
laws requiring states to keep registration data for a specified amount o f time. 
Consequently, registrars would often destroy records after an election. Mississippi 
holds the record for being the woret record-keepers in the South. In 1965, when 
federal registrars began combing the records of southem states looking fo r black 
registration data, they found in Mississippi that the records had been destroyed “by 
fire” in 72 of Mississippi's 82 counties (U.S. Commission on C ivil Rights 1968).
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Racial threat states that race still plays an Important role in southern politics. 
It contends that whites who live in areas of high black populations feel threatened 
by these black voters. Consequently, these white voters vote for the most racially 
conservative candidates available. If racial threat is at work, one would expect to 
find it in the black belt counties o f the southem states. We would also expect to 
see such a racially motivated vote to favor the Republican Party since most blacks 
do not support the GOP (M iller and Shanks 1996). Unlike Key’s black belt 
hypothesis that pertained only to rural counties, the racial threat hypothesis 
contends that urban residents are less likely to have their vote influenced by racial 
threat. Urbanism has often been associated with greater tolerance on racial issues 
(Black 1973; Abrahamson 1980). Accordingly, we include urbanism in the analysis 
to determine whether urbanism has an effect upon voting.
Giles and Buckner (1995) found racial threat at play in the David Duke 
candidacies of 1990 and 1991 in Louisiana. We examine Georgia, Louisiana, and 
South Carolina to determine the role that race plays upon the voting behavior of 
white voters in these states. As discussed previously, Georgia, Louisiana and 
South Carolina have election turnout figures based upon the race of the voter, while 
the other two Deep South states of Alabama and Mississippi maintain no such data.
Due to varying forms of data and the timing of elections, we examine 
different elections in these three states. In Georgia, the state has maintained racial 
turnout data only since 1996, allowing for an examination of the 1998 gubernatorial 
election in Georgia. In Louisiana, we analyze the 1995 gubernatorial campaign.
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Finally, in South Carolina, we have the opportunity to analyze both the 1994 and 
1998 elections. This is also desirable because David Beasley, the Republican 
candidate on both occasions, won in 1994 but lost his reelection bid in 1998. As 
we w ill see, racial issues probably played a factor in both Beasley's victory and 
subsequent defeat.
If racial threat appears in southern elections, we would expect fo r the 
Republican Party to benefit since blacks are overwhelmingly Democratic (Lamis 
1988; Miller and Shanks 1996). The literature abounds with discussions of how the 
Republican Party has gradually gained fertile ground in most of the South. 
Undoubtedly, racial issues initiated this Republican conversion (Cosman 1966; 
Carmines and Stimson 1989; Black and Black 1992; Carmines, Huckfeldt, and 
McCurley 1995; Miller and Shanks 1996). If racial threat does motivate some white 
voters, does it always exist on the basis o f physical proximity to large black 
populations? We attempt to answer this question in the remainder of this paper.
HYPOTHESES
In 1994 and 1995, the Republican nominees for governor should do well 
among white voters in black belt counties. In these counties, white voters are more 
likely than other white voters to cast a vote for the GOP candidate based upon race. 
In black belt counties, white voters may feel threatened by the large number of 
black residents. Consequently, these whites may be more likely to vote for the
135
Republican candidate. We might also expect this racial voting to occur in suburban 
counties where white voters may have fled from from more diverse urban areas.
Education often affects one’s voting behavior (Campbell, Converse, Miller, 
and Stokes 1960; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Miller and Shanks 1996). Giles 
and Buckner (1995) found that less education made one more susceptible to racial 
threat voting. The second hypothesis involves the education of white voters, in all 
probability, college educated white voters, who live near large black populations, 
are less likely to vote for the Republican nominee in these two states because of 
a reactionary response to large black populations.
Since previous studies have argued that urbanism makes one more tolerant 
to racial diversity, we examine the role of racial threat upon urban voters. The third 
hypothesis states that voters in urban areas are less likely to support Republican 
candidates because of racial threat. Due to the greater racial toleration of white 
voters in urban areas, one would not expect to see the same patterns of behavior 
among urban whites as opposed to rural, or even suburban white voters.
DATA AND MEASURES
The percentage of white persons with college experience are whites with 
some type of college education. These figures include post-secondary educational 
attainment ranging from some college to a Ph.D. (U.S. Census 1990).
We obtained the percentage black of a county’s (or parish’s) population from 
the U.S. Census. The term black belt counties and parishes refer to those counties
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and parishes where blacks made up the highest percentage of the population/
Urban counties and parishes are those defined by the U.S. Census, which 
includes any town larger than 2500 in population. Dividing the number of urban 
residents by the county’s total population, results in the percentage of residents in 
a county that reside in an urban area.
In the models, the white vote for the Republican candidates is extrapolated 
based upon the racial turnout data that the three states keep examined. To arrive 
at the dependent variable, the percent o f white GOP voters, we take the black 
ballots and multiply by .10 to give us a GOP black vote. Since blacks are 
overwhelmingly loyal to the Democratic Party, this assumption seems to be a safe 
one (Miller and Shanks 1996).^ Overall, black loyalty to the Democratic Party tends 
to be the highest in the black belt counties of the Deep South (Black and Black 
1987; 1992; Lamis 1988; Bullock 1998). Next, we take the total number of GOP 
ballots and subtract the GOP black vote. This gives us the closest possible 
approximation for a GOP white vote. To compute the percentage of GOP white
^Parishes are administrative units analogous to counties. Louisiana has 64 
parishes.
^Lamis (1988) presents data on the historic loyalty of southern blacks to the 
Democratic Party. More recently, blacks voted for Democratic gubernatorial 
candidates at extraordinarily high rates. In the 1998 Georgia campaign, Roy 
Barnes garnered 90 percent of the black vote (CNN/AIIPolitics Exit Poll 1998). 
South Carolina has featured similar patterns. In 1994 and 1998, Democrats Nick 
Theodore and Jim Hodges respectively won 92 percent o f the black vote in both 
elections (CNN/AIIPolitics Exit Poll 1994; 1998). In 1995, Democrat Cleo Fields 
won 95 percent of the black vote in Louisiana (University o f New Orleans Poll 
1995).
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votes for a Republican candidate, we divide the GOP white vote by the total number 
of white ballots cast.
CASE STUDIES AND EMPIRICAL RESULTS
We now test the hypotheses detailed above in the three states that this 
chapter examines. Unlike the gubernatorial campaigns during the segregation era, 
mainstream candidates generally make no blatant racial appeals (Black 1976; 
Lamis 1988). Today, many blacks find Republican proposals such as welfare 
reform and elimination of affirmative action to be objectionable, but some white 
voters may vote for a Republican candidate based solely on ideas that they 
perceive as anti-black.
Georgia 1998
Georgia has been among the most loyal states to the Democratic Party 
(Lamis 1988; Aistrup 1989). Since the end of Reconstruction, no Republican 
candidate has won a gubernatorial campaign in the state. Yet, to say no inter-party 
competition took place in the state would be misleading. Unlike Arkansas that Key 
(1949) found the most solidly Democratic state, factions w ithin the Georgia 
Democratic Party have existed. In fact, Georgia has a long legacy o f bi-factionalism 
(Key 1949; Black 1983; Lamis 1988)."* From the 1930s through the 1950s, Georgia
'‘Key (1949) defines factionalism as “any combination, clique, or grouping or 
voters and political leaders who unite at a particular time in support of a candidate 
(16). In some states like Florida, factions appear for only an election or two, while 
states like Georgia and Louisiana featured factions that were long-lasting. In the 
states with durable factions, the foctionalism usually revolved around a candidate,
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featured a bi-factionalism that resembled in some ways a two-party competition, 
w ith the Talmadge faction, whom the rural areas supported, versus the Anti- 
Talmadge faction, a more progressive urban faction (Key 1949; Bartley 1970; Black 
1983; Lamis 1988; Bass and DeVries 1995).
As the pretense of two-party competition within the Democratic Party was 
disappearing, the Republican Party slowly began to grow in the state beginning in 
the 1950s. As in much of the South, Georgia had no organized Republican Party 
until the 1960s. The only Republican candidates came from extreme north Georgia 
and typified Key’s (1949) discussion o f “mountain Republicanism” in a few southern 
states. Beginning in the 1950s, some Republicans sought office in urban areas of 
the state, primarily supported by upper-class white urban voters looking for an 
alternative to the rural Democratic candidates (Bartley 1970; Bass and DeVries 
1995). In 1964, the Republican Party arrived on the scene in a monumental way 
w ith the Goldwater landslide and the victory of Howard “Bo” Callaway in the 3"^  
congressional district.
As discussed in the previous chapter, Callaway came extremely close to 
winning the govemorship in 1966, but he lost by a provision of the state constitution 
that threw the close election into the Democratic-dominated State House (Bullock 
1998). After this near-win in 1966, the Republican Party at the state level fe ll into 
a chasm from which it would not emerge until the 1990s. The next serious 
Republican gubernatorial candidate came in 1990 when Johnny Isakson won 45
like Talmadge in Georgia or Long in Louisiana (Black and Black 1987).
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percent of the vote against Democrat Zell Miller. In 1994, first-tim e candidate Guy 
M illner, a wealthy Atlanta businessman, nearly defeated M iller, mainly due to 
Miller’s controversial proposal to remove the Confederate battle flag from the state 
flag.
In 1998, Millner was again the Republican gubernatorial nominee, while Roy 
Games, a longtime member of the Georgia General Assembly, was the Democratic 
nominee.® While Millner had the advantage of running against a weakened M iller 
in a very Republican year nationwide in 1994, Millner did not face the same 
environment in 1998. Since the 1994 election. M iller had become one of the most 
popular governors in Georgia history, and his popularity carried over to Barnes. 
Black voter turnout was extremely high in the 1998 election, an event which is 
always beneficial to Democratic candidates in Georgia (Lamis 1988; Bullock 1998). 
Simultaneously, Barnes and Millner disgruntled many white voters due to the 
negativity of television commercials run by both candidates. Consequently, Millner 
lost to Barnes, only garnering 44 percent o f the vote.
Figure 4.1 illustrates the statewide vote for both Barnes and Millner. Table 
4.1 lists descriptive statistics for each variable, while Table 4.2 demonstrates all 
significant and non-significant findings after we test the model. We test the 
hypotheses, using OLS regression, to see the impact that race played in this 
election.
^Georgia governors have been limited to two consecutive four-year terms 
since 1977. Thus, Zell M iller could not run again in 1998.
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Figure 4.1 
County-Level Vote Returns
Millner
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Table 4.1
Descriptive Statistics for Georgia Model Variables
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Range
Black percentage 
of county population
27.42 17.33 27.70 79.40
Republican normal vote 52.84 8.59 53.40 50.53
Urban counties 29.75 27.15 27.70 97.48
Percentage of whites 
with college experience
21.83 8.26 19.73 46.66
Percent of white votes 
for Millner-1998
51.52 8.15 51.68 43.34
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Table 4.2
Regression of Percent of W hite Votes for Millner
Percent o f white votes for Millner-1998
Black percentage of county population .273****
(.064)
Republican normal vote .725****
(.124)
Urban counties -.038
(.024)
Percentage of whites with college experience .387****
(.086)
Constant -1.946
R2 .40
Adjusted R^ .38
N 159
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001
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Based on the results of the multivariate analysis, it appears that physical 
proximity racial threat voting was taking place among white Georgia voters in 1998. 
Overall, the model is successful in predicting 38 percent of the variance in the 
dependent variable, the white vote for Millner. The average error made when 
predicting the white vote for M illner is 6.5. As we see from Table 4.2, a large part 
o f the strength o f the model derives from the strength of the white collegiate 
variable, but the association is in the opposite direction from the hypothesis. 
Therefore, it is dangerous to read too much into the overall strength of the model 
due to this factor.
Among white voters in Georgia’s black belt counties, race was having an 
effect upon voting patterns. The first hypothesis suggests that white voters in the 
black belt are more susceptible to racially influenced voting than their counterparts 
elsewhere. The findings are in a manner consistent with the hypothesis. The 
unstandardized coefficient had an impact of .27 on the dependent variable, the 
percentage of the white vote for Guy Millner.
In an attempt to take into account white voters who may not normally vote 
Republican, we use a Republican normal vote. The GOP base vote is an average 
of the percentage of votes received by Republican presidential candidates in the 
last three elections. Past research indicates that such normal votes are effective 
in determining voters who typically vote a particular political party (Bond, Fleischer, 
and Talbert 1997). Of course, the GOP base vote has an extremely strong positive 
correlation with the Millner vote. The Republican base vote had a positive
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relationship of .73 with the dependent variable, but the independent variable, 
percent black of a county, still had a strong positive impact on the dependent 
variable despite the presence of the base vote. Again, this suggests that living 
close to large concentrations of black voters had an impact upon white Georgia 
voters in the 1998 gubernatorial election, beyond the long-term presidential base 
vote.
The urban variable shows a negative impact on the Millner vote at -.04. The 
urbanization hypothesis suggests that racial threat does not influence urban white 
voters to the extent of their rural counterparts. While a negative association exists 
between urbanism and the Millner vote, the strength of the relationship is not 
statistically significant. This might suggest that urbanization does not play as great 
a role as thought in mitigating racial attitudes. Prudence demands that one is guilty 
of interpreting too much in this relationship due to its statistical insignificance, but 
it does appear that physical proximity threat voting is not endemic of only rural 
areas.
In a surprising finding, college education did affect the white vote fo r Millner, 
but in a manner contrary to our hypothesis. The education hypothesis contended 
that some amount of college education would lessen the impact o f physical 
proximity racial threat voting. According to the model, the relationship is in the 
opposite direction than we might expect. The relationship between college 
educated white voters and the Millner vote was .39. Further, this relationship was 
significant at less than the .001 level. Past research indicates that white voters with
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less than a college education are prone to racial threat voting (Giles and Buckner
1995). In the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election, this is not the case. Perhaps, 
college education has less o f an impact on racial attitudes than assumed, or it is 
closely related to other measures such as the GOP normal vote. A bivariate 
correlation revealed that an association o f .54 at less than the .001 level existed 
between the GOP normal vote and some college education. This helps to explain 
some of the relationship between the dependent variable and college education. 
As we w ill see in the Louisiana and South Carolina models, both of these states 
have fewer college educated white citizens, making it more likely that the larger 
Georgia collegiate population might act in ways contrary to the ways of those in 
Louisiana or South Carolina.
In summary, it appears that racial threat as activated by physical proximity 
to large black populations was present in the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election. 
According to the model, it also appears that physical proximity’s impact is not 
relegated solely to rural areas. The impact o f some college education also had an 
influence upon the M illner vote, and the impact was positive. The educational 
hypothesis suggests that college education would possibly decrease the effect of 
physical proximity on racial threat voting. One cannot read the significance o f this 
relationship between college education and the white M illner vote as indicating 
education did not lead to racial threat voting. Instead, college education was highly 
correlated with the GOP normal vote, helping to explain this strong association.
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Louisiana 1995
Much like Georgia, Louisiana has a history of bi-factionai politics (Key 1949; 
Black and Black 1987; Lamis 1988). The Longs and the Anti-Longs were factions 
that clashed within the Louisiana Democratic Party. Unlike the Talmadge/Anti- 
Talmadge split in Georgia, the Longs and the Anti-Long competition was a conflict 
o f longer duration. Through the 1960s, the Long camp was usually the victor in 
statewide elections, but the Anti-Longs never really died out despite their lack of 
widespread success. By the 1970s, both factions had ceased to exist (Lamis 1988; 
Bass and DeVries 1995). The last Long candidate to hold statewide office was 
Russell Long, son o f Huey, when he retired from the U.S. Senate in 1986.
As we saw in the last chapter, the Republican Party in Louisiana developed 
more quickly than any other Deep South state. In 1956, Louisiana became the first 
Deep South state to vote for a Republican presidential candidate, due to 
Eisenhower’s position on offshore oil deposits (Black and Black 1992). Also, viable 
Republican gubernatorial candidates preceded the Goldwater landslide o f 1964. 
Despite this initial success, it would take Louisiana Republicans until 1979 to win 
the governorship. As Lamis (1988) discusses, David Treen, a Democrat-tumed- 
Republican, won the governorship in 1979, but the election was odd, even by 
Louisiana’s standards. Treen was the beneficiary o f being endorsed by popular 
Democratic politicians. Although he won in 1979, he lost by a wide margin in his 
1983 reelection bid.
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Since 1975, Louisiana uses a nonpartisan primary to determine governors.® 
This provides for a battle royale between multitudes of candidates from both 
parties. The two candidates with the highest vote totals from the primary face each 
other in a runoff. The 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial runoff pitted Republican Mike 
Foster against Democratic Congressman Cleo Fields, who was black. The fact that 
there was a white candidate running against a black candidate might have provided 
for even heightened racial threat voting among some white voters. Additionally, 
one m ight expect to find heavier black tumout due to the presence of a black 
candidate (Bullock, Caddie, and Kuzenski 1995). Foster won the election with 63.5 
percent o f the vote in route to winning to winning 58 of the state’s 62 parishes. 
Figure 4.2 illustrates the statewide vote for both candidates.
Table 4.3 presents the descriptive statistics for the variables in the Louisiana 
model, and Table 4.4 displays the results of regression analysis for the Louisiana 
model. Like our analysis o f Georgia, we use a GOP base vote to net out white 
voters who might not usually vote Republican. Given the religious division in the 
state, the model also uses a Roman Catholic control variable. The variable takes 
a percentage of those residents that are Roman Catholic as compared with the 
overall parish population. Since Fields had represented two different versions of 
the racially drawn 4"^  congressional district, we include a dummy variable for those
®AII gubernatorial candidates run against each other in a nonpartisan 
primary. The two candidates with the highest percentage of the primary vote face 
each other in a primary runoff. The winner of the runoff becomes the governor. No 
consideration is taken into account for parties. It is possible that two candidates in 
the runoff may be of the same party (Lamis 1988).
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parishes that Fields once represented. The reason for the creation and inclusion 
o f this variable is based on the rationale that white voters in the old 4“’ district might 
not cast votes based on racial threat since Fields had represented them in the past. 
Since a black congressman had represented them, some o f the fear that leads 
white voters to cast a vote based on race alone might have been absolved.
149
Figure 4.2 
County-Level Vote Returns
o
Foster
Table 4.3
Descriptive Statistics for Louisiana Model Variables
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Range
Black percentage 
o f parish population
30.45 14.10 29.50 60.10
Fields control variable .46 .50 .000 1.00
Republican normal vote 51.10 7.93 51.98 33.40
Roman Catholic 
control variable 24.95 26.22 10.10 84.18
Urban counties 42.37 28.33 37.41 99.89
Percentage of whites 
with college experience
20.29 6.55 18.53 30.73
Percent of white votes 
for Foster-1995
85.25 8.42 86.86 63.47
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Table 4.4
Regression o f Percent of White Votes for Foster
Percent of white votes for Foster-1995
Black percentage of parish population -.223*
(.119)
Fields control 2.492
(2.327)
Republican normal vote .408*
(.200)
Roman Catholic control -.036
(.049)
Urban parishes -.040
(.047)
Percentage of whites with college experience -.626*
(.233)
Constant 81.979
R2 .26
Adjusted R^ .18
N 64
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<-10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001
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The results from the model indicate that racial threat voting is not occurring. 
Overall, the model predicts 18 percent o f the variance in the dependent variable, 
white vote for Mike Foster. The standard error o f the estimate is 7.68.
According to the model, white voters in black belt parishes were less likely 
to vote for Foster. While the relationship between parishes with greater numbers 
of black residents is significant with the white vote for Foster, the direction of the 
relationship is in the opposite direction than the hypothesis predicts. Indeed, living 
in a parish with a high black population appears to make white voters less likely to 
vote for Foster.
While the association between the urban parishes and Foster’s percentage 
of the vote is negative, the relationship is neither large nor statistically significant. 
W hile white voters in urban parishes were less likely to vote for Foster according 
to the model, reading too much into the relationship would be hazardous due to its 
m inuscule size and its insignificance. Perhaps one reason for this relative 
weakness of the variable is that the only urban parish that Foster did not carry was 
Orleans Parish.
White voters with college education were more likely to cast a vote for Cleo 
Fields. This hypothesis did perform in the expected direction. The relationship was 
-.626 between whites with a college education and a vote for Foster. A bivariate 
correlation reveals that an association exists o f-.379 on at the .001 level between 
white voters with a college education and a high black percentage of a parish’s 
population. W hile college educated white voters live in black belt parishes, they
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were not as many as in metropolitan areas. Still a negative impact exists, as 
predicted.
The Roman Catholic control variable had little impact upon the dependent 
variable. The Roman Catholic parishes were less likely to vote for Foster, although 
the relationship was not statistically significant. W hile Foster is from South 
Louisiana, he is Protestant. Given Foster’s consen/ative stands on social issues like 
abortion, one might expect Roman Catholic voters to be more receptive to Foster. 
A  bivariate correlation between the Catholic control variable and the GOP base 
vote reveals a relationship o f -.34 at the .01 level. As the percentage of a parish's 
population that is Roman Catholic rises, the support for Republican presidential 
candidates decrease. Given this information, it is not as surprising that Foster did 
not fare well among Roman Catholic voters.
Finally, we tested the parishes that Fields represented in either configuration 
o f the 4*^  congressional district. One might expect those white voters in these 
parishes represented by Fields would be more familiar with him. Consequently, 
they may not feel threatened by the fact that he was black. The finding in Table 4.4 
reveals a positive association between the Fields control variable and the Foster 
vote, although the relationship was not statistically significant. Due to the unstable 
nature of this relationship, it would be dangerous to draw any conclusions from this 
result.
In Louisiana, racial threat based on physical proximity to large black 
populations apparently was not at work in the gubernatorial election of 1995. In
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fact, the relationship between whites in the black belt and the Foster vote was a 
negative one, which was in the opposite direction predicted by the hypothesis. 
Although Giles and Buckner (1995) found racial threat voting operating in the 1991 
gubernatorial runoff between David Duke and Edwin Edwards, this analysis 
provides no evidence that this was the case in 1995. This may underscore a basic 
necessity o f physical proximity racial threat voting: political context sets the stage 
for racial threat voting. W ithout explicitly racial issues or candidates, it may be that 
the likelihood of racial threat voting based on physical space lessens, despite this 
election having a white candidate and black candidate in the runoff. Although such 
a racial difference between these two candidates might have some other type of 
racial appeal, it did not figure prominently in the physical proximity analysis. In 
Chapter 5, we take a closer look at the potential impact of the fact that a black 
candidate was running against a white candidate.
One o f the factors that may have hurt Fields was the feud within the 
Democratic Party (Parent and Perry 1998). Fields had fought a bitter campaign 
against Democrat Mary Landrieu in the open primary. When Fields placed second 
to get into the runoff against Foster, Landrieu refused to endorse him. This may 
have led some white voters to vote for Foster. This again suggests that physical 
proximity racial threat voting does not occur in all cases, even when a black 
candidate is running against a white one. The political climate must be conducive 
to physical proximity racial threat voting. Othenwise, other issues w ill come to the 
forefront.
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While the statistical analysis does not support a conclusion that race had a 
definitive impact in the 1995 gubernatorial election, it might be possible that the 
electorate was so racially polarized that Foster received the bulk o f the white vote 
regardless of racial threat (Parent and Perry 1998). In part, we examine this 
question further in the next chapter when the exploring the role of symbolic racial 
attitudes in racial threat voting. Religion apparently had no significant role either. 
Although Foster was the candidate o f the Christian Right, this apparently was not 
enough for him to sway Roman Catholic voters. In the past, religion has often 
played an equally important, if not more important, role in Louisiana politics (Lamis 
1988; Bass and DeVries 1995). The 1995 election apparently was not one of them.
What may have been more important than anything else in 1995 was public 
image. Although Mike Foster is a millionaire, he portrayed himself as a working 
man with a common sense approach to government. To underscore this image, 
Foster appeared in campaign ads wearing a welder’s cap and engaging in outdoor 
recreation (Parent and Perry 1998). Foster also portrayed himself as a gun owner 
and a Christian. Foster was also the author of Louisiana's concealed handgun law, 
which made it easier for law-abiding citizens to receive such a permit. Given 
Louisiana’s propensity towards populism (Key 1949; Lamis 1988), this alone may 
have been enough to mobilize the working class in the state to cast their votes for 
Foster, preventing race from becoming an openly mobilizing factor in this particular 
campaign.
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South Carolina 1994
Historically, race played an important role in the politics o f the Palmetto 
S tate/ As Lamis (1988) details, South Carolina Democrats did not break down into 
constant race-baiting characteristic of Mississippi, where the state’s white 
Democratic leaders in the 1960s refused to court black votes resulting in black 
citizens creating the Mississippi Freedom Democratic Party. The main reason for 
this was that the Republican Party within the state received a huge boost in the 
1960s. Besides the Goldwater sweep in 1964, United States Senator Strom 
Thurmond was an early convert to the Republican Party, which led to some early 
success for the Republicans within the state. W ith Thurmond’s conversion, many 
white voters disgruntled with the civil rights movement began voting Republican in 
large numbers (Topping, Lazarek, and Linder 1966). As discussed in the previous 
chapter. South Carolina was the first Deep South state since Reconstruction to 
elect a Republican governor when James Edwards was elected in 1974.
Since the initial gubernatorial breakthrough for the GOP, the period from 
1974 through 1994, both parties had held the governor’s seat equally. From 1978 
to 1986, Democrat Richard Riley was governor. Succeeding Riley, Carol Campbell 
was the Republican governor from 1986 to 1994. The 1994 South Carolina 
gubernatorial election featured Republican David Beasley and Democrat Nick 
Theodore. Beasley was a candidate unlike Campbell who appealed to
^Only Mississippi has a greater percentage of its population that is black than 
South Carolina.
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conservative fiscal voters and business leaders. In contrast, Beasley was more 
appealing to Christian conservatives. This trend was a new one in South Carolina 
Republican politics (Kuzenski 1998).
In addition, Beasley ran on a promise to keep the Confederate battle flag 
flying over the State Capitol. Since the Brown decision in 1954, the state has flown 
both the battle flag as well as the state flag atop the State Capitol.^ Many blacks 
see the battle flag as a racial issue while many white voters, especially those in the 
lower socioeconomic class, support the flying o f the flag (Clark 1997). Therefore, 
we might expect to see some racial voting among white voters due to this stand 
alone. In a very good year for Republicans, Beasley won with only 51 percent. 
Contrast this with Campbell’s reelection number of 69 percent in 1990, and Beasley 
was not as successful in holding together the coalition built by Campbell.^ Figure 
4.3 illustrates the counties won by both candidates.
Table 4.5 presents descriptive statistics for the South Carolina model 
variables, and Table 4.6 displays the results o f the model. Like the previous two 
states, we utilize a GOP base vote. The GOP base vote has an extremely strong 
positive correlation with the Beasley vote. Overall, the model predicts 38 percent 
of the variance in the dependent variable, the white vote for David Beasley. The 
standard error of the estimate is 5.69.
^Alabama followed the same practice until 1995. Both Georgia and 
Mississippi have the battle flag incorporated into their state flags.
^Campbell won 25 percent of the black vote in 1990 against a black 
Democratic candidate (Lamis 1988).
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Figure 4.3 
1994 County-Level Returns
VO
i  Beasley
Table 4.5
Descriptive Statistics for South Carolina Model Variables
Mean Standard
Deviation
Median Range
Black percentage 
of county population
37.58 16.18 36.81 60.71
Republican normal vote 53.30 9.22 53.83 35.57
Urban counties 37.44 21.67 33.95 87.98
Percentage of whites 
with college experience
23.26 8.61 22.02 32.90
Percent o f white votes 
for Beasley-1994
65.09 7.20 63.80 29.52
Percent of white votes 
for Beasley-1998
58.85 11.10 57.98 74.72
Note: Only the figures o f the Beasley vote in 1994 and 1998 changed during the 
two elections. Thus, all descriptive statistics fo r the South Carolina models are 
Included in this table.
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Table 4.6
Regression of Percent o f White Votes for Beasley-1994
Percent o f white votes for Beasley-1994
Black percentage o f county population 680****
(.136)
Republican normal vote 1 213****
(.261)
Urban counties -.035
(.062)
Percentage of whites with college experience -.225
(.221)
Constant -18.597
R2 .43
Adjusted R^ .38
N 46
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p< 10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.OQl
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The first hypothesis, which posits that white voters in counties with large 
concentrations of blacks are more likely to vote for Republican candidates for racial 
reasons, is tested on South Carolina. Based on regression analysis, support exists 
for the racial threat hypothesis at work in the black belt counties of South Carolina. 
In fact the support o f the black belt hypothesis is very strong with the 
unstandardized coefficient being .680. Some of this feeling may be connected to 
support for Confederate symbols as promised by Beasley.
Regarding the urbanization hypothesis, no statistically significant relationship 
exists between the urban counties and the Beasley vote, although the results did 
have an impact in the predicted manner. It does not appear that the urban white 
voters were voting under a feeling of racial threat in large numbers, but we cannot 
say that race was affecting urban white voters. The only two urban counties that 
Beasley carried were Greenville and Spartanburg, both of which are in the 
Piedmont section of the state that has a history of being supportive of the GOP 
(Lamis 1988).
Among whites with a college education, there was a negative impact of -.225 
with the Beasley vote, although the relationship was not statistically significant. 
Apparently these more educated white voters did not feel threatened. Also, support 
for Confederate symbols often declines among more highly educated white voters 
(Clark 1997).
As expected, the GOP normal vote was extremely significant with the 
Beasley vote. This variable had an impact of 1.21 on the dependent variable, the
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white vote for Beasley. For every unit increase in the GOP normal vote, there was 
a 1.21 increase in the Beasley vote. This indicates that Beasley’s election hinged 
upon white voters who normally voted Republican. It also underscores that not 
many white Democratic voters crossed party lines to vote for Beasley, but most 
white South Carolinians now affiliate with the GOP (Lamis 1988; Kuzenski 1998).
In South Carolina, one facet o f the model is upheld. In 1994, some racial 
threat voting was taking place in counties with high black population, but the data 
do not support the other hypotheses. Although the relationships were in the 
predicted direction, neither college education nor urbanism was statistically 
significant predictors of the Beasley percentage o f the vote. Still, white voters in 
the black belt and white voters who normally voted Republican were crucial to 
Beasley’s election. By selecting only black belt counties in the model, the bivariate 
correlation between the white percentage of a black belt county’s population and 
the Republican normal vote reveals a relationship of .83 at the .001 level. This 
indicates that white voters in the South Carolina black belt are very loyal to the 
Republican Party. It is not surprising that Beasley had such great success among 
white voters there. The 1994 election indicates that Beasley's electoral base was 
extremely tenuous. In 1998, Beasley discovered the hard way just how fragile his 
basis of support was.
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South Carolina 1998
Since South Carolina maintained racial turnout data for both elections during 
the dissertation’s time frame, we are able to test the model again. In 1998, Beasley 
was the incumbent govemor seeking a second term, and his Democratic opponent 
was Jim Hodges. During his first term, Beasley attempted to remove the 
Confederate battle flag from the State Capitol. Many white voters, especially lower 
socioeconomic class rural white voters, support the continued flying of the battle 
flag in South Carolina. The state legislature rebuffed Beasley’s attempt at removing 
the flag, and it continued flying over the Capitol (Kuzenski 1998).
Promising in 1994 to keep the flag flying, Beasley reneged and paid a heavy 
political price for this effort. Many of his white supporters became disgruntled. In 
fact, some whites adorned their cars with bumper stickers proclaiming, “Dump the 
Govemor-Keep the Flag!” (Kuzenski 1998). Given Beasley’s rather narrow victory 
in 1994, political pundits predicted that Beasley might be headed for trouble in 
1998. As it turned out, Beasley lost his reelection bid, garnering only 45 percent 
of the vote against Democrat Hodges. Figure 4.4 illustrates the counties won by 
each candidate. We tested the same model used in 1994 on the 1998 contest. 
Table 4.7 presents all significant and insignificant relationships between the 
dependent variable, white vote for David Beasley.
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Figure 4.4 
1998 County-Level Returns
0\Ut
i  Beasley
Table 4.7
Regression of Percent of White Votes for Beasley-1998
Percent o f white votes for Beasley-1998
Black percentage of county population .142
(.275)
Republican normal vote .435
(.527)
Urban counties -.070
(.126)
Percentage of whites with college experience -.021
(.446)
Constant 33.442
R2
Adjusted R  ^
N
.024
-.071
46
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001
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Clearly, the identical model that explained 38 percent o f the variance in the 
white vote for Beasley in 1994 was not effective at explaining his vote in 1998. At 
11 percent, the 1998 model explains very little o f the dependent variable, while the 
standard error o f the estimate is 11.49. Clearly, the political environment in the 
state was drastically different in 1998 than it was in 1994.
The first hypothesis which argues that white voters in the black belt are more 
like ly to vote for Republican candidates was not statistically significant. The 
relationship between this variable and the dependent variable was .142. While the 
relationship was in the expected direction, the relationship is not statistically 
significant. Again, Beasley’s retreat on the Confederate flag may explain the 
precipitous decline among black belt whites who were strongly supportive o f 
Beasley just four years earlier.
The urbanization hypothesis was not a good predictor o f the Beasley vote 
in 1998 either. While the urbanization variable did have a negative impact of -.07, 
the relationship was not statistically significant. Again, an unsurprising finding, but 
interesting nonetheless. According to the model, the relationship between urban 
white voters and Beasley percentage of the vote dropped slightly. This indicates 
that perhaps some less educated urban white voters were abandoning Beasley as 
well.
Among white voters with some college education, the relationship between 
th is variable and Beasley’s percentage of the vote was negative. The impact o f 
these two variables was -.021, although no statistical significance was present in
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the relationship. Given the lack of a solid relationship, one must interpret this figure 
with caution. Some white voters with college education were slightly more 
supportive o f Beasley in 1998.
In a finding that was indicative of Beasley’s vulnerable position in 1998, a 
meager .435 relationship existed between the GOP base vote and the Beasley 
vote. This relationship was not statistically significant. Compared with the 
significant 1.213 impact of the GOP base vote in 1994 to the small relationship in 
1998 gives one an idea of how Beasley had alienated white voters who typically 
vote Republican in South Carolina. To gauge the change in support for Beasley, 
we ran additional analysis using the difference in Beasley’s support from 1994 to 
1998 as the dependent variable. Table 4.8 features the results o f this analysis.
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Table 4.8
Regression of Difference in the White Vote for Beasley, 1994-1998
Difference in 
Full Model
white vote for Beasley
Bivariate Model
Black percentage
of county population -.534** -.192*
(.250) (.097)
Republican normal vote -.254
(.594)
Urban counties -.065
(.116)
Percentage of whites with .139
college experience (.408)
White vote for Beasley-1994 -.564
(.377)
Constant 54.130 .976
R^ .19 .08
Adjusted R^ .09 .06
N 46 46
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<.001
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Overall, these two models explain 9 and 6 percent o f the variance 
respectively. Still, it appears that race had an effect on white support for Beasley 
in 1998. As the table demonstrates, Beasley lost support among his two most 
important bases of support: white voters in the black belt and white Republicans. 
The only variable to reach statistical significance was among white voters in South 
Carolina’s black belt region. It is clear that these white voters abandoned Beasley 
en masse during the 1998 campaign. W hile only the black percentage variable 
was statistically significant, overall the model indicates that Beasley lost large 
amounts of support from loyal white Republicans, urban voters, whites in the black 
belt, and the 1994 Beasley backers. The bivariate regression reveals that alone 
whites in the black belt turned on Beasley in 1998. Again, this suggests that most 
of the drop in Beasley's support was due to race.
In 1998, the model that was moderately successful in 1994 was not a good 
predictor of the Beasley percentage of the vote. None of the relationships between 
the independent variables and the dependent variables were statistically significant. 
In 1998, racial threat voting was not taking place as it may have been in 1994. The 
model again underscores a prerequisite for physical proximity racial threat voting. 
Political context plays a large role in the presence or absence o f racial voting. In 
1994, one of the political issues that may have led white voters to vote under a 
feeling of racial threat was Beasley’s promise o f keeping the Confederate flag flying 
despite the protests of some black voters.
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By 1998, Beasley broke that promise by trying to take the flag down from the 
State Capitol. Although unsuccessful, Beasley paid a price for his change o f heart 
because many white voters abandoned Beasley over his gaffe. In addition, the 
Democratic nominee made a promise that he would make no attempts to remove 
the flag from the Capitol. This may have led some white voters to abandon Beasley 
for Hodges. Again, this may reiterate that political context plays a large role in 
racial threat voting.
CONCLUSION
After testing the models in these elections, the findings indicate mixed 
results. The 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election lends support to the idea of 
physical proximity racial threat voting. In that model, three o f four independent 
variables had a statistically significant impact upon the white vote for Guy Millner, 
although one of these variables, whites with a college education, performed in a 
direction opposite than the hypotheses predicted. The lone insignificant variable 
was urbanism. While Millner was not a blatantly racial candidate, he did have issue 
stances that were not pleasing to black voters. Foremost among them, M illner 
supported a rollback of affirmative action programs in the state and sharply curbing 
welfare programs in the state. These stances alone may have been enough to 
activate some white voters into voting for Millner.
The analysis o f the 1995 Louisiana election indicates that physical proximity 
racial threat voting was not taking place at a discernable level. This might come as
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a mild surprise given the previous findings of racial threat voting in David Duke’s 
1990 and 1991 statewide elections (Giles and Buckner 1995). Despite the election 
featuring a white Republican nominee and a black Democratic nominee, race 
apparently played no large role in influencing white voters. In fact, white voters in 
the black belt parishes were less likely to support Republican Mike Foster, and a 
negative association existed between black belt whites in Louisiana and the 
likelihood to cast a vote for Foster. It would appear that ideology may have played 
a larger role in this election. Foster portrayed himself as a common sense 
conservative with the same values of Louisiana's working class, while Fields 
portrayed himself as more liberal on the issues.
In South Carolina, the 1994 gubernatorial election suggested that racial 
threat was a factor in vote choice of whites. Among white voters in black belt 
counties, greater support existed for the Republican nominee and winner, David 
Beasley. Black belt whites may have supported Beasley for his stated position for 
the continued flying of the Confederate battle flag over the State Capitol.
Just four years later. South Carolina displayed a drastically different 
outcome. David Beasley was running for reelection. During his first term, Beasley 
had given up the ghost and tried to remove the Confederate battle flag from atop 
the State Capitol in Columbia. Beasley was unsuccessful in getting the state 
legislature to go along with this plan, but Beasley had mortally wounded himself. 
Many white voters became angry and disgruntled with Beasley, and Beasley's 
Democratic opponent in 1998, Jim Hodges, promised to leave the flag alone. The
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result was an overwhelming defeat fo r Beasley. It also underscored the 
predicament of South Carolina Republicans: they could not go too far in alienating 
their white base of support, or voters would defeat them at the polls.
In three of the four models, the other three variables, urbanism, college 
education, and the Republican normal vote behaved as predicted by the 
hypotheses, while the college education vote did not have an association in the 
expected direction in the Georgia model. Urbanism had a negative impact upon the 
white vote for all Republican candidates in the observed elections, although the 
coefficients were so small and insignificant that no meaningful trends can be drawn 
from these associations. College education, as well, had a negative impact in 
Louisiana and South Carolina. Only in Louisiana though did college education 
have a statistically significant negative association, and in the Louisiana model no 
physical proximity racial threat voting was detected. Of course, the GOP normal 
vote had a strong relationship with these Republican candidates, although it was 
the weakest for David Beasley in 1998.
What do these analyses say about the prevalence of physical proximity racial 
threat voting? Based upon the analysis o f these four separate elections across 
these states, we can conclude that racial threat voting does not exist in a vacuum, 
oblivious to political candidates and issues. Political context plays a vital role in the 
presence or absence of physical proximity racial threat voting. Certain types o f 
candidates and issues lead white voters to vote based upon race. When these 
white voters, who may be susceptible to racial threat voting, are presented with
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candidates and issues that are not openly racial, it seems that they use other cues 
to decide their vote choice. For example, ideology may have played a more 
important role for Mike Foster’s victory in 1995, a concept that we explore in the 
next chapter.
When blatantly racial candidates or issues are present, it would appear that 
physical proximity racial threat voting is still in operation during the 1990s in 
Georgia and South Carolina. One could argue that Louisiana had blatantly racial 
candidates given the fact that one candidate was white and the other black, but the 
analysis does not bear out a significant relationship between physical proximity and 
racial threat voting in 1995. It might be possible that racial threat is operating in 
another dimension in this election. We explore this possibility further in the next 
chapter. In Georgia, it is likely that some of Millner’s issue stances may have been 
enough to mobilize some white voters. Clearer evidence of this exists in South 
Carolina. In both 1994 and 1998, race played a large role in the vote choice of 
white voters. In 1994, Beasley’s support of the Confederate flag likely helped sway 
many whites. Conversely, race had a negative impact upon Beasley in 1998 after 
his retreat on the flag issue. Here, rural white voters abandoned Beasley for his 
Democratic opponent due to his reversal.
These findings underscore that physical proximity racial threat voting needs 
certain types of candidates or issues to become activated. Without them, race does 
not matter as much. W ith racial candidates or issues, physical proximity racial 
threat voting operates, and the stark differences in the two South Carolina models
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support this conclusion. In the next chapter, we examine racial threat voting as a 
product of one's culture.
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CHAPTER 5 
EXAMINATION OF RACIAL THREAT AS A CONTEXT OF CULTURE
The previous chapter examined racial threat as a product o f physical 
proximity. When racial threat voting is influenced by living near high concentrations 
of black voters, white voters cast racially-influenced votes because o f the physical 
proximity aspect. Yet, is this physical proximity the only influence on racial threat 
voting? Perhaps, racial threat voting can occur as a product of one's culture. 
Predispositions which individuals hold for long periods of time may influence 
cultural racial threat voting. Sears and Funk (1999) find evidence that racial 
attitudes are deeply ingrained in some individuals as a result of their formative 
years. The racial attitudes of family or friends can have a large impact upon one’s 
political and racial attitudes. Sears and Funk (1999) assert that racial attitudes 
often need certain catalysts to stimulate racial voting. The authors argue that the 
civil rights movement served as a catalyst for many white voters in the 1960s to 
cast racially-influenced votes.
Given the importance that family has upon the formation of political attitudes, 
one’s rearing may be extremely important to the existence o f racial threat voting. 
Numerous studies have found evidence that family has a large influence on the 
formation of political attitudes. If racial threat is a consequence of one’s rearing,
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then some voters may cast a racially-influenced vote wherever they live. If so, this 
would not relegate racial threat voting to just the black-belt and urban areas with 
high black populations.
If one’s heritage does lead to certain racial attitudes, it could be symbolic 
racial gestures by political candidates trigger that racial threat. If so, then political 
candidates would not have to take blatantly racial stances to have racial threat 
voting occurring. Instead, muted issue stances could lead to racial voting by white 
supporters. For example, a candidate’s support for curbing affirmative action or 
social welfare programs may be enough to lead some white voters to cast a vote 
for this candidate. Also, one might expect that an election, like Louisiana in 1995, 
in which the contest featured a white candidate versus a black candidate might 
trigger racial threat voting due to cultural reasons. Before testing these 
hypotheses, we need to examine the prior literature on the phenomenon of 
symbolic racism to understand better the dynamics of this concept.
PRIOR RESEARCH
An extensive literature exists on the topic of symbolic racism. Symbolic 
racism differs from traditional, or biological racism, which is based on the premise 
that blacks were somehow biologically and genetically inferior to whites. With 
traditional racism, whites could rationalize the existence of slavery and later racial 
segregation (McConahay 1986). Since the civil rights movement, opinion polls 
have shown that the number of adherents o f traditional racism has been declining
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(Sears and Kinder 1971; Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo 1985). Yet this decline in 
tradition racism does not mean that race has evaporated as an issue for some 
whites. Schuman, Steeh, and Bobo (1985) found that certain issues, like affirmative 
action and welfare policies, are strongly opposed by some white voters. Further, 
black candidates have not had great success in attracting white voters unless black 
candidates are conservative and downplay racial issues (Perry 1996).
Further research attests that race is still present as a political issue. Edsall 
and Edsall (1991) state that at the presidential level certain issues like crime and 
welfare are in reality outward signs of the race issue at work. W hite voters 
continue to oppose social welfare programs that target specifically blacks as a 
whole, while they are less opposed to welfare programs that help all races (Bobo 
and Kluegel 1993). White opposition to affirmative action, forced busing, greater 
welfare spending, and support for strict law-and-order issues all have their root in 
deeply-held racial attitudes (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, Tyler, and 
Allen 1980; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1982; Gilens 1995; Kinder and 
Sanders 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley 1997). 
Further research indicates that whites have a propensity to be more harsh in their 
views towards black welfare recip ient as opposed to white ones (Peffley, Hurwitz, 
and Sniderman 1997).
Evidence also exists that the racial attitudes of white voters have played a 
significant factor in opposition to black rreyoral candidates (Sears and Kinder 1971; 
K inder and Sears 1981). Abramowitz (1994) found similar findings about white
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racial attitudes in their opposition to the Jesse Jackson presidential candidacy. 
Other authors have also found that a candidate stressing racial issues can also 
activate long-held racial attitudes among white voters (Kuzenski, Bullock, and 
Caddie 1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996).
Support for the continued prevalence of racial attitudes among white voters 
has not been universal. Hagen (1995) asserts that polling data reveals that most 
Americans do not mention race as an important problem in America, nor do most 
Americans cite race as a political issue. The data derived from opinion polls shows 
us what Americans claim, but it is impossible to determine if these answers are the 
unqualified truth. Other authors argue that white opposition to welfare policies and 
affirmative action are due to ideology, not race (Sniderman and Piazza 1993; 
Abramowitz 1994; Abramowitz and Sanders 1998). Roth (1994) also contends that 
most white Americans are not supportive of what they see as liberal policies, while 
Carmines and Memman (1993) assert that white opposition to welfare programs is 
more indicative of rugged individualism than racial attitudes. Others maintain that 
a mixture of race and conservatism lead to white opposition to affirmative action 
(Kuklinski, Sniderman, Knight, Piazza, Tetlock, Lawrence, and Mellers 1997).
In a study using polling data from over forty years, Sears Van Laar, Carillo, 
and Kosterman (1996) find evidence that race is still around as a political factor. 
While traditional racism has been on the wane since the 1960s, the authors argue 
that symbolic racism is still prevalent in the United States. While formal racial
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discrimination is no longer generally supported by most white citizens, it would be 
naive to argue that race no longer has an impact among some whites.
Symbolic Racism
With the decline in traditional racism, symbolic racism has taken its place. 
The concept was first articulated by Sears and Kinder (1971) when they were 
examining the 1969 Los Angeles mayoral election. In that election, the authors 
found that race was still affecting not only vote choice, but also the racial-influence 
derived from long-held political attitudes. As Kinder and Sanders (1996) argue, 
symbolic racism is not a constant. Rather, political context and candidates are vital 
in activating racial voting. Accordingly, most elections do not have racial threat 
voting, but occasionally some do.
What distinguishes symbolic racism from traditional racism? Sears, Van 
Laar, Carillo. and Kosterman (1997) conceptualize symbolic racism in three 
dimensions. First, symbolic racism is based on ideological grounds rather than 
blatantly racial grounds. Symbolic racism focuses instead on how white voters 
perceive that society should be structured. Symbolic racism also attempts to tie into 
the moral code and vision that white voters would like to see in this country.
Second, symbolic racism focuses upon social and welfare policies towards 
black citizens. Arguing that the time of legalized racial discrimination is nonexistent 
today, symbolic racism stresses that black citizens should work harder to better 
themselves in this country. Within this realm, blacks are often criticized for seeking
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too much special treatment from government through various social and welfare 
programs (Sears 1988).
Third, symbolic racism appeals to the work ethic o f white voters. An 
assumption of this appeal is “a negative socialization" among white voters about 
blacks as a whole (Sears Van Laar. Carillo, and Kosterman 1997, 21). In this 
aspect, symbolic racism assert that black citizens in some way “violate such 
traditional American values as the work ethic, traditional morality, and respect for 
traditional authority” (Sears Van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman 1997, 22; also see 
Kinder and Sanders 1981).
Thus, symbolic racism appeals to white voters on three different levels. 
Unlike traditional racism, which appeals to voters out of hatred and a belief in the 
inferiority of blacks as a race, symbolic racism discounts any such discussions o f 
traditional race relations. Rather, symbolic racism stresses that black citizens get 
special unwarranted treatment from government, that blacks do not work hard 
enough, and that blacks somehow violate the traditional moral fabric o f the United 
States. In this manner, symbolic racism can appeal to many white voters who 
normally would not be receptive to a traditional racial appeal.
Sears, Van Laar, Carillo, and Kosterman (1997) argue that symbolic racism 
is often hidden from view by overlapping conservative principles about social 
welfare policies. A  closer examination reveals that race is still very much a factor 
in the voting decisions of white voters. To reiterate, the political environment is key
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to the strength of symbolic racism. It requires a certain economic climate, issues, 
and political candidates for symbolic racism to have great appeal.
This finding, that the political environment plays a significant role in symbolic 
racism, coincides with the previous chapter. In the case o f physical proximity racial 
threat voting, political context was extremely important. W ith cultural racial threat 
voting, it may be that the same political environment is needed for it to flourish. For 
the balance o f this chapter, we examine racial threat from this cultural aspect, 
through the use of polling data.
IMPACT OF SYMBOLIC RACISM ON PARTY IDENTIFICATION
Before exploring the role o f symbolic racism at the state level, it would be 
beneficial to examine the role that symbolic racism plays on the formation of party 
identification both in the South and outside the region. Previous studies have 
argued that race has been pivotal in the growth of the Republican Party both in the 
South and in the non-South (Carmines and Stimson 1981 ; Lamis 1988; Edsall and 
Edsall 1991; Black and Black 1992), while others have argued that the growth of 
the Republican Party is more attributable to ideology than race (Beck 1977; 
Wolfinger and Arseneau 1978; W olfinger and Hagan 1985; Stanley 1987; Stanley 
and Castle 1988; Sniderman and Piazza 1993; Abramowitz 1994; Abramowitz and 
Sanders 1998).
By examining polling data compiled by the National Elections Studies (NES), 
we can test the factors that lead white voters to form an attachment to the parties.
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In this Instance, we examine the factors that lead one to fee! affinity with the 
Republican Party. An analysis of the NES data allows us to see if symbolic racism 
may be playing an underlying role in voter’s attachment to the Republican Party. 
Unlike the data presented later in the chapter, the NES allows us to test this posit 
on both southern and non-southern respondents.
DATA AND METHODS
In this analysis o f party identification, we utilized data from the NES 1994 
and 1998 datasets, since these two years closely corresponded to the elections 
analyzed in this research. The polling was a combination of telephone interviewing 
and person-to-person interviewing between November and January of each 
respective year. The respondents were part of a national sample in which each 
region of the nation was represented. Since we are concerned with predicting the 
behavior of white voters, the following analyses use only white respondents from 
the two polls.
Symbolic Racism
To test the impact of symbolic racial attitudes upon white voters’ party 
affiliation, the NES asked three questions of respondents in both 1994 and 1998 
that proved useful to constructing a symbolic racism measure. Respondents were 
asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or had no opinion on the following 
statements:
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1. Irish, Italians, Jewish, and other minorities overcame 
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do 
the same without any special favors.
2. It's really just a matter o f some people not trying hard 
enough. If blacks would only try harder they could be 
just as well off as whites.
3. Some people say that because of past discrimination 
blacks should be given preference in hiring and promotion. 
Others say that such preference in hiring and promotion is 
wrong because it gives blacks advantages they haven't 
earned. What about your opinion — are you for or against 
preferential hiring and promotion of blacks?
To derive a symbolic racism variable, two procedures were used.’ First, the 
responses from the three questions were averaged to derive a symbolic racism 
figure. Next, we utilized confirmatory principal-components factor analysis to 
determine the effectiveness of the averaging the scores together. The graph in 
Appendix A demonstrates the extremely close relationship between the two 
procedures. Therefore, we utilize the symbolic racism variable derived by 
arithmetic averaging during the remainder o f the statistical analysis in this chapter.
Other Variables
Besides symbolic racism, eight other independent variables were used in the 
analysis. W hile additional questions were asked in both years, these eight 
variables were chosen because they appeared in both samples. In addition to 
socioeconomic variables of age, education, income, and gender, we included four
’ For a complete discussion of the data manipulation and the procedures 
used in this chapter, see Appendix A.
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other Independent variables in the analysis. Ideology is a seven-point scale 
ranging from (1) which is extremely liberal to (7) which is extremely conservative. 
The question of government spending asked respondents to give their preferences 
on a seven-point scale about government services. The range proceeded from (1) 
spending more on government services to (7) cutting government services. The 
remaining two variables, foreign affairs and the economy, are questions which ask 
the respondents which of the two parties could best handle these problems. If the 
respondents did not believe that either party was best equipped to handle these 
issues, they were given the option of choosing neither party or no difference 
between the parties. By using these variables, we should gain some conception 
o f what issues were influencing voters in both samples to identify with the 
Republican Party.
FACTORS LEADING TO PARTY IDENTIFICATION
We now turn our attention to testing the variables that might influence party 
identification. In the statistical analysis presented, the dependent variable is 
dichotomous. It is coded as 1 for those respondents who claim to be Republican, 
and 0 for all others. Since only two possible answers to this question exist, 
ordinary-least squares (OLS) regression is not appropriate in this case. Therefore, 
we use logistic regression, which is used when the dependent variable is 
dichotomous. In logistic regression, the procedure estimates the independent 
variables in a probability model which predicts values for the dependent variable.
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Republican identification. We run the logit models for both the 1994 and 1998 NES 
datasets. In addition, the data for each year is divided into a southern subset, in 
which all respondents are white Southerners, and a non-southern subset in which 
the white respondents live outside the region.^ The following four tables present 
the results of the logistic regressions.
^The NES considers the South to be a thirteen-state region defined by the 
Census as including the states of Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, 
Louisiana, Maryland, North Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, W est Virginia, 
as well as the District o f Columbia.
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Table 5.1
Logistic Regression for Predicting Republican Party ID (Non-South 1994)
Independent
Variables
b S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes .286 .286
Age .264 .180
Education .129 .098
Income .014 .153
Gender (Male) .192 .385
Ideology (High=Conservative) .342*** .147
Handling of Foreign Affairs .095 .185
Govemment Spending .232* .133
Handling Economy .866**** .180
Constant -8.1660*** 2.35
N
Percent correctly classified 
Null prediction (percent) 
Pre
Model Chi-Square
207
79.7
65.3
41.5
96.06 (d f9 ,p  <.0001)
Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others.
The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal
to zero.
"p^.10; **ps.05; ***p^.01; ****ps.001
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Table 5.2
Logistic Regression for Predicting the Republican Party ID (South 1994)
Independent
Variables
b S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes .830* .064
Age -.160 .205
Education .258 .173
Income -.032 .213
Gender (Male) .857 .591
Ideology (High=Conservative) .218 .281
Handling of Foreign Affairs .554 .384
Government Spending .108 .214
Handling Economy .230 .229
Constant -12.2777*** 4.25
N
Percent correctly classified 
Null prediction (percent) 
Pre
Model Chi-Square
92
75.0
76.0 
.04
26.94 (df 9, p <.001 )
Notes: The dependent variable Is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others.
The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal
to zero.
*ps.10; **p^.05; ***p^.01; ****p^.001
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Table 5.3
Logistic Regression for Predicting the Republican Party ID (Non-South 1998)
Independent
Variables
b S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes .180 .178
Age -140 .122
Education .003 .087
Income -.042 .079
Gender (Male) .239 .385
Ideology (High=Conservative) .652**** .107
Handling o f Foreign Affairs .384*** .119
Government Spending .094 .093
Handling Economy .647**** .107
Constant -8.5678*** 1.25
N
Percent correctly classified 
Null prediction (percent) 
Pre
Model Chi-Square
471
81.7
73.9
30.0
205.52 (df 9, p <.0001)
Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others.
The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal
to zero.
'P3.10; **p<.05; ***ps.01; ****p^.001
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Table 5.4
Logistic Regression for Predicting the Republican Party ID (South 1998)
Independent
Variables
b S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes .306 .270
Age -.197 .170
Education -.022 .129
Income .038 .099
Gender (Male) -.034 .398
Ideology (High=Conservative) .659*** .184
Handling Foreign Affairs .244 .159
Govemment Spending .077 .134
Handling Economy .529 .156
Constant -7.3059**** 1.73
N
Percent correctly classified 
Null prediction (percent) 
Pre
Model Chi-Square
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75.3
87.4 
95.8
72.18 (df 9, p <.0001)
Notes: The dependent variable Is coded 1 for Republican and 0 for all others.
The model chi-square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal
to zero.
*P3.10; **p^.05; ***p^.01 ; ****p^.001
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Based on the preceding four tables, symbolic racism was a significant 
predictor of Republican Party identification only in the 1994 southern subset. Of the 
nine variables, ideology was significant in three of the four analyses. Which party 
was best equipped at handling the economy was significant in two o f the subsets. 
Finally, government spending was statistically significant in 1994, while handling 
of foreign affairs was significant in 1998. Neither government spending nor foreign 
affairs achieved statistical significance in both years though.
Logistic regression is a nonlinear statistical procedure. Consequently, we 
cannot read the coefficients in the previous tables in the same manner as the 
results of an OLS regression. To derive the figures into easily interpretable results, 
we can use the logit equation to discern the relationship of the independent 
variables on Republican identification. Using only the independent variables that 
achieve statistical significance, values can be substituted into the logit equation, 
while we hold the values for the other independent variables constant at their 
means. The predicted probabilities of the independent variables upon Republican 
identification are presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.6.
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Table 5.5
Predicted Probability of Republican ID for Whites (1994)
Independent
Variables
Probability o f Republican ID 
Non-South South
Ideology
Extremely liberal .08 —
Liberal .12 —
Slightly liberal .16 —
Moderate .22 —
Slightly conservative .28 —
Conservative .35 —
Extremely conservative .43 —
Handling the Economy
Democratic Party .06 —
Neither/no difference .25 —
Republican Party .65 —
Government Spending
Desire more government services .23 ——
Maintain current levels .32 —
Desire less govemment services .43 —
Sym bolic racial attitudes
Low (-2 Standard Deviations (SD)) — .03
Below average (-1 SD) — .08
Average (mean) — .17
Above average (+1SD) — .32
High (+2SD) .52
Notes: The above independent variables are those which achieved statistical 
significance in the logistic regression in Tables 5.1 through 5.4. Among the southern 
respondents subset, only symbolic racism achieved statistical significance. Figures 
above are the predicted probabilities of white voters identifying with the Republican 
Party.
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Table 5.6
Predicted Probability o f Republican ID for Whites (1998)
Independent
Variables
P robab ility  o f Republican ID 
Non-South South
Ideology
Extremely liberal .02 .03
Liberal .05 .07
Slightly liberal .08 .13
Moderate .15 .23
Slightly conservative .25 .36
Conservative .39 .53
Extremely conservative .55 .68
Handling the Economy
Democratic Party .06 .12
Neither/no difference .18 .28
Republican Party .44 .53
Handling Foreign A ffa irs
Democratic Party .08
Neither/no difference .16 —
Republican Party .30 ---
Notes: The above independent variables are those which achieved statistical 
significance in the logistic regression in Table 5.2. Figures above are the predicted 
probabilities of white voters Identifying with the Republican Party.
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In the 1994 analysis, ideology was the best predictor o f party Identification 
among the non-South subset. Not surprisingly, we can see that the probability of 
being a Republican was not great If one Is extremely liberal, although the 
probability does seem high at 8 percent. On the opposite extreme, the probability 
o f an extreme conservative Identifying with the Republican Party was 43 percent. 
Again, the fact that this probability was not higher Is unexpected.
The probabilities fo r the economic Issue and govemment spending 
demonstrated no unexpected directions. As Table 5.5 Illustrates, the probabilities 
followed party lines on the question of which party could best handle the economy. 
Among the non-southern respondents, those who felt the Democrats could best 
handle the economy were unlikely to Identify with the Republican Party. 
Respondents who fe lt Republicans were best equipped to deal with the economy 
were extremely likely to identify Republican. With government spending, the 
expected directions were evident, but the magnitude was unexpected. Among non­
southern respondents, those who wanted to increase government services were 
less likely to Identify as a Republican, but the probability was still almost 25 
percent. Those who wanted a cut In government services were more likely to 
Identify with the GOP, but the probability was not even 50 percent, which was an 
unexpectedly low probability.
In the southern subset, the only statistically significant predictor of 
Republican identification was symbolic racial attitudes. Among southern white 
respondents with a low level o f symbolic racism, the chances o f Identifying with the
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Republican Party were around 3 percent, while those who had the highest levels 
o f symbolic racism had a probability o f more than 50 percent o f identifying with the 
Republican Party. Since symbolic racism was the only significant variable among 
the nine tested, it would suggest that race played a larger role in southern white 
respondents’ views o f the two parties. Coupled with this is the fact that symbolic 
racism was not significant among non-southern whites, which illustrates the 
preoccupation that some southern whites seem to have with race.
In 1998, ideology was again a significant predictor o f Republican 
identification. Unlike four years earlier, ideology was significant among the 
southern subset as well as the non-South. In this instance, we see that ideology 
was a more important cue among the respondents o f both subsets. Those who 
were extremely liberal among both groups were most unlikely to identify as 
Republicans, while on the opposite extreme of the spectrum were very likely to feel 
affinity with the Republicans. In 1998, the strength o f the probabilities was greater. 
Holding an extreme conservative position led to a probability of 55 percent that non­
southern whites would identify Republican, while southern whites with the same 
views had a probability o f 68 percent of being Republican.
The party that could best handle the economy was significant in both 
subsets. Like ideology, the economic issue was significant in the southern subset 
in 1998 but not 1994. When comparing the economic issue among non-southern 
whites in both years, we see that the magnitude of the probabilities is lower in 1998 
among those who feel the Republicans can do the best job with the economy.
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Among southern white respondents, the probabilities are in the expected direction. 
Overall, the degree o f the probabilities is slightly greater when compared with the 
non-South subset.
In 1998, the handling of foreign affairs was a significant Indicator of 
Republican Identification among non-Southerners, but It was not significant among 
Southerners. Among the non-South respondents, those who fe lt the Democrats 
could best handle foreign affairs were unlikely to be Republican, while those who 
felt that the Republicans could best conduct foreign affairs were more likely to be 
Republican. Again, the magnitude of the probability Is low when one examines 
those who support Republican control o f foreign affairs. Believing that the 
Republicans could best handle foreign affairs led to only a 30 percent likelihood of 
being Republican. This may underscore that foreign affairs was a back burner 
Issue when compared to the Clinton scandal In the fall o f 1998.
Although past research Indicates that racial threat leads to higher rates of 
Republican Identification among southern whites (Giles and Hertz 1994), It appears 
from this research that symbolic racism Is an Inconsistent predictor of Republican 
Identification among white southem respondents. Of the two years analyzed, only 
1994 showed that symbolic racism was dictating party choice among southern white 
respondents. In 1998, symbolic racism did not approach statistical significance. 
Among the non-South respondents, symbolic racism was not a significant Indicator 
of Republican Identification In either year. From the analyses. It would appear that 
Ideology was more Important overall In party Identification. In both 1994 and 1998
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among the non-South, It was the most significant indicator, while it was the most 
significant among the South in 1998. Following closely behind, the question o f 
which party could best handle the economy showed a similar pattern to ideology.
While this examination of party identification does not purport to definitively 
project the factors that lead to party identification over the long term, it does give 
us an idea o f what was significant during the time period that this dissertation 
analyzes. Looking at the significance of symbolic racism in 1994 among the 
southern respondents, an observer might ponder why symbolic racism was not 
important in 1998. A possible answer might harken back to the previous chapter. 
Perhaps political context dictates the importance of symbolic racism on party 
identification. In 1994, discussion abounded about cutting welfare and affirmative 
action, and getting tough on crime. All o f these issues are characteristics o f 
symbolic racial attitudes. Since these issues were at the forefront in 1994, southern 
white respondents may have been more likely to be influenced by race than in 1998 
when these issues were not as prominent on the political scene. If so, the role of 
political context in racial threat voting is again underscored. We now turn our focus 
to analyzing polling data from an individual state. By using statewide polling data, 
we can get a better sense o f the dynamics o f the race issue in individual 
gubematorial elections.®
^Unfortunately, statewide polling data was not available in either Georgia or 
South Carolina for the appropriate elections. Statewide polling did exist to an 
extent in Georgia, but no racial questions were asked of the respondents which 
would allow us to test the impact o f race upon the vote. In South Carolina, no
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THE USE OF SYMBOLIC RACISM IN THE LOUISIANA 
GUBERNATORIAL CAMPAIGN
Did symbolic racism play a major role in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial 
campaign? After analyzing the details of the campaign, symbolic racism had the 
potential of playing a factor in the campaigning of the major gubematorial 
candidates. Without having to mention race, the presence o f U.S. Representative 
Cleo Fields, a black candidate, in the runoff against a white candidate, Mike Foster, 
would have been enough to trigger symbolic racial voting w ithout candidates even 
mentioning racial issues (Sears and Kinder 1971; Kinder and Sears 1981; Sears 
and Funk 1999). Even before the runoff between Fields and Foster, racial appeals 
were made to white voters, but the source came not from a Republican candidate 
but from one of the Democratic candidates. In the last weeks of the primary 
campaign, Mary Landrieu's campaign allegedly ran radio ads that argued that 
Fields, as a black candidate, would have no chance against the probable 
frontrunner, Mike Foster. Although Landrieu denied that her campaign ran these 
ads, the ensuing furor likely solidified black support behind Fields, propelling him 
into a runoff against Foster (Parent and Perry 1998).
Beyond the racial characteristics of the two candidates in the runoff, one can 
argue that appeals to symbolic racial attitudes were present during the runoff by 
Mike Foster’s campaign. Many of Foster’s campaign stances were characteristic 
of the discussion of symbolic racism. Among other issues which he championed.
statewide polling data was available, and attempts to obtain private polling from 
David Beasley’s campaign were unsuccessful.
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Foster stood for the elim ination of affirmative action, reforming social welfare 
programs, and a constitutional challenge to the Motor Voter Bill. Further, Foster 
was publicly critical of the existence of the majority-minority congressional district 
which Cleo Fields had represented.
While Foster’s stances may have been a subtle appeal for white votes, his 
comments about the problem of crime in New Orleans were even more blatant. 
During the last days o f the campaign, he referred to New Orleans as “the jungle” 
where crime was rampant (Walsh 1995). In comparison, he cited predominately 
white suburban Jefferson Parish, which is adjacent to New Orleans, as an area with 
a low crime rate. Even more telling, was the fact that Foster was endorsed by 
David Duke, but Foster refused to renounce Duke’s endorsement. Although Foster 
did not engage in blatantly racial rhetoric with the exception of “the jungle” 
comment, his refusal to distance himself from the endorsement may have also 
appealed to some white voters. It appears that some symbolic racism was used by 
the Foster campaign in 1995.
DATA AND METHODS
To discern the impact that symbolic racism was having upon white voters in 
Louisiana, public opinion polling data was utilized. The particular poll used was a 
statewide poll conducted by Survey Research Center at the University of New 
Orleans (UNO) between 8-14 October 1995. The survey was conducted via 
telephone interviewing, with the sample being randomly selected. All of the
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respondents were registered Louisiana voters, and an equal number o f white and 
black voters were called during the interview. Since this chapter is concerned with 
the impact o f symbolic racism upon white voters, only the responses from white 
voters were used. The total number o f white respondents In the poll was 498.
The model used in the analysis in this chapter is based upon the research 
of Knuckey (1997) who also examined the role that symbolic racism played in this 
particular election.'’ For the remainder o f this chapter, we use Knuckey's model to 
test this particular election. In the model, I added a variable which asked 
respondents if they had voted for David Duke in 1991. Otherwise, the chapter 
replicated Knuckey’s research, who found symbolic racism in operation during the 
1995 Louisiana election. The first task was to define symbolic racism based upon 
the questions asked In the UNO poll. Next, we examine the role that racial attitudes 
play upon the images that voters have of Fields and Foster. Finally, we explore the 
role that race played upon white vote choice in the 1995 gubernatorial runoff 
between Fields and Foster.
Defining Symbolic Racism
Among the questions asked in the 1995 UNO poll, four are particulary useful 
in conceptualizing symbolic racism for the purposes o f this analysis. Respondents
*The author would like to thank and acknowledge Jonathan Knuckey for 
providing the UNO data which is vital to this chapter. Also, this chapter replicates 
Knuckey’s model where he studied the same election.
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were asked whether they agreed, disagreed, or had no opinion to the following 
statements:
1. Over the last few years, blacks have gotten less than 
they deserve.
2. Irish, Italians, Jewish, and other minorities overcame 
prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should 
do the same without any special fôvors.
3. It’s really just a matter of some people not trying hard 
enough. If blacks would only try harder they could be 
just as well off as whites.
4. Generations of slavery and discrimination have created 
conditions that make it difficult for blacks to work their way 
out o f the lower class.
The responses were used as a foundation of symbolic racism. Like the previous 
analysis, symbolic racism was defined by taking the responses from the four 
questions and arithmetically averaging to derive a symbolic racism figure.
Operationalizing Other Variables
Beyond symbolic racism, other variables were also defined using different 
questions in the UNO poll. First, the dependent variable, candidate comparison, 
was created using an additive index of four different questions. Respondents were 
asked whether Fields or Foster would do a better job at (1) improving education in 
Louisiana, (2) cleaning-up political corruption in the state, (3) dealing with the 
state’s increasing gambling industry, and (4) handling the state budget. If Fields 
was the preferred choice on a question, it was coded as -1. If Foster was preferred.
201
the question was coded as 1. Those who had no opinion or did not know were 
coded as 0.
Two related dependent variables also derived by additive indices were 
candidate image variables for each candidate. Respondents in the poll were asked 
a series of four questions in which they were asked which candidate demonstrated 
the best personal qualities. The questions asked which of the candidates were best 
in (1) leadership, (2) knowledge, (3) honesty, and (4) caring fo r other people. The 
choices given the respondents were not well at all, not too well, quite well, or 
extremely well. Those respondents who had no opinion were placed in a middle 
category.
Other variables created from the questions included the dependent variable 
white vote for Foster which was coded as 1 or 0. One was a vote for Foster, while 
zero was a vote against Foster. Two other independent variables used in the 
analyses were also manipulated. Both partisanship and ideology were re-coded 
so that Republican was the high figure, while conservative was the high figure for 
ideology.
DATA ANALYSES
To test the impact of symbolic racial attitudes in this election, we use 
different types of statistical analysis. First, OLS regression is used to determine the 
impact of symbolic racism upon candidate comparison, Foster’s image among white 
voters, and Fields’ image among white voters. Next, the impact o f symbolic racism
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is tested upon white vote choice. Since the dependent variable, white vote for 
Foster, is dichotomous, nonlinear logistic regression is utilized.
Evaluations of Fields and Foster
To determine the role that symbolic racial attitudes have on white voters' 
images and appraisals of the candidates, independent variables are regressed onto 
three different dependent variables, candidate comparison, Foster’s image, and 
Fields’ image, which were defined previously. In addition to symbolic racial 
attitudes, the following independent variables were included in the analysis of the 
three dependent variables; education, age, gender, ideology, partisanship, and 
income. The results of the three analyses are presented in Table 5.7.
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Table 5.7
Candidate Evaluations Among White Voters 
in the 1995 Gubernatorial Election
Independent Candidate Foster’s Fields’
Variables Comparison Image Image
Education -.172** .015 .395**
(.089) (.150) (.136)
Symbolic racial .699**** .740**** -1.004****
attitudes (.102) (.172) (.156)
Age .0098* .024** .0074
(.006) (.010) (.009)
Gender (Male) .131 306 -.602**
(.194) (.327) (.296)
Ideology .158* .180 .018
(High=Conservative) (.089) (.151) (.136)
Partisanship .186*** .173 -.417****
(High=GOP) (.063) (.107) (.096)
Income .058 .113 -.098
(.045) (.076) (.069)
Constant -2.502**** -3.277*** 5.941****
(.661) (1.114) (1.007)
R2 .14 .07 .15
Adjusted .13 .06 .14
N 498 498 498
Notes: The candidate comparison variable ranges from -4, which is most favorable 
to Cleo Fields, to 4, which is the most favorable to Mike Foster. Both the Foster 
and Fields image variables are coded in a manner so that the high scores always 
represent a positive image.
Unstandardized regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. 
*p<.10 **p<.05 ***p<.01 ****p<001
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When examining the results, symbolic racial attitudes is the only 
independent variable which is statistically significant in all three analyses. 
Symbolic racial attitudes have a very strong positive impact on white voters when 
comparing the two candidates and in the development of Foster’s image. 
Conversely, symbolic racial attitudes have a strong negative impact on white voters 
in their assessment o f Fields' image. In all three equations, symbolic racial 
attitudes are significant at greater than the .001 level, which indicates that a very 
significant relationship exists between symbolic racial attitudes and the three 
dependent variables.
Beyond symbolic racism, other independent variables achieved statistical 
significance, although none among all three dependent variables. Education had 
a negative impact upon the comparison of the two candidates, while education had 
a positive relationship on Fields’ image. It appears that the more educated white 
voters were more likely to have a positive view of Fields than less educated white 
voters. Education had only a very slight positive impact upon Foster’s image, 
although the relationship fell far short of a statistically significant relationship.
Age of white voters was significant in explaining candidate comparison and 
Foster’s image. Of the two, age was a more significant predictor of Foster’s image. 
Still the coefficients were small suggesting that while age did have an impact, it was 
not a definitive factor. Age had a slight positive impact on Fields’ image, but this 
relationship was not statistically significant. When examining the impact of male 
voters upon these three dependent variables, gender had a very strong negative
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impact upon Fields’ image, while gender had non-significant positive relationships 
w ith comparison between the two candidates and Foster’s image. White male 
voters had a strong negative opinion o f Cleo Fields based upon this analysis. 
Possible explanations for this would be Field’s stances on abortion and his call for 
more strict gun control laws, while Foster called for laws that would make it easier 
for law-abiding citizens to obtain concealed handgun permits, and Foster also 
called for limitations on abortions.
Two closely related variables, ideology and partisanship, demonstrated 
mixed results. Ideology, in which the high value was conservative, had a positive 
relationship on the candidate comparison measure, which demonstrates that white 
Louisiana voters did use ideology as a cue in assessing differences between Foster 
and Fields. Ideology was not statistically significant in explaining the image that 
white voters had of Foster and Fields, though.
Partisanship, which was coded so that Republicans represented the high 
value, was more significant in formation o f candidate comparison, and Field’s 
image. With candidate comparison, it appears that white voters were using party 
as a way of distinguishing between the two candidates. A very significant negative 
relationship existed between white Republican voters and Field’s image, which 
should come as no surprise. W hat is somewhat unexpected was that partisanship 
apparently had little impact among white voters and their image of Mike Foster. 
One might expect this figure to be higher, but the relationship is not even 
statistically significant. An explanation for this might be the fact that Foster was a
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lifelong Democrat who only became a Republican the day that he filed his 
candidacy for governor.
Finally, income did not have a significant impact upon any of the three 
dependent variables. In fact, income is the only independent variable which did not 
achieve statistical significance in some manner. One explanation for the lack o f a 
relationship between income and the dependent variables was the reality that the 
Louisiana economy was in relatively good economic shape during this election. 
Thus, economic issues were not as important to voters in this particular instance.
From the analyses presented, symbolic racial attitudes were the most 
powerful factor of all tested. It would appear that race did have a large role in the 
opinions of white voters towards the two candidates as well as the perceived 
differences between the two, despite the fact that neither candidate blatantly 
appealed to race for support. After race, partisanship demonstrated strong 
relationships overall, but not to the extent of symbolic racism. Age, education, 
ideology, and gender had mixed results across the three analyses. Now that the 
impact of race upon assessments o f the candidates has been tested, we turn our 
attention to the impact o f race upon white vote choice.
Impact of Symbolic Racial Attitudes Upon White Vote Choice
While symbolic racism had a strong impact upon white voters’ perception of 
Mike Foster and Cleo Fields, did these same racial attitudes have an impact on the 
vote choice of white voters? To determine the impact o f race upon the decision of
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the respondents to vote fo r Foster, ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is not 
appropriate because the dependent variable, white vote for Foster, is dichotomous 
where the variable has two distinct options minus missing values. In the logit 
model, symbolic racial attitudes, age education, income, gender, ideology, and 
partisanship were included. These were the same variables included in the 
previous OLS regression. Additionally, five variables that tapped into current 
political issues of the campaign, govemment spending, government providing jobs, 
support for government-funded health care, govemment help for minorities, and 
support for handgun control, were included. Finally, whether white voters self­
identified themselves as voting for David Duke in the 1991 gubernatorial election 
is included. Including this variable allows us to see whether the same voters who 
were attracted to David Duke in 1991 show sim ilar support for Foster in 1995. The 
results of the logistic regression are presented in Table 5.8.
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Table 5.8
Logistic Regression for Predicting the White Vote for Mike Foster
Independent
Variables
b S.E.
Symbolic racial attitudes .705*** .257
Age .006 .011
Education -.167 .169
Income .077 .086
Gender (Male) .133 .346
Ideology (High=Conservative) .246 .165
Partisanship (High=GOP) .226** .117
Govemment Spending -.130 .105
Government Provided Jobs -.083 .138
Health Care .237*** .117
Help for Minorities .265 .201
Handgun Control .053 .073
Vote for David Duke in 1991 -.013 .124
Constant -3.8095*** 1.37
N
Percent correctly classified 
Null prediction (percent) 
Pre
Model Chi-Square
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82.1
63.8
50.5
75.55 (df13,p <.0001)
Notes: The dependent variable is coded 1 for Foster and 0 for Fields. The model chi- 
square tests the posit that all coefficients in the logit equation are equal to zero.
"ps.lO; **ps.05; ***p^.01; ****p^.001
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Of the thirteen Independent variables, symbolic racial attitudes, partisanship, 
and health care achieved statistical significance. Of the three, symbolic racial 
attitudes had the strongest impact in favor o f Mike Foster. Partisanship and health 
care also demonstrated positive relationships with the Foster vote. Since the 
logistic results can not be interpreted in their present form, the same statistical 
manipulation performed above is used to derive easily interpretable results. The 
predicted probabilities o f the independent variables upon the white vote fo r Foster 
is presented in Table 5.9, while Table 5.10 demonstrates the impact o f symbolic 
racial attitudes, controlling for partisanship and health care, upon the Foster vote.
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Table 5.9
Predicted Probability of the White Vote for Mike Foster
Independent
Variables
Probability o f Casting 
a Vote for Foster
Symbolic racial attitudes
Low (-2 Standard Deviations (SD)) .40
Below average (-1SD) .57
Average (mean) .72
Above average (+1 SD) .84
High (+2SD) .91
Partisanship
Democratic .72
Independent .84
Republican .89
Health Care
Government-sponsored plan .75
In-between/mix .82
Private .88
Notes: The above independent variables are those which achieved statistical 
significance in the logistic regression in Table 5.8. Figures above are the predicted 
probabilities of white voters supporting Mike Foster.
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Table 5.10
Impact of Symbolic Racism on the White Vote Choice After Controlling for
Partisanship and Health Care
Low
Symbolic Racial
Below
Average
Attitudes
Average Above
Average
High
Partisanship
Democratic .30 .50 .63 .78 .88
Independent .40 .57 .73 .85 .92
Republican .51 .68 .81 .90 .95
Health Care
Government Plan .40 .57 .73 .84 .92
Mix/In-between .77 .87 .93 .97 .98
Private Plan .95 .97 .99 .99 1.00
Notes: The three independent variables are those that reached statistical
significance. Figures are the predicted probability o f a white vote for Mike Foster. 
Entries were calculated from the logit equation in Table 5.8.
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Based upon these two tables, it appears that symbolic racism had a 
significant role in the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election between Mike Foster 
and Cleo Fields. From the probabilities in Table 5.9, as one's degree o f symbolic 
racism Increased, so did the likelihood o f voting for Foster. Even among white 
voters who demonstrated low levels o f symbolic racial attitudes, the chances o f 
them voting for Foster was still quite high. Not surprisingly, being Republican made 
it more likely for white voters to vote for Foster. What is surprising is the probability 
if  one was a Democrat. The probability was nearly .75 among white Democrats. 
This would indicate that many white liberal voters were also casting votes for 
Foster. With the question of health care, the results again indicate that Foster was 
doing incredibly well w ith white voters. Even among white voters who supported 
government-sponsored health care, an issue which Foster did not support, the 
probability of voting for Foster was .75. All of this would seem to indicate an 
underlying symbolic racial attitude in operation if traditionally liberal voters are 
voting for archconservative Foster.
From the results in Table 5.10, we can understand how symbolic racism 
fares across partisanship and stances on health care programs. From examining 
symbolic racism across party lines, it is clear that voters who held moderate to high 
levels of racial attitudes could be found among Democrats, independents, and 
Republicans, with the GOP having the highest overall levels of symbolic racial 
voters. The rather high levels among Democrats gave Foster the ability to appeal 
to these voters without alienating hard-core Republican supporters (Knuckey 1997).
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With respect to the question of how best to fund health care, a similar pattern 
is also found. W hites with moderate to high levels o f symbolic racism could be 
found at all levels of health care from government control to private control. Again, 
this suggests that Foster was enjoying incredible support among white voters at all 
levels. This also freed Foster to champion positions that favored more private 
control of health care, while he still was receiving support a majority of white voters. 
A t the same time, many of his white supporters might have disagreed with Foster’s 
positions on health care.
This analysis o f the 1995 Louisiana gubernatorial election indicates that 
symbolic racism was in operation among white voters. The tact that Foster was 
enjoying such high white support across the ideological and economic spectrum 
suggests that race played a pivotal role in the voting behavior of Louisiana whites 
in 1995. By using the concept of symbolic racism, we can get a sense o f the impact 
that culture has upon racial threat voting.
This approach also illuminates a weakness in studying racial threat solely 
as a result of physical proximity. In the previous chapter, the county-level analysis 
indicated that race did not play a significant factor among Louisiana whites in 1995, 
while this chapter has demonstrated, through the use of survey data, that race did 
have a significant role in vote choice in 1995. W hile neither candidate made 
explicit appeals to race, racial attitudes as influenced by one’s culture led a majority 
o f white voters to use race as a cue to choose between Cleo Fields and Mike 
Foster. The simple fact that Fields was black and Foster was white may have been
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the deciding factor among white Louisiana voters for whom to cast a vote. This 
finding would not have been possible if we studied racial threat voting simply as 
dependent on physical proximity. By realizing that racial threat voting can be 
influenced by culture, we can gain new insights into the motivations behind some 
white voters.
CONCLUSION
In closing, this chapter has examined racial threat from a cultural perspective 
as opposed to geography. The findings have illustrated that racial threat does not 
operate solely in one dimension. Rather, racial threat voting can operate 
simultaneously on different levels. Unfortunately, the only existent data was from 
the NES and statewide polling data from Louisiana conducted by the University of 
New Orleans. Polling data was not available in either Georgia or South Carolina. 
W hile this lack of data is disappointing, it does not prevent us from gaining new 
insights on the dynamics of racial threat voting.
Much o f the research in this chapter rested on the previous findings from 
studies initiated by David O. Sears on the existence o f symbolic racism, which is 
dependent upon culture. Symbolic racial attitudes are instilled in individuals at a 
young age by parents, relatives, and friends (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; 
Sears, Lau, Tyler, and Allen 1980; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1982; Gilens 
1995; Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Hurwitz and 
Peffley 1997). Individuals carry these racial attitudes throughout life, and they can
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be periodically activated by external forces (Sears and Funk 1999). Cultural racial 
threat voting operates in much the same manner as symbolic racism. Individuals 
have certain racial attitudes which they care with them. When circumstances are 
favorable, these racial attitudes can possibly lead these individuals to cast a vote 
under the auspices of racial threat voting.
The impact that race played upon whites party identification was tested using 
the NES datasets. Since the NES data is a nationwide poll, we were able to split 
the respondents into southern and non-southern subsets. The results revealed that 
race only had a significant impact on southern respondents party affiliation in 1994, 
but not 1998. While It was not significant in the non-South subset in either year, 
race did have a positive relationship on the likelihood that non-southern whites 
would be Republican. Since this relationship was not significant, we cannot say 
that race drives white voting behavior outside of the South, but it does illustrate that 
race and the Republican Party is not a strictly southern occurrence.
Secondly, the fact that race had a significant impact on southern 
respondents in 1994 alone suggests that racial threat voting is not a perennial 
phenomenon in southern politics. Only in 1994 did race have a statistically 
significant relationship on a southern respondent’s probability o f being Republican. 
In 1994, potentially racial issues, such as reforming welfare and eliminating 
affirmative action programs, were discussed quite frequently by Republican 
candidates in the South. Given this occurrence, race had a discernable role, but 
in 1998 when these issues were not at the forefront, race did not have a significant
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relationship. This finding harkens back to the previous chapter where we 
discovered the importance of political context to the presence o f physical proximity 
racial threat voting. In this case, it appears that cultural racial threat voting 
depends upon the political environment as well.
In addition to these findings regarding race and party afRliation, we also 
tested the Louisiana polling data to see how white Louisiana voters used race to 
judge the two candidates and its role in vote choice. W e see that race was 
significant in the images that voters held of both candidates. Furthermore, race 
was Important in determining the differences between the two candidates. While 
ideology and partisanship were also important in the images o f the candidates and 
the difference between Fields and Foster, race was the only variable which was 
significant across all three dependent variables, suggesting the importance that 
race played in this election.
When analyzing the effects o f race on vote choice, we see that racial 
attitudes had a statistically strong relationship between white respondents and their 
chances of voting for Republican Mike Foster. O f the three independent variables 
to reach statistical significance in the analysis, racial attitudes demonstrated the 
strongest relationship. This indicates that race was playing a role in the 1995 
Louisiana gubernatorial election, despite the foct that the previous chapter found 
no evidence of racial threat voting occurring.
This finding underscores once again the fact racial threat voting is best 
understood in different dimensions. Examining racial threat voting from only one
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perspective, such as geography, is shortsighted and fraught with danger. Although 
racial threat voting may not occur when examining it at one level, it does not mean 
that race is completely absent from the political landscape. Further, this chapter 
again underscores the importance that political context plays in the occurrence of 
racial threat voting. Both the NES data and the Louisiana poll indicate that political 
context, candidates, and issues do matter for racial threat voting to exist. W ithout 
this context, racial threat voting may not occur. The data also suggests that racial 
threat voting, while possible, is not a given in southern elections. Examining racial 
threat voting, without taking into account political context, leads to erroneous 
conclusions about the role o f race in electoral politics.
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CHAPTER 6 
THE ROLE OF MEDIA COVERAGE IN RACIAL THREAT VOTING
The previous two chapters have examined racial threat voting as a 
consequence o f physical proximity and culture. This chapter extends beyond the 
previous models to study what if any role media coverage plays in racial threat 
voting. Voters rely upon the media for coverage of campaigns; perhaps media 
coverage can heighten the likelihood that racial threat voting may take place in 
various elections. If the media portrays a certain candidate or certain issues as 
racially-based, then some voters may t>e more likely to cast their votes in a racially- 
influenced manner. If so, the media may play an extremely important role in racial 
threat voting. Unlike physical proximity or culture, media coverage is fluid. The 
way in which the media chooses to portray a campaign may have profound 
implications upon the vote choice of white voters. We now turn our attention to 
past research on the role that the media plays in framing issues and candidates in 
elections.
THE AGENDA-SETTING ROLE OF THE MEDIA
Tradition models o f voting behavior held that the media had relatively little 
influence upon vote choice (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954). The
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American Vofer (1960) argues that social and economic factors were the most 
important factors in vote choice, while other research indicated that the way in 
which parties pitched candidates and issues was more important in the way that 
voters perceived issues and politics than anything else (Key 1966; Page and Brody 
1972; Popkin, Gorman, Phillips, and Smith 1976; Carmines and Stimson 1980; 
Markus 1982).
Some have asserted that the media plays a much larger role in shaping the 
political scene than past scholars generally acknowledged. Media agenda-setting 
is a concept which argues that the media plays a crucial role in what the average 
voter perceives to be important issues in a campaign. Media agenda-setting is 
based upon two assumptions;
1. The press does not serve as a simple conduit or 
as a mirror held up to the world. In other words, 
the press does not reflect reality, but rather filters 
and shapes it, much as a kaleidoscope filters and 
shapes light.
2. Concentration by the press over time on relatively 
few issues and subjects, and certain aspects o f 
those subjects, generally leads to the public 
perceiving these issues and subjects as more 
salient, or more important, than other issues and 
subjects (W eaver 1987, 176).
Thus, the media plays a pivotal part in campaigns in this nation. To ignore the role 
that the media occupies in our system is foolhardy at best. If the media is playing 
such a significant role in elections, then the media could potentially have a large 
impact upon racial threat voting.
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McCombs and Shaw (1972) are the founding fathers o f the media agenda- 
setting literature. In their research, the authors found that a direct relationship 
between media coverage of various issues and what the public perceived as 
important issues. In a 1968 poll conducted in Chapel Hill, North Carolina, the 
authors found in the vast majority o f respondents that convergence existed between 
what the media reported as important issues and which issues the respondents 
perceived to be important. Second, when the media did not report on certain 
issues, the authors found that the respondents did not consider these issues to be 
important. Finally, media coverage of campaigns had an impact upon these 
respondents. When the media portrayed the George Wallace campaign as not 
having a chance in 1968, some respondents reported that they would not vote for 
Wallace because he did not have a legitimate chance of winning election.
Other research also indicates that the media plays a significant role in the 
shaping of political issues. Seymour-Ure (1974) argues that media coverage tends 
to focus on simple issues that are easy to grasp (see also Chapter 1 for a 
discussion o f “easy” and “hard” issues). For example, the media usually focuses 
on issues that they can simplify into buzz words like “busing” or “detente.” The 
media is also likely in their coverage to cause rifts between candidates and look for 
controversial issues. Patterson (1980) found that in presidential elections the 
issues that were the most important to most voters were not necessarily issues that 
the candidates stressed. Instead, what voters claimed to be the most important 
issues were the same that the media was reporting as important.
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MacKuen (1981) further refined the agenda-setting role of the media. One 
might conclude from some of the prior literature that the media has an almost 
dictatorial control of which political issue are the most important. MacKuen defines 
issues into two types: obtrusive and unobtrusive. Obtrusive issues are those that 
have a direct impact upon voters' daily lives. The prime examples would be the 
economy and employment. Unobtrusive issues are those that do not have a direct 
impact upon most voters. Examples of these types of issues include foreign policy, 
race relations, crime, energy, and the environment. W ith unobtrusive issues, 
MacKuen found considerable evidence that the media does have a great deal of 
power in agenda-setting, but very little on obtrusive issues. By refining the study 
o f agenda-setting into obtrusive and unobtrusive issues, we obtain a greater 
understanding of the power that the media has over political campaigns in this 
country.
More recent literature on the impact of the media upon issues, candidates, 
and elections has provided further insights into the agenda-setting role o f the 
media. Bartels (1993) argues that the impact of the media is much greater than 
political scientists generally believe. Due to measurement error, Bartels states that 
scholars have often underrepresented the role of the media in politics in this 
country. He finds that the media has enormous influence on voters' perception of 
political issues and candidates, especially “new” issues and candidates when 
public opinion is still extremely fluid.
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In an examination of the 1992 presidential election, Hetherington (1996) 
argues that the media had a large influence on vote choice, and that media 
influence was beneficial to Bill Clinton. According to Hetherington, the media 
portrayed George Bush as unsympathetic to the economic woes o f some 
Americans. The media also continued to portray the country in recession, when 
most economic indicators suggested that the economy had rebounded by early Fall 
1992. Nevertheless, media reporting o f the slow economy damaged Bush’s 
reelection bid.
Mondak (1995) studied an unique scenario involving the political influence 
o f the media. In 1992, the Pittsburgh Post-Gazette was not published for eight 
months due to a strike. Mondak studied this event to see the impact that an 
absence of newspaper coverage had on political discussions. If political 
discussions did decline, then would vote choice be greatly affected? Mondak found 
that discussions of politics between individuals did not substantially decline, nor did 
voter turnout substantially differ in the 1992 elections. While Mondak does ascribe 
to the media a significant role in politics, he also suggests that it may not be as 
prevalent as some have suggested.
Throughout the recent literature focusing on the political impact of the media, 
most authors acknowledge that the media does play a prominent role in our political 
system. Most concede that earlier studies on voting behavior had a tendency to 
neglect or minimize the media impact. Since the 1970s, research has indicated in 
varying degrees that the media plays a significant role in the framing o f political
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Issues and candidates. W hile they do differ in how far the media impact 
penetrates, most scholars today acknowledge that neglecting the political power of 
the mass media can lead to distorted views o f political reality.
THE IMPACT OF THE BROADCAST MEDIA VERSUS NEWSPAPER 
COVERAGE
In his study of the campaign intensity o f U.S. Senate elections, Mark Westlye 
(1991) states that a common assumption when studying the media impact on 
political campaigns in this country is that television coverage is the most important. 
Such assumptions are not as clear as one might expect. While scholars generally 
believe that television has replaced the print media as the major actor in agenda- 
setting, considerable evidence exists that suggests that the print media under 
certain circumstances may have a more important role in setting the political scene 
and agenda than does television.
The second assumption about the impact o f the media is that most voters 
pay more attention to the broadcast media than print. This belief rests in large part 
on a series of surveys conducted by the Roper organization. In those surveys, 
Roper (1983) found that since 1964, televison coverage has surpassed the print 
media in the coverage that most people say is important to them. In 1980, two- 
thirds of those surveyed stated that they paid more attention to television news than 
any other source.
One of the criticisms of the Roper study is that no distinction exists between 
national elections and state and local elections. Further, the Roper surveys do not
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ask questions about political news, but rather questions are directed at news in 
general. Finally, the questions allow respondents to give multiple responses, 
making it impossible to rank the order o f media sources (Westlye 1991).
Because ambiguity exists about which media source is the most important 
in political news, we address these two points. First, does the literature argue that 
newspaper coverage is a better source of political news than television media? 
Second, do most people rely upon newspapers as their primary source o f political 
news?
Television or Newspaper Coverage: Which is Better?
In the last few decades, some scholars have assumed that television 
coverage has replaced newspaper coverage as the most important sources of 
political news in this country. Theodore White argues that television has 
dramatically altered coverage o f politics in this country. In fact. W hite (1986) 
compares the development of television coverage of politics “as revolutionary as 
the development of printing in the time o f Gutenberg" (in McDowell 1986, 242), but 
W hite’s proclamation was within the context of presidential campaigns.
W hile research does exist that televison coverage has changed the 
landscape of national elections in this country, does this apply for state elections? 
Leary (1977) argues that television coverage not only has affected state elections, 
but the broadcast media also spends more time on campaigns and commands more 
attention from voters. Robinson (1975) argues that television coverage has
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become the better source of political news in U.S. Senate campaigns, although U.S. 
House elections are not as well covered since they are not statewide elections in 
forty-three states.’ While candidates for the Senate are generally well-known and 
their campaigns extensively covered, the average voter does not know House 
candidates and campaigns frequently. Thus, one may conclude that television 
coverage provides the best coverage for statewide races as well (Campbell, Alford, 
and Henry 1984).
Westlye (1991) argues that these assumptions are not correct. Rather, 
televison coverage o f statewide elections “typically underrepresents the actual 
intensity” (Westlye 1991, 35). Newspaper coverage is more extensive in statewide 
elections for various reasons. Newspapers have more flexibility in filling space, 
while television news producers must make editing decisions because of the tight 
time frame within which they must operate.
While the time frame and flexibility requirements o f the print and broadcast 
media differ substantially, Clyde and Buckalew (1969) found that television 
coverage Is essentially the same types of stories and issues. The difference arises 
when one examines the depth of campaign coverage. On average, newspapers 
have more time and space to devote to all facets o f a campaign. Thus, their 
coverage is typically more extensive than television coverage (Graber 1980).
’Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and 
Wyoming all have at-large U.S. House seats due to their small populations. In 
these states, the entire state is in the same congressional district.
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In sum, newspapers are able to provide a more detailed examination of 
statewide political contests due to the differing realities of print media as opposed 
to broadcast media. Television news in this country has only a certain amount of 
time in each broadcast ranging from thirty minutes to one hour in prime time. Due 
to the time constraints involved with the broadcast media, it falls to producers to 
lim it the amount o f coverage that television news can provide (Ranney 1984). 
While the types of stories may not differ, television news simply cannot relay all of 
the details about every aspect of a candidate and his campaign like the print media. 
As Westlye (1991) argues, newspaper coverage is a better source of news 
concerning political campaigns as compared with the broadcast media. If one 
relied upon newspaper coverage of political candidates and their campaigns in 
statewide elections, past research would suggest that such a person would be 
better informed about politics n this country. This begs a question: how many 
people actually rely upon newspapers in this country as their main source of 
information regarding statewide political contests in this country?
The Primary Source of News for the Average Voter
Just as many have assumed that television news coverage of campaigns is 
better than print coverage, so the same premise exists about where most voters get 
their news. As mentioned previously, much of this belief is based upon a series of 
Roper polls that found that nearly two-thirds of respondents in 1980 cited television 
news as their primary source of information (Roper 1983). Yet W estlye (1991)
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criticizes the Roper questions by arguing that these polls did not distinguish 
between national and local news, the questions did not distinguish between political 
news and other types of news, and it allows multiple responses from those 
interviewed, making it difficult to say definitively that television news is the medium 
that is the primary source for most Americans.
Robinson (1978) found that respondents are more likely to read a newspaper 
than to watch television news based upon a poll conducted by the University of 
M ichigan. According to several Gallup polls in the 1970s, a majority of people 
reported that they were more likely to rely upon newspapers for news than 
television (Sterling 1984). The Roper polls (1983) found that more people were 
likely to focus on newspapers for information about local campaigns.
In addition, some research has indicated that those who read newspapers 
are better informed about politics than those who solely watch television. McClure 
and Patterson (1974) found that voters who regularly read newspapers were more 
likely to know more about the issues that candidates advocated. Patterson (1980) 
found similar findings when he discovered that voters who relied upon newspaper 
coverage had better conceptions of candidates’ issues stances than those who 
relied solely on television coverage (see also Robinson and Levy 1986; Berkowtiz 
and Pritchard 1989; Robinson and Davis 1990; Weaver and Drew 1993). Quarles 
(1979) found that television viewers on average were less informed about politics 
largely because of the shallowness of television news coverage. Clarke and Fredin 
(1978) found that voters in U.S. Senate elections were more likely to be better
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informed about campaigns, candidates, and issues when they had read newspaper 
coverage. Finally, Mondak (1995) found that voters who read newspapers typically 
had a greater understanding of political issues and candidates, especially in 
statewide elections.
Given this discussion, it would appear that concluding that newspaper 
coverage is not important for a majority of voters is premature. Evidence exists that 
many individuals tend to rely more heavily upon newspaper coverage than some 
polls suggest. Furthermore, the importance of newspaper coverage is even more 
important for state and local elections as compared with presidential campaigns. 
Not only is newspaper coverage a source of political information for many people, 
but newspapers also give readers a more detailed knowledge o f candidates, 
campaigns, and issues than television coverage does.
Based upon these findings, voters who regularly read newspaper coverage 
of the elections examined in the dissertation might be more likely to view certain 
issues or candidates as racial if newspaper coverage were portraying them in such 
a manner. Therefore, it is more appropriate to examine newspaper coverage of the 
selected elections to see if the media may be causing racial threat voting since 
research suggests that newspapers do a better job o f covering campaigns and that 
a large number o f voters still depend upon them for coverage of state elections.
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METHOD
To discover if newspapers are possibly leading to racial threat voting, we 
examine selected newspapers from each state examined in Chapter 4. The 
newspapers selected are those with a statewide circulation in each state. 
Consequently, the following newspapers are used in this analysis: Atlanta Journal- 
Constitution, The Advocate (Baton Rouge), The Post and Courier (Charleston), and 
The TImes-Picayune (New Orleans). These are statewide newspapers in their 
respective states. Thus, informed voters In these states would be able easily to 
obtain copies of these papers unlike smaller daily papers in these states that may 
not have a very large subscription area.
The examined dates rely upon Westlye’s (1991) method, which examined 
media coverage of U.S. Senate elections. As it pertains to this chapter, we use 
Westlye’s method of content analysis on newspaper coverage. We study articles 
that appeared between 1 October and the day prior to Election Day.^ Since the 
majority of newspaper coverage comes between these dates, the analysis is limited 
to these dates. Coverage before 1 October tends to focus less on the campaign 
and more on candidate appearances and limited analysis of campaign commercials. 
News articles and editorials are analyzed for possible portrayal o f certain issues or 
candidates as racially-based. Articles that mention the candidate in a non-
^In the case o f Louisiana, coverage begins on 23 October 1995 and 
continues through 18 November 1995 due to the unique primary system for electing 
governors in the state. Since no semblance of a two candidate election exists until 
the runoff, newspaper coverage did not focus as extensively on any candidate(s).
230
campaign context are excluded. Also, paid advertisements as well as letters to the 
editor are also ignored.
The articles from each o f these newspapers are analyzed using content 
analysis. We derived a code sheet, which is presented in Appendix B, and a series 
of key issues was listed on the code sheet. As we analyzed the articles, an article 
was noted if it contained one o f the issues. By using such a methodology, we can 
quantify the newspaper coverage by seeing how often these issues arose during 
the articles. The author coded the articles. As a test of validity, another individual 
coded a sample from 15 percent o f each set of articles. The test revealed that we 
were both coding in the same manner 85 percent of the time. In the next section, 
we see the results of this content analysis.
ANALYSIS OF NEWSPAPER COVERAGE
Articles from the selected newspapers were coded based on certain issues. 
These issues ranged from social issues which included the topics o f Confederate 
symbols, welfare reform, affirmative action, and other social issues like abortion, 
teen pregnancy, and the general breakdown o f family. Finally, a topic o f other 
racial issues, which included any coverage o f other topics that some might construe 
as race-based, was coded. For example in Louisiana, whenever the media 
mentioned David Duke or his endorsement o f Mike Foster, we coded the article as 
other racial issues.
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A second category was economic issues. Two topics under this 
classification were the state of the economy and taxes. Any articles that dealt with 
improving the state economy or maintaining its current condition was coded under 
the state of the economy issue. To be coded under the taxes issue, an article must 
mention or analyze proposals to either raise or lower taxes within the state.
Finally, a third category dealt with education issues. Articles, which were 
concerned with the condition o f public education within the state, were coded 
accordingly. Another issue in all three states, but especially South Carolina, was 
the question of whether a lottery and other forms of legalized gambling should be 
used to improve education. When articles discuss this topic, we code them 
appropriately. The results o f the content analysis are presented in Table 6.1. 
Following the table, is an analysis o f coverage by individual state.
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Table 6.1
Content Analysis of Newspaper Articles (in percent)
Atlanta
Joumal-Constitution
(N=41)
The Advocate 
(Baton Rouge) 
(N=30)
The Times-Picayune 
(New Orleans) 
(N=31)
The Post and Courier 
(Charleston) 
(N=44) (N=27) 
1994 1998
1. Social Issues
A. Confederate symbols 7.3 0.0 0.0 4.5 29.6
B. Other racial issues 21.9 50.0 48.3 25.0 11.1
C. Affirmative action 19.5 13.3 12.9 2.2 3.7
D. Social welfare reform 2.4 30.0 35.4 13.6 14.8
E. Law and order/crime 39.0 33.3 32.2 31.8 14.8
F. Other social issues 4.8 26.6 32.2 45.4 7.4
II. Economic Issues
A. Status of state economy 31.7 13.3 16.1 22.7 33.3
8. Taxes 39.0 30.0 25.8 22.7 33.3
III. Educational Issues
A. Status of public education 46.3 50.0 25.8 38.6 70.3
B. State lottery/legalized gambling 21.9 23.3 16.1 27.2 92.5
to support education
KJ
U>
U>
Notes: Articles in the Atlanta Joumal-Constitution and The Post and Courier (Charleston) begin on 1 October and continue 
through the day prior to the general election. With both Louisiana papers, the coverage begins the day after the primary, 23 
October 1995, and continue until the day before the runoff between Fields and Foster on 18 November 1995.
South Carolina-1994 and 1998
After examining the previous table, the articles mentioned Confederate 
symbols more frequently in 1998 than 1994 in South Carolina’s coverage. One 
reason for this was the fact that David Beasley, the incumbent Republican 
governor, had in 1995 and 1996 attempted to halt the practice of flying the 
Confederate battle flag from atop the State Capitol in Columbia.^ Although Beasley 
was unsuccessful in his attempt, his Democratic opponent, Jim Hodges, made the 
most of this failure by criticizing Beasley for attempting to bring down the flag, and 
Hodges promised that he would leave the flag flying if elected.
In 1994, the only major racial issue covered by the media was an incident 
involving a black campaign worker for David Beasley. Democrat Nick Theodore’s 
campaign attacked this worker for having a prior criminal record, although former 
Governor Carroll Campbell had pardoned her in 1987. W hile the articles quoted 
some black citizens in news coverage as upset about the attack, the incident was 
only mentioned twice during the remainder of the campaign. Much of the other 
coverage discussed the fact that Beasley had very low black support.
Affirmative action, social welfare reform, and crime are all issues which can 
potentially activate symbolic racism (Sears, Hensler and Speer 1979; Sears, Lau, 
Tyler, and Allen 1980; McConahay 1982; Sears and Citrin 1982; Gilens 1995;
^South Carolina is the only state that flies the Confederate battle flag, also 
known as the St. Andrews Cross, over the State Capitol. The state legislature 
voted to fly the battle flag over the Capitol in the early 1960s as a show of defiance 
of Federal policies aimed at desegregating public schools.
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Kinder and Sanders 1996; Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo 1996; Hurwitz and Peffley
1997). Many white voters are resentful of affirmative action and social welfare 
programs, while some whites view crime as a racial issue due to  the high 
percentages o f blacks who commit violent crimes. For these reasons, we examined 
articles fo r the presence of these issues in newspaper coverage, but crime 
commanded little coverage in South Carolina in either 1994 or 1998. W hile David 
Beasley did advocate the curbing o f some affirmative action programs, it was not 
pivotal to either o f his campaigns.
The print media did not cover social welfere reform that extensively, although 
it did appear in more coverage than affirmative action cuts. Beasley advocated a 
two-year lim it on welfare as well as other proposals like requiring able-bodied 
recipients to work on public projects to receive their benefits. In 1994, Beasley’s 
Democratic opponent, Nick Theodore, did not supp>ort such calls for welfare reform, 
but Jim Hodges in 1998 did support some limited welfare reforms. Thus, white 
voters whom symbolic racial attitudes may have influenced would not have 
automatically voted for Beasley because of Hodges’ stand on the issue as well.
The print media covered the crime issue quite extensively in South Carolina 
in 1994, but dropped the issue in coverage during the 1998 campaign. As 
discussed previously with symbolic racism, some white voters see crime as a cue 
to vote in a racial manner. The fact that the issue was so widespread in the 
coverage m ight lead one to suspect that race may have played a role on vote 
choice w ith this issue, but the crime issue did not breakdown into clear partisan
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divisions either, in a pattern that we see in all three states, both the Republican 
and Democratic candidates took equally hard lines on the crime issue, making it 
d ifficu lt to say that race would have definitely led white voters to vote for the 
Republican candidate. In 1994 and 1998, David Beasley and both of his respective 
Democratic rivals called for more police enforcement and greater spending on 
prisons. Again, this makes it difficult to proclaim that newspaper coverage would 
have led some whites to vote automatically in a racial manner for Republican 
Beasley.
Finally, other social issues included abortions, teen pregnancy, breakdown 
of the fam ily, and the general state of society. In the 1994 coverage, the articles 
featured these issues In 45 percent of the articles. During the 1994 election, part 
o f the high level of other social issues was fueled by the fact that David Beasley 
was a born-again Christian fundamentalist who ran as the accepted candidate of 
the Christian Coalition. Beasley talked quite frequently about the need to eliminate 
abortions. He also lamented the state of society where families were not as 
cohesive as they once were and rampant teen pregnancy abounded, especially in 
the state's poorest areas. Since Beasley was running on a family values platform, 
this helps to account for the high levels of coverage on this category in 1994. In 
1998, the print media did not cover other social issues in South Carolina. In South 
Carolina, we see in the coming discussion that both economic issues and education 
issues were more prominent than any social issue in 1998. This also underscores
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that people tend to worry less about social issues when they are more preoccupied 
with the economy.
We coded two economic categories in the analysis. The first was the status 
of the state economy. While the economy was doing well in varying degrees 
among all of the states, it was still an important issue. In South Carolina, coverage 
o f the status of the state economy was found in almost 23 percent of the 1994 
articles and in roughly 33 percent of the 1998 coverage. In many cases, the media 
coupled coverage o f this economic issue with education since many jobs created 
required higher-skilled and educated workers.
Closely related to the first category was the issue of taxes. In all cases, the 
Republican candidates across the three states called for varying degrees of tax 
cuts. In South Carolina, Beasley called for lower state income taxes and greater 
tax breaks for industry in both 1994 and 1998. Before rushing to claim lower taxes 
as a Republican issue, Hodges in his 1998 campaign also supported a lower 
income tax, although at a higher rate than Beasley supported. We now turn our 
attention to another set of issues that are often linked with economic ones, issues 
related to the topic o f education.
Public education is always a concern in southern elections. Historically, 
state spending on public education in the South has lagged behind the nation. One 
of the education issues coded was status of public education. In South Carolina, 
education was covered almost 40 percent of the coverage in the 1994 election, but 
that coverage jumped to 70 percent in 1998. The other category within the
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education issue was the question o f state lotteries and other forms o f legalized 
gambling to support public education. This gambling issue came to the forefront 
in the 1990s. Louisiana has had varying forms of legalized gambling since the 
early 1990s which proved enormously profitable for the state. In 1993, Georgia 
instituted a statewide lottery, the proceeds of which went exclusively to education. 
By the late 1990s, Georgia was spending greater amounts on education due to 
lottery proceeds.
In 1994, neither David Beasley nor Nick Theodore made the lottery the issue 
of their respective campaigns. Beasley opposed the lottery, while Theodore only 
tacitly supported it. Consequently, coverage in the 1994 articles on the lottery was 
at roughly 27 percent. In 1998, that figure had risen to an astounding 92 percent. 
Democrat Jim Hodges made the lottery the issue of his campaign much like Zell 
M iller had in his 1990 gubernatorial campaign in Georgia.
While Beasley still opposed the lottery in 1998, he did state that he had no 
problem with the people voting on the issue. Hodges, on the other hand, pointed 
to the success o f Georgia’s lottery as an example of what South Carolina could 
have. Thus, the extraordinarily high rate of coverage on the lottery issue. Hodges 
ran a television advertisement geared to those voters who supported a statewide 
lottery for education. The main character in this ad was “Bubba” who talked about 
how Georgia loved South Carolina due to the large numbers o f the state's residents
238
who were crossing the state line to buy Georgia lottery ticke ts/ Simultaneously, 
Beasley was arguing that the lottery would not work as well in South Carolina since 
it was a much smaller state in both geography and population compared with 
Georgia. Nevertheless, Hodge’s campaign was extremely successful. Gaulden 
and Swindell (1998) argue that the key to Hodge’s success against Beasley more 
than anything else was his call for a state lottery.
In closing, the two South Carolina elections covered show that race had 
slightly more coverage in the 1998 campaign as opposed to 1994. W hile the 
Confederate flag was essentially a non-issue in 1994, it had become an issue in 
1998 due to David Beasley’s reneging on a promise to leave the flag alone. After 
the state legislature rebuffed Beasley’s attempt to remove the flag, Beasley opened 
himself up for attack from Hodges. The rest o f the print media’s focus on race was 
the fact that neither candidate seemed to be very appealing to black voters (Frazier 
1998). In 1994, the only major racial issue covered by the media was the incident 
involving the black campaign worker for David Beasley.
Therefore, one cannot say that race was a defining issue in either South 
Carolina campaign based on the print media coverage. In 1994, other types of 
social issues like abortion and family issues were covered more extensively and 
were more central to that campaign. The fact that David Beasley was closely 
identified with the Christian Coalition added to this emphasis on social issues. In
^In 1997 alone, South Carolinians had spent an estimated $75 million on 
Georgia lottery tickets, which in turn benefitted public schools in Georgia (Gaulden 
and Swindell 1998).
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1998, educational issues, specifically calls for a state lottery to improve educational 
funding, dominated the news coverage. Hodges' call o f a lottery modeled after 
Georgia’s appears to have helped him defeat Beasley more than anything else, 
though our analysis in Chapter 4 indicated the flag pledge was also relevant.
While racial issues were covered to a lim ited extent, race did not dominate 
either o f these campaigns. Some white voters could have taken the racial 
coverage, especially involving the Confederate flag, as a cue to vote based upon 
race. Nevertheless, race did not dominate the coverage. It appears that the lottery 
was the issue that dominated, and lotteries tend to be an issue that cuts across 
race with black and white supporters on both sides o f the lottery issue. This may 
also account for the lack of explanatory power that we saw in the South Carolina 
model in Chapter 4.
Louisiana-1995
In Louisiana, racial issues were prominent in the print coverage of the 1995 
gubematorial runoff between Cleo Fields and Mike Foster. While no mention was 
made of Confederate symbols in the two Louisiana papers, discussion of race in 
other ways accounted for 50 percent of the articles in The Advocate and nearly 50 
percent in The Times-Picayune, despite a promise by both candidates that they 
would not discuss race during the course of the campaign.
Race did inevitably come into play during the campaign though. A great deal 
o f coverage focused on David Duke’s endorsement o f Mike Foster, who refused to
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renounce that endorsement When asked why he refused to distance himself from 
the Duke endorsement, Foster commented, “why are you going to say anything bad 
to someone who supports my conservative message?” (Shuler 1995, 4A). Besides 
the Duke endorsement, race came into play In the Foster campaign in other ways. 
Later in the campaign, Foster was discussing crime in a debate with Cleo Fields. 
Foster stated that Jefferson Parish, an adjoining suburban parish to New Orleans, 
“does a good job [with crime]—if  s right next to the jungle of New Orleans..."(Dyer 
1995, 8A). This comment caused substantial furor in the media, and Cleo Fields 
chastised Foster for the comment. Later, Foster apologized for the comment saying 
that it was a poor choice of words.
Despite their pledge not to mention race, both candidates nevertheless did 
mention race. Fields stated that Foster was playing the race card through his 
refusal to denounce the Duke endorsement as well as Foster’s stances on 
affirmative action and welfare reform. Foster accused Fields of playing the race 
card during the campaign as well. In one instance, Foster attacked Fields’ plans 
to give voters a ride to the polling place, although this was legal in the state. At 
another point, Foster attacked Fields for using racial rhetoric during a televised 
debate. Perhaps, the most illuminating potential that race had in the contest came 
from a white Louisiana voter who was a resident of the town of Central in which 
every precinct had given at least 50 percent support for Foster in the primary. This 
voter remarked
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if you think that any whites in Central are going to vote 
for Cleo Fields, you’re crazy. It is a strictly black-white deal. 
A in’t nobody cares about anybody’s views on anything 
(Garland 1995, 1A).
This comment alone helps us to see how many white Louisiana voters may have 
been viewing the election. Certainly, the extensive coverage of race in the 
campaign had the potential of influencing some white voters who may be 
predisposed to vote based on racial attitudes.
While race was prominent in the newspaper coverage, it was not the only 
issue that was featured. Among the remaining categories of social issues, the print 
media mentioned affirmative action in about 13 percent of articles across both 
newspapers. Republican Mike Foster was vocal in his criticism o f affirmative action 
while Democrat Cleo Fields defended the programs. Affirmative action programs 
are among those issues which can lead many white voters to cast votes in a racial 
manner.
Coverage in Louisiana focused more on social-welfere reform than any other 
state, based on the analysis o f the print coverage. In all three states. Republican 
candidates advocated calls for limiting the number of years that an individual could 
be on welfare. In Louisiana, it seems that Mike Foster, who had been extremely 
vocal in his opposition to certain welfare polices, spurred the print coverage into 
greater attention to social welfare issues than any of the three states.
The crime issue appeared roughly one-third o f the time in the print news 
coverage. Much like South Carolina, saying that Foster owned this potentially
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symbolic racial issue would be hazardous. Both Fields and Foster took hard lines 
with the crime issue, and both called for greater prison spending. Divergence came 
on the death penalty which Foster supported, but Fields opposed.
Among the other social issues category, the majority constituted coverage 
of the abortion issue which is even more divisive in Louisiana given its large Roman 
Catholic population. Mike Foster called for the end of all abortions except for rape 
or incest o f the mother, while Cleo Fields did not advocate any change in abortion 
policy. Fields did point out that he personally opposed abortions, though.
We now turn our attention to the coverage of economic issues in the 1995 
campaign. By combining both economic categories, status o f the state economy 
and taxes, we see that the two combined accounted for more newspaper coverage 
o f any o f the social issues with the exception of racial issues. The economy in 
Louisiana was in relatively good shape in 1995 after it had endured a statewide 
recession since the oil bust o f the early 1980s. The articles coupled most of the 
discussion of the state economy with two other issues: (1) taxation, (2) education. 
Discussion of taxation revolved around tax incentives for businesses to locate in the 
state. Mike Foster also proposed an increase to the exemption on personal 
property taxes, while Fields opposed this. The candidates also discussed the 
economy together with education when discussing the needed for my educated and 
skilled workers.
Educational issues were also coded when the articles were analyzed. 
Overall, education illustrated the greatest disparity in the two papers. In The
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Advocate, education appears In 50 percent of the coverage, but it consisted only 
25 percent in the Times-Picayune. When the articles discussed the status of 
education, both candidates supported increases fo r educational spending, but they 
differed on the means. Foster sought to cut social programs to fund education at 
a greater level. Fields opposed such a move, arguing that the state might need 
modest tax increases to increase educational spending.
Given the success of legalized gambling and the lottery in Louisiana, 
coverage in the two newspapers did not pay a great deal of attention to this issue. 
Coverage tended to focus on the high sums of money paid by the gambling 
industry to influence state ofticials. No real debate beyond this took place because 
legalized gambling had existed for some time before 1995.
Race did dominate the print news coverage of the Louisiana gubernatorial 
election. Much o f this dominance focused on two elements. First, the fact that 
David Duke’s candidacy had occurred only four years earlier still had an impact on 
the election. Coupled with this was Duke’s endorsement of Republican Mike 
Foster, who refused to renounce the nod from Duke. Despite Foster’s repeated 
denials that he was not a racist, his tacit acceptance of the Duke endorsement 
undoubtedly raised questions among some voters.
Beyond the David Duke factor, the Louisiana election featured a white 
candidate versus a black candidate. When given this type of choice, symbolic 
racial attitudes w ill automatically influence some white voters (Sears and Kinder 
1971). The simple fact that one o f the candidates was black was enough to  focus
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the media coverage on this, and it was enough that neither candidate had to be 
blatantly racial to appeal to certain white voters. Perhaps the most illumination 
comment came from the white voter who stated that the race was all black and 
white.® These two factors combined led the print media to cover racial issues to a 
greater extent than any other issue in 1995.
Georgia-1998
In Georgia, the print media did not cover racial issues to any great extent 
during the 1998 campaign. Discussion of the Georgia state flag, which 
incorporates the Confederate battle flag in its design, accounted for all of the 
discussion about Confederate symbols. While other racial issues did account for 
nearly 22 percent o f the articles analyzed, most o f that included articles detailing 
the lack of black support for Republican Guy Millner, part o f a trend that we have 
seen is common in the South. Coverage also focused in on the need for an 
historically high black voter turnout if Barnes was to defeat Millner.
The only news coverage that painted Millner as an explicitly racial candidate 
came from two articles. One was coverage of a rally o f the National Association for 
the Advancement fo r Colored Persons (NAACP) in which black leaders painted 
Millner as racist because of his opposition to affirmative action programs. The other 
article, an editorial by columnist Cynthia Tucker, attacked Millner for hiring 
homeless blacks to  show up at M illner rallies as his supporters. Tucker attacked
®Exit polls in Louisiana showed Foster with 84 percent o f the white vote 
(Parent and Perry 1998).
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M illner’s stances on affimnative action and the state flag as racist, although 
Democrat Roy Barnes also supported the current state flag. Tucker also compared 
M illner to the late General Sani Abacha o f Nigeria who hired outside political 
consultants and supporters to appear at rallies so that he seemed to have popular 
support (Tucker 1998).
Much like Mike Foster in Louisiana, M illner attempted to turn the tables on 
Barnes regarding race. On several occasions late in the campaign, Millner attacked 
Roy Barnes for voting against the Martin Luther King holiday in 1989, when Barnes 
was a member of the Georgia Senate. Barnes diffused the issue by stating that he 
regretted that vote more than any other in his public career. Besides these articles, 
race was not the focus of the print media during this campaign.
Articles also discussed affirmative action in around 20 percent of the articles 
analyzed. In a fam iliar pattern. Republican Millner opposed affirmative action 
programs, and Democrat Bames favored keeping the programs to an extent. W hile 
Millner was attacking the programs as racial quotas, Barnes stated that he did not 
support affirmative action because o f race. Rather, he supported the programs 
because they helped women gain better jobs. Millner also attacked affirmative 
action as letting less-qualified minority students into the state's universities. 
Despite the discussion o f affirmative action, reform of social welfere accounted for 
relatively little coverage. One reason for this might have been that both candidates 
supported welfare reform to varying degrees.
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Thirty-nine percent of the articles focused on crime, and both candidates 
took hard lines on the problem of crime. Again, like affirmative action and welfare 
reform, crime has the potential of activating racial voting among some whites. In 
Georgia, Republicans could not claim crime as their issue. In fact, Roy Barnes 
arguably took a tougher stance on crime in one aspect. Guy Millner proposed early 
in the campaign that prisoners who worked in the prison system should have money 
paid into an escrow account that they would receive upon release. Accordingly, 
these prisoners would have some money and not have to go directly onto welfare 
upon release. Bames blasted the idea saying that, “I want to work them [prisoners] 
for nothing” (Wooten 1998). Barnes went out to add that cities and counties have 
a right to work prisoners because they are repaying a debt to society.
In Georgia, the coverage did not focus on issues like abortion or family 
breakdown as in South Carolina in 1994 or in Louisiana in 1995. Republican Guy 
Millner did state that he opposed abortions, but he did not make it a hallmark of his 
campaign. His Democratic rival, Roy Barnes, did not make much of the issue 
either. One reason being may have been that Barnes ran as a pro-life 
gubematorial candidate in 1990, but he stated his views had changed since then.
Combined, the two economic categories accounted for a greater share of 
print media coverage than any of the social issues by themselves. The status of the 
state economy accounted for nearly 32 percent o f the articles, while taxes 
accounted for around 39 percent. Both candidates proposed ways to make 
Georgia’s robust economy even stronger. Guy Millner proposed a series of costing
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cutting measures that would free more money to cities and counties. When 
pressed on how he would cut the state budget, he stated that he did not know, but 
“experts” could help him with this job. Barnes, on the other hand, did not propose 
any significant changes to state government except one. Barnes proposed 
establishing a traffic authority that would oversee traffic congestion in all 
metropolitan areas, but the authority would focus extensively on Atlanta since it was 
the state's largest city and had the greatest traffic problems.
On the issue of taxes, Guy Millner called for a repeal of ad valorem  taxes 
and a lower personal income tax. Millner also called for tax breaks to attract new 
industry to the state. M illner noted that greater tax incentives would attract future 
industries to the state much like South Carolina and Alabama had respectively 
attracted BMW and Mercedes-Benz plants. Barnes called for an increase in the 
exemption rate for property taxes, and he also proposed a three-year moratorium 
on business paying unemployment taxes as a tax incentive to attract new industry. 
Bames did not rule out raising taxes though. While he stated that Georgia’s current 
gas tax was probably enough for the roads, he was keeping his options open 
possibly to raise it if need be to built transportation alternatives to roads (Goldberg
1998).®
Almost half the articles focused on education. Most o f the discussion 
between the candidates dealt with the best way to improve spending on education. 
Although Georgia’s lottery is very successful, both candidates proposed spending
^Georgia has the lowest state gasoline taxes In the nation.
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more money on the greater use o f technology In the classroom. Besides using 
more technology in schools, the candidates discussed the need to improve 
educational facilities in the state further. Part of the Georgia lottery goes to fund 
the Hope Scholarship which pays the tuition of Georgia high school students with 
a B average who go to a state-supported college or university. As a result, the 
state’s institutions of higher learning, from universities to two-year colleges, saw 
substantial increases in enrollment leading to a need for more spending on higher 
education. Barnes also supported a plan to expand the state’s technical colleges 
to provide more opportunities for students in the state.
Unlike South Carolina, the lottery did not occupy the majority o f the coverage 
in 1998. Georgia had instituted a statewide lottery to improve educational spending 
in 1993, and it had proved enormously successful. In 1998, neither Barnes nor 
Millner opposed the lottery although both had opposed a lottery in the past. Most 
o f the discussion of the lottery dealt with how best to use the proceeds to improve 
education.
In closing, while racial issues combined did comprise about 30 percent of the 
content in the print coverage, race did not dominate the 1998 campaign like it did 
in Louisiana three years prior. Part o f the reason dealt w ith the fact that both 
candidates supported the current state flag, eliminating the possibility of a racial 
sp lit on those grounds. The most racially divisive coverage came on affirmative 
action programs and the lack of black support for Guy Millner. Other than this, it 
would be a mistake to characterize the news coverage as focusing on racial issues.
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Education accounted for the content of 46 percent of the articles. Most of the 
discussion focused on proposals by both candidates to improve education, primarily 
by increasing the use of technology in the classroom. Both candidates stated that 
they supported the lottery in 1998, and they sought ways of best allocating the 
proceeds to funding public education in the state.
Of all the Issues, economic ones were the most extensively covered in this 
campaign. Both candidates focused on how to improve the state's strong economy, 
and they also supported lowering taxes in varying degrees. By 1998, Millner and 
Bames were running in an extremely strong economy that had rebounded from the 
recession o f the early 1990s. Factored into this strong economy was the fact that 
two-term governor Zell M iller was leaving office as one of the most popular 
governors in state history. In many ways, the 1998 election was a referendum on 
who could best continue the policies and direction set forth by Miller. Barnes 
portrayed himself as part of “a line of mind-the-store Democrats” (Baxter 1998). 
Even Republican Millner claimed that he could best follow-up the policies and 
direction which Miller was leaving. Thus, while economic issues did account for a 
majority o f the coverage, in many ways this election was a referendum on 
maintaining the successes o f the M iller Administration.
CONCLUSION
When examining the content analysis o f the newspaper articles overall, a 
few trends emerge. In South Carolina, social issues played a more important role
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in the 1994 election, while the lottery was the overwhelming story of the 1998 
election. In Georgia, economic issues and the status o f public education were the 
most important issues as covered by the print media. Finally, in Louisiana, social 
issues occupied the majority o f coverage in the two Louisiana newspapers.
What of the racial issues? Was race dominant in the newspaper coverage? 
All three of the newspapers examined, covered racial issues, but the issue waxed 
and waned across the states. In Georgia, racial issues accounted for almost 30 
percent of newspaper coverage when combining other racial issues and 
Confederate symbols. In the 1994 South Carolina election, race accounted for 
around 30 percent in that election as well. The election in 1998 was a different 
story for South Carolina where coverage focused on race in around 40 percent of 
the coverage. Interestingly, coverage of the Confederate flag issue rose from 4.5 
percent to almost 30 percent during the two elections. We can attribute much, if not 
all, of this to E^easle/s flip on his 1994 promise to keep the Confederate flag flying 
over the State Capitol. By 1998, he had tried and feiled to remove the flag. 
Beasley’s Democratic opponent, Jim Hodges, made the most of this failure, and 
Hodges also promised to leave the flag alone should he win election.
It was in Louisiana, however, that race drew the most coverage. Perhaps, 
this should not be surprising since the racial tone of the 1991 gubernatorial election 
had torn the state. In 1995, neither of the two candidates in the runoff were 
blatantly racial candidates. In fact, the Democratic candidate, Cleo Fields, was 
black. Yet, it may have been the subtle racial tone o f the runoff that led to such
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extensive coverage o f the racial issue. Although he was not present in the 1995 
runoff, David Duke still commanded media attention in this election. Many articles 
mentioned the fact that Duke endorsed Mike Foster, and the fact that Foster 
refused to renounce that endorsement. Several newspaper articles discussed the 
fact that little white support existed for Fields, and the fact that no statewide 
Democratic officeholder endorsed Fields. Finally, a few newspaper editorials 
pleaded with the two candidates that this election not turn into a racial competition. 
All of this led the media coverage o f the Louisiana contest to have the most 
distinctly racial flavor o f any of the states.
Based upon the newspaper coverage from these three states, the print 
media coverage of these campaigns did have varying levels of racial flavor, but only 
in Louisiana did that racial coverage approach dominance. In Georgia and both 
South Carolina campaigns, the print media more frequently covered economic and 
educational issues. Undoubtedly, white voters could have interpreted some 
newspaper coverage as race-based, and the coverage may have indeed influenced 
some white voters susceptible to the influence of symbolic racial attitudes.
It should be noted that the results o f the media coverage dovetail with the 
findings over the past two chapters. In Louisiana and South Carolina, racial threat 
voting is taking place based upon culture in Louisiana and geography in the 1994 
South Carolina election. In the 1998 South Carolina election, the county-level 
analysis did not support the existence of physical proximity racial threat voting, and 
this is demonstrated in the newspaper coverage as well. Given David Beasley’s flip
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on the Confederate flag, many of his white supporters from 1994 abandoned him. 
Yet, race was not a significant factor in the analysis suggesting that some other 
factor was more important to South Carolina voters. As we have seen from this 
chapter, the other factor was the lottery. Finally, in Georgia, around 30 percent of 
the articles focus on racial issues. In the county-level analysis, race did have a 
significant positive factor on Guy Millner’s success with white voters. The articles 
covered affirmative action quite frequently, which may account for even more of his 
white support, especially among black belt whites who are not in favor of affirmative 
action.
Does media coverage help to activate or cause racial threat voting? While 
saying with absolute certainty is impossible, it seems that the potential exists that 
media coverage could activate racial threat voting. It may be that voters who vote 
in a racially threatened manner use media coverage as a reinforcement rather than 
the cause. As the past research in Chapters 4 and 5 suggest, those who are likely 
to be susceptible to racial threat voting usually already have certain racial attitudes 
ingrained in their belief systems. In the case of physical proximity racial threat, the 
environment may lead white voters to vote based upon race. W ith cultural racial 
threat voting, one's belief system, not environment, can lead one to vote in a racial 
manner. The print media coverage may be a way of reinforcing these beliefe, but 
it may not cause racial threat to become activated. While media coverage can be 
a powerful tool, it seems that racial threat voting requires more than just media 
coverage to thrive.
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CHAPTER 7 
THE LESSONS OF RACIAL THREAT VOTING
In this dissertation, we have attempted to understand better the concept of 
racial threat, which argues that some white voters cast votes in a racial manner 
when they feel intimidated or threatened by black citizens. As discussed in the first 
chapter, racial threat is a variant on V.O. Key’s black belt thesis. Key (1949) argues 
that the black belt counties controlled the politics o f their state, even though black 
belt counties were not the majority in most southem states. Although outnumbered, 
the black belt counties voted as a solid bloc in elections, and these black belt 
counties were usually able to elect officials of their choosing in most states. The 
glue which held the black belt together was race because white voters in the black 
belt were the most concerned with keeping the status quo regarding blacks and 
therefore opposed progressives who moderated on issues of race.
Of course. Key wrote during a time when blacks were effectively barred from 
political participation in the South. As enormous changes came to the region after 
the Civil Rights movement. Key’s thesis became outmoded since whites in black 
belt counties could no longer control the politics of their county or state since black 
mobilization had occurred. Yet, some scholars continued to find racial voting taking 
place among white voters, especially in the black belt areas. Racial threat argues
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that race has not vanished as a political force In the South. According to most of 
the prior research on racial threat voting, white voters who live In close 
concentration to black populations may feel “threatened” by these blacks. 
Consequently, they cast their votes for the candidate who clearly would not be the 
favorite of black residents. In the South, this would usually mean a white vote cast 
for whomever the Republican nominee might happen to be. Is It a requirement that 
racial threat voting be contained solely to those regions, like the black belt, where 
whites live In close contact to large black populations?
The goal of this study has been to clarify the entire concept of racial threat. 
Past research has tended to examine racial threat voting only In geographic terms 
much like Key’s black belt thesis. Further, much o f the research focused on one 
state which may or may not be Indicative of a general pattern across the region. 
As mentioned at the outset, this study limited Itself to the Deep South states 
because of the historical Importance that race had played In defining the politics of 
those states. While race was Important In the Rim South as well. It played less of 
a factor due to smaller black populations In those states. Unfortunately, two Deep 
South states, Alabama and Mississippi, had to be excluded from this study due to 
the lack of readily available data. The three states left, Georgia, Louisiana, and 
South Carolina, were studied to determine the Impact o f racial threat on selected 
gubernatorial contests In these states.
A further refinement o f racial threat was to conceptualize it In different 
dimensions. In addition to viewing racial threat as a consequence of one’s physical
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proximity to counties where blacks make up a large proportion of the population, 
this dissertation has attempted to examine racial threat in two other dimensions as 
well. First, we have studied racial threat as a product o f one’s culture. Perhaps 
racial threat voting is not dependent upon where one resides. Rather, one’s culture 
and rearing may instill certain racial attitudes in some white voters. Accordingly, 
racial threat voting could occur anywhere in a state, not just the black belt. Second, 
we have examined racial tiireat as possibly activated and fueled by media coverage 
o f elections. As we discovered in Chapter 6, the impact o f the media has often 
been discounted in voting behavior research.
Beyond this, this dissertation has attempted to answer the question o f 
whether racial threat is a distinct different school of voting behavior literature, or 
could racial threat be viewed as an extension o f previous theories of voting 
behavior? Later in this chapter, we discuss racial threat’s placement in the voting 
behavior literature.
Finally, what does racial threat hold for the future of the Republican Party in 
the South? As noted above, when racial threat voting does occur, the beneficiaries 
o f these racially-charged elections are usually Republican candidates. As 
mentioned in the firs t chapter, the breakthrough for the Republican Party in the 
South during the 1960s was based upon race. Can the party continue to use race 
to build a coalition in hopes o f becoming the majority party in the region, or does a 
certain glass ceiling exist where racial appeal will eventually end? We discuss this 
prospect at the end o f this chapter.
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FINDINGS OF THE PREVIOUS THREE CHAPTERS
In the past three chapters, racial threat has been examined in dimensions 
o f physical proximity, culture, and media coverage respectively. Reviewing the 
findings of these chapters will help to put the idea of racial threat into context. From 
the findings, we see the strengths and weaknesses of each approach to racial 
threat.
Physical Proximity
In the fourth chapter, racial threat, as defined by geographic environment, 
was tested using county-level analysis. Fortunately, data was available in all three 
states. The results o f the analysis revealed a mixed pattern. In the 1994 South 
Carolina gubematorial election, physical proximity racial threat voting was occurring 
among white voters. A significant relationship existed between those white voters 
in the black belt and support for David Beasley. None of the other independent 
variables were statistically significant, suggesting that race was a large factor 
among white voters in the black belt in their decision to support Beasley in 1994.
The other state in which physical proximity racial threat voting bore out a 
significant relationship was the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial election. Here, a 
positive association existed between the Republican Guy Millner and white voters 
in the black belt, but the relationship was not as powerful as the 1994 South 
Carolina election had been. Further, the only issue advocated by Millner that could 
have accounted for this relationship was his opposition to affirmative action
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programs. This stance could have Indirectly led to some racial voting, but beyond 
that no other issue could really account for this.
In the Louisiana gubernatorial election of 1995, physical proximity racial 
threat voting was not in operation according to the statistical analyses. This was 
mildly surprising given the highly racial content of the 1991 gubernatorial contest 
when David Duke ran. Prior research had also shown that racial threat voting did 
exist in the 1991 election among whites who lived in the black belt (Giles and 
Buckner 1995). Though neither Mike Foster nor Cleo Fields portrayed themselves 
as racial candidates. Fields was black and Foster was white possibly leading to 
some latent racial animosities leading to racial threat voting. In fact, the 1995 
election was in many ways an ideological contest between these two candidates. 
Since neither was blatantly racial like a David Duke, it may have been that the 
factors necessary to activate race based solely on physical proximity was not there.
Finally, the analysis of the 1998 South Carolina gubernatorial election did 
not reveal any significant pattern o f racial threat voting occurring based upon 
geographic proximity to black populations. One large reason for this lack of 
significance may have been David Beasley’s reversal on a promise to keep the 
Confederate battle flag flying over the State Capitol in Columbia. Although Beasley 
failed, many white voters may have been angry at Beasley’s attempt. Coupled with 
this was the fact that Jim Hodges, the Democratic nominee in 1998, promised to 
leave the flag alone if elected. This would also account for the drop in Beasley’s 
support among some white voters.
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Overall, the mixed results of the county-level analysis suggest that racial 
threat voting based on physical proximity to large black populations does not exist 
in a vacuum. Instead, physical proximity racial threat voting depends upon political 
context in order to function as a significant force in elections. In both cases where 
the county-level analysis demonstrated racial threat voting taking place, we could 
point to the political context as providing the impetus for this. Also, in the two cases 
where physical proximity racial threat voting was not taking place, political context 
again plays a role, in the 1998 South Carolina election, the fact that David Beasley 
had reneged on his promise about the Confederate flag was enough to cause some 
o f his white supporters to abandon him. In Louisiana, the fact that neither 
candidate was blatantly racial was enough to keep racial threat voting from 
occurring based solely on physical space, although voting may have been so 
racially polarized that no variance in the white vote existed. In sum, physical 
proximity racial threat voting needs cues in order to function. Without the proper 
political environment, racial threat voting based upon geography will not operate.
Racial Threat as a Consequence of Culture
The fifth chapter examined racial threat voting in the context of one’s culture. 
Perhaps, racial threat voting is not based on where a person lives. Rather, the 
mores and attitudes instilled in people by their culture could lead to certain attitudes 
that activate racial threat voting. Thus, physical proximity would not be as crucial 
to the presence of racial threat voting. Much of the literature in Chapter 5 was
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based on research pioneered by Sears and Kinder (1971) in their study o f symbolic 
racism, which asserts that one's rearing can lead to certain racial attitudes. In turn, 
these racial beliefs can affect one’s voting behavior (Sears and Funk 1999).
When testing for this type of racial threat voting, public opinion polling data 
is the most appropriate method. Therefore, opinion polls were obtained where 
possible. Unfortunately, the only state in which raw polling data was available 
statewide was in Louisiana.' Consequently, data for the National Election Studies 
(NES) from 1994 and 1998 were used to supplement the findings of the Louisiana 
data. While it was not possible to use candidate choice as a dependent variable 
with the NES data, we were able to test the impact o f race upon one’s party 
identification for both a southern and non-southern subset.
By constructing a symbolic racism measure, we tested for the importance o f 
race in individual white voting behavior. This would allow us to see the influence 
that race might have on the voting decisions o f white voters wherever they might 
live, and use of polling data allowed us to test for the effects of race upon these 
elections even when racial issues were not mentioned frequently by the candidates.
Before testing for the role of race in Louisiana, the NES data was analyzed 
to determine the role that race has upon party identification, and it also allowed us 
an opportunity to compare the differences in race between the South and non-
'The necessary statewide polling data was not available for either Georgia 
or South Carolina. While a statewide poll in Georgia does exist, no racial questions 
were asked making it impossible to construct any measure of race. No statewide 
polling is done in South Carolina. Attempts to obtain private polls done for David 
Beasley’s campaigns were unsuccessful.
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South.^ The results revealed an overall negative pattern for the importance of race 
in Republican identity. Only in the 1994 southem subset did symbolic racial 
attitudes reach statistical significance. In neither non-southem subset nor the 1998 
southern subset, did race play a significant factor in Republican identification.
This finding underscores two points. First, race does not appear to be a 
noteworthy factor among whites living outside o f the South. Although a positive 
relationship did exist among non-southern whites between symbolic racism and 
Republican identity, it was not a statistically significant relationship. Secondly, 
symbolic racial attitudes only registered a significant relationship in the southern 
subset in 1994, revealing as misleading claims that race w ill always define 
Republican identification among southern whites. Again, it appears that variations 
exist, even among southem whites, in the role that race plays in party identification.
After testing the NES data, the statewide poll from Louisiana, conducted by 
the University o f New Orleans was analyzed. As we saw in the previous 
discussion, physical proximity racial threat voting was not occurring in the 1995 
Louisiana gubematorial election. An analysis of the UNO poll data for the presence 
of racial threat voting based on culture was undertaken. If race was playing a large 
role in white support for Mike Foster, then racial threat may be occurring based 
upon culture, not geography. The results revealed that racial attitudes played a 
significant role in the 1995 gubernatorial election. White respondents used race
^White respondents only were used in the NES data. The respondents were 
broken into two subsets: South and non-South. The southern subset was an 
eleven state region as defined by the U.S. Census.
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not only as a way of comparing differences between Mike Foster and Cleo Fields, 
but they also used race when forming opinions of each candidate. In the case of 
Fields, white voters who had a high level of symbolic racism had a negative image 
of Fields and a positive image of Foster. In fact, symbolic racial attitudes were the 
only variable that achieved statistical significance when testing all the independent 
variables for their importance on candidate image and differences between the 
candidates. While ideology was important in helping white respondents determine 
the difference between Foster and Fields and in Foster’s image, it was not 
significant in how white respondents viewed Fields. These findings reveal a pattern 
where racial attitudes were important in the way that white voters viewed each 
candidate.
When analyzing fo r the role that race played in the likelihood that white 
respondents would cast a vote for Mike Foster, racial attitudes again showed high 
levels of statistical significance. Race was a definite factor in the voting behavior 
of Louisiana white voters. In addition to symbolic racial attitudes, ideology and 
health care attitudes were the other statistical significant variables. In the end, the 
analysis revealed an interesting finding. White Louisiana voters across the political 
spectrum were overwhelming in their support for Mike Foster. Even white liberal 
voters were more likely to vote for Foster. As Parent and Perry (1998) reveal, exit 
polls showed that Foster won with the support of about 55 percent o f white voters. 
Also, white voters across the gamut of whether health care should be completely
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private or government sponsored were also extremely supportive o f Foster, despite 
the fact that Foster opposed government sponsorship o f health care.
All of this suggests that race was the primary factor in the decision of white 
voters to cast a vote for Foster. More importantly, the findings also reveal a 
possible shortcoming of conceptualizing racial threat voting as solely a geographic 
phenomenon. The analysis, in Chapter 4, did not reveal the existence of racial 
threat voting based upon physical proximity. Nevertheless, race had a dominant 
impact upon the election when racial threat voting is viewed through the lens of 
cultural aspects, which suggests that racial threat voting operates on different 
levels. To view racial threat voting as solely geographic is like viewing a landscape 
w ith blinders on one’s eyes. Racial threat operates in different dimensions and 
should not be viewed in only one aspect.
Racial Threat as a Media Phenomenon
Is it possible that racial threat voting is activated or instigated by the manner 
in which the media reports the issues and candidates of a campaign, or is it 
possible that media coverage supplements or verifies a person's preconceived 
notions about the role o f race in a campaign? Chapter 6 addressed the role that 
the media plays in racial threat voting. The media coverage was limited to the print 
media, since scholars have demonstrated that newspaper coverage tends to be 
more important in statewide and local campaigns. Past research also reveals that 
convergence exists between those voters who rely upon newspaper coverage o f
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a campaign and what Issues they consider im portant As noted previously, much 
o f the voting behavior literature tends to neglect the role that the media plays in 
voters’ opinions and actions. Consequently, the media was included to determine 
their possible impact on racial threat voting.
After analyzing the news coverage of the three states, race was covered to 
varying degrees. In Louisiana, coverage of racial issues occupied around 50 
percent of the articles in both newspapers. This demonstrates again that race was 
a significant factor in Louisiana in 1995. Much of the coverage also focused on the 
lack of white support for the candidacy of Cleo Fields. Both candidates initially 
promised to avoid mentioning race during the campaign, but they ultimately 
discussed the issue. Foster criticized Fields’ campaign for planning to offer free 
rides to eligible voters on Election Day, although this is legal under state law. 
Fields accused Foster of running a racial campaign when Foster commented that 
New Orleans was a “jungle” and a haven for crime, insinuating that this was due to 
the high black population of the city. Perhaps the most telling commentary came 
from a white voter who said that the election was all black and white, and he 
believed that nothing else mattered besides race.
In South Carolina, race was covered approximately 30 percent of the time 
in the 1994 coverage. Most of this focus on race came from two sources. First, the 
articles throughout the campaign mentioned the low-level of black support for 
Republican David Beasley, and the coverage mentioned on several occasions the 
racial divide in the electorate. The other major source o f racial coverage involved
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one of Beasley's campaign workers who was black. Democrat Nick Theodore 
attacked this black campaign worker as a criminal because she had been convicted 
o f a crime in the past, but she was pardoned of the crime in 1987. W hile a few 
articles focused on this incident In the midst of the campaign, it did not figure 
prominently in the coverage as Election Day approached.
Interestingly, the Confederate battle flag, which flies atop the State Capitol 
and is generally seen as radst by most black citizens, was not mentioned frequently 
in the 1994 coverage. Part of the reason may have been that both candidates 
stated that they supported the flying of the flag, which is supported by a majority of 
South Carolina whites. In the 1998 South Carolina coverage, racial coverage 
jumped to roughly 40 percent of the coverage. Around 10 percent of the racial 
coverage focused on the familiar pattern across the region o f low black support for 
the Republican candidate, in this instance David Beasley. Coverage of the 
Confederate battle flag constituted 30 percent of this racial coverage. The reason 
for this dramatic increase was David Beasley's flip on the flag issue. During his first 
term, he had tried and failed to remove the Confederate emblem from the State 
Capitol, and this made him unpopular with many of his white supporters from 1994. 
When the 1998 election rolled around, Beasley was vulnerable to attack on this 
issue, but the assault did not come from within the Republican Party. Rather, the 
Democratic nominee, Jim Hodges, attacked Beasley on this flip-flop, and he 
promised to keep the flag flying if elected. As we have seen in Chapter 4, this set
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of circumstances helps to account for the white flight from Beasley’s camp, 
especially among rural white voters in the black belt.
Finally, racial coverage of the 1998 Georgia gubernatorial campaign 
accounted for about 30 percent of the articles examined. Discussion of the Georgia 
state flag which incorporates the Confederate battle flag in its design, accounted 
for only around 7 percent o f the coverage, despite vociferous debates about 
changing the design over the past decade. Part of this can be attributed to the fact 
that both Democrat Roy Barnes and Republican Guy M illner stated that they 
supported the current design, and neither had any plans to change it.
The majority o f the racial coverage came from several different sources. 
First, the articles, like the other two states, discussed the low black support for the 
Republican nominee, in this case Guy M illner. In fact, Millner’s support among 
blacks was so low that his campaign paid blacks to appear at his rallies, a tactic 
which was attacked by an editorialist of the Atlanta Joumaf-Constitution (Tucker 
1998). The other major portion of this racial coverage dealt with Roy Barnes' 1989 
vote against the Martin Luther King, Jr. holiday.
To a greater extent than the other two states, coverage o f the Georgia 
campaign focused on affirmative action around 20 percent of the time. Affirmative 
action is an issue that some white voters finding particularly offensive (Schuman, 
Steeh, and Bobo 1985). Republican M illner was opposed to affirmative action 
arguing that these were simply racial quotas for hiring, and he opposed the racial 
considerations that went into the admissions process at the University o f Georgia.
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Roy Barnes stated that affirmative action was not solely racial in nature, because 
they also applied to women, and he stated that he supported affirmative action 
because of gender, not race.
Overall, racial coverage varied over the three states. Did the newspaper 
coverage activate and make race an issue in these campaigns, or was the news 
coverage simply a mirror o f what the candidates were discussing? Based on the 
content analysis of these four newspapers, the vast majority of articles reported 
racial issues as they were discussed by the candidates. On a few  occasions, 
editorials would mention the race issue, but these occasions were the exception 
rather than the norm. It seems more plausible that white voters who were likely to 
vote based upon race would have used the newspaper coverage as justification in 
seeing an election as race-based. It seems unlikely that the newspaper coverage 
itself was the cause for racial threat voting.
Summary
In the end, how does racial threat theory fare under this scrutiny? It would 
be hazardous, at best, to pronounce the presence or absence of racial threat voting 
across a region or state by examining it only in terms of geography. As we saw 
when testing the idea of physical proximity racial threat voting, the models revealed 
that racial threat voting among whites in black belt counties was occurring in South 
Carolina in 1994 and Georgia in 1998. The county-level analysis did not reveal a 
statistically significant pattern o f racial threat voting in either Louisiana in 1995 or
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South Carolina in 1998. If one relied solely on the county-level analysis, one might 
be led to the belief that racial threat voting did not occur based solely on these 
findings in the latter two cases.
By examining racial threat in terms o f cultural aspects, we see that, in 
Louisiana, racial attitudes exerted a strong impact upon white voters’ behavior in 
1995, whereas the county-level analysis suggested racial threat voting was not 
occurring. Herein lies one o f the findings of this dissertation. Examining racial 
threat voting in only one dimension can lead to erroneous conclusions. Scholars 
would be well advised to take into consideration all three dimensions studied in this 
dissertation. By studying racial threat voting in context o f geography, culture, and 
media coverage, researchers procure a more true and accurate picture o f the 
dynamics of racial threat voting.
IMPORTANCE OF POLITICAL CONTEXT
Another underlying theme of this study has been the role of political context 
in racial threat voting. Based upon the findings in the previous chapters, it would 
seem that racial threat voting does not exist in a political vacuum oblivious o f the 
surrounding political environment. For racial threat voting to occur, the proper 
political setting is needed. For example, in the 1994 South Carolina gubernatorial 
election, both David Beasley and Nick Theodore ran on a promise to keep the 
Confederate battle flag flying over the State Capitol, but Beasley was more 
successful among black belt white voters since racial threat theory argues that
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“threatened” whites are more likely to vote Republican since black voters are 
overwhelmingly Democratic.
Contrast this with the 1998 South Carolina election where racial threat based 
on physical proximity was suddenly absent. Again, political context is vital. In 
1998, Republican David Beasley had attempted to remove the Confederate banner 
from the State Capitol, and he paid an enormous price for this. As a result of 
Beasley’s action, his white support base in the black belt abandoned him for his 
Democratic opponent. We might have expected threat voting to disappear if 
Beasley was a successful incumbent. The movement in the opposite direction 
indicates that threat may have undone Beasley on the flag issue. W hile other 
issues, especially the lottery, did have a role, undoubtedly the hot-button racial 
issue was a factor in this. Again, political context is important and suggests that 
racial threat voting is dependent on political issues o f the day.
Political context also reveals itself to be important when analyzing racial 
threat from a cultural standpoint. The prime example for this is the 1995 Louisiana 
gubernatorial election. W hile neither candidate was blatantly racial like a David 
Duke, the physical characteristics of the candidates did play a factor, because this 
election was a contest between a white Republican and a black Democrat. This 
alone was enough to trigger some racial voting. Throughout the campaign, racial 
issues would occasionally rear their head. To view cultural racial threat voting 
absent of political context would again lead to a distorted view of how race operates 
in elections.
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Finally, political context is important when examining racial threat voting in 
terms o f media coverage o f campaigns. By its very nature, media coverage relies 
upon die political environment, in part, for its stories. While research exists that the 
media can and does set the agenda to a limited degree, in most cases news 
coverage revolves and is dependent upon contemporary political issues. As 
discussed previously, most o f the newspaper coverage of all three campaigns 
focused upon the candidates and campaigns more than they dictated the agenda. 
For the most part, newspaper coverage did not initiate discussions of race outside 
o f the reporting o f opinion polls or editorials and focased on the events of the 
candidate's campaigns. Thus, the media was not manipulating the political agenda 
as much as they were reporting what was occurring. While coverage o f racial 
issues did exist in all of the newspapers examined, political context was driving this 
coverage, bec^ause the majority o f these articles were simply reporting what 
candidates were saying.
In the end, political context is vital to the existence of racial threat voting. 
W hite voters who are prone to vote in a racially threatened manner need cues to 
activate this behavior. W hile some white voters undoubtedly do vote in a racial 
manner on all occasions, it would appear that the majority of white voters who fit the 
description o f racial threat voting require some impetus to do so. Therefore in an 
election where racial issues are not mentioned frequently, it may be that racial 
threat voting w ill not exist. In elections featuring easy issues like affirmative action 
or Confederate symbols, it appears that racial threat voting thrives. Thus, it is vital
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that the role of political context be considered when attempting to understand racial 
threat voting.
RACIAL THREAT’S ROLE IN THE VOTING BEHAVIOR LITERATURE
After this extensive analysis, should racial threat voting be considered a 
distinct school o f voting behavior literature, or is it compatible with existing 
theories? Based upon the results, racial threat voting does not form a distinct 
school of voting behavior literature. Rather, it fits into previous theories and 
research on voting behavior.
On one level, racial threat voting is a logical extension of Issue voting which 
flows out of the Michigan studies which have greatly influenced voting behavior 
literature. Since race is an “easy” issue, as defined by Carmines and Stimson 
(1980; 1982; 1989), one could make the argument that racial threat is the logical 
extension of issue voting. In this scenario, blacks are the issue upon which 
threatened white voters cast their votes. Instead o f a new approach to voting 
behavior, racial threat may simply be part of a school that argues that issues are 
important, but those issues must be simple enough for the common person to 
understand. Racial threat would also fit into the realm o f an “easy” issue because 
less educated whites are more prone to vote Republican on the basis of race (Giles 
and Buckner 1995).
On another level, racial threat could fit into that part of the literature which 
argues that one’s culture and upbringing plays a large role in voting behavior.
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Perhaps, we can understand racial threat as a product of one’s culture Instead of 
physical proximity. Sears and Funk (1999) found In a longitudinal study conducted 
on four occasions between 1940 and 1977 that respondents were greatly 
Influenced by the racial attitudes of their parents. In the 1960s and 1970s as race 
became polarizing, the authors found that these voters were politically activated by 
their latent racial views. When race became an Issue, the majority of these voters 
reacted In a manner that was consistent with their long-held racial views. Sears, 
Van Laar, Carrillo, and Kosterman (1997) also found that white voters' racial 
attitudes were long-standing. In an analysis o f white respondents’ answers on 
various racial policies and racial candidates, the authors found that race was the 
primary determinant In their bellefe. For example, an Individual who Is born and 
raised In the black belt w ill probably pick up the racial attitudes and mores o f his 
parents. In turn, this Individual may cast his votes guided by his racial attitudes.
On this basis, racial threat may be a logical extension of political culture. If 
so, racial threat could be part of a sociological approach to voting behavior that was 
Initially begun by the Columbia study o f the 1940 presidential election. If true, one 
must raise the question of how reliable racial threat can be for political candidates, 
because white voters would need some cue to spark latent racial tendencies Into 
vote choice.
What of racial threat and the media? Based on the newspaper coverage In 
the elections studied. It would not appear that racial threat fits Into any of the media 
coverage literature. W hile the potential does exist that the media could play an
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agenda-setting role with this issue, support for this does not exist in the media 
coverage in this dissertation.
Based upon the findings in the previous three chapters, racial threat’s place 
in the voting behavior literature falls into two categories. First, if one is examining 
racial threat on the basis o f geography, then racial threat fits into the literature on 
issue voting. In this case, race is the issue that activates and causes white voters 
in close physical proximity to large black populations to vote in a racial manner. 
Since race is an example o f an issue which is easily understood by the average 
voter, then it becomes all the more plausible that racial threat voting is part o f the 
issue voting literature. In addition, racial threat voting occurs more frequently 
among the least educated o f white voters, and easy issues are more readily 
understood by less educated voters.
While racial threat on one level can be seen as an extension of issue voting, 
it can also be viewed as part o f the literature that argues that culture has a large 
role in individuals’ voting behavior. When examining racial threat as a cultural 
phenomenon, individuals' long-held attitudes about race which are formed in youth 
by one’s culture suddenly become very important to the existence of racial threat 
voting. In this instance, it would appear that it was not easy or hard issues as much 
as heritage that plays a more vital role in the presence of racial threat voting. With 
cultural racial threat voting, the presence of a black candidate, like Cleo Fields in 
Louisiana, may have been enough to trigger racial threat voting based upon cultural 
aspects.
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in the end, racial threat voting does not warrant inclusion as a new school 
in the voting behavior literature. Rather, its place in the literature comes out of 
various prevailing theories in the field. It depends in large part how racial threat is 
conceptualized that dictates its place in the prior literature. If racial threat is seen 
as a purely geographic occurrence, then racial threat belongs w ithin the issue 
voting literature. In contrast, if racial threat voting is seen as purely cultural, then 
its place seems to belong within theories that cite the importance of culture in voting 
behavior.
As discussed earlier, though, racial threat is best understood if it is viewed 
in different dimensions rather than as solely geographic, cultural, or media-driven. 
In this case, racial threat voting is actually part of various different theories on 
voting behavior. Yet, racial threat voting does not substantially deviate from its 
various legacies to the point that it should be considered as a distinct school of 
though within the voting behavior literature.
RACIAL THREAT'S ROLE IN A REPUBLICAN REALIGNMENT
As we discussed in the opening chapter, much attention has focused upon 
the role that race played in the rise of the Republican Party in the South. 
Undoubtedly, race did provide the initial jo lt that made the GOP a viable party 
initially at the presidential level and later at lower levels (Cosman 1966; Carmines 
and Stimson 1981; 1989; Lamis 1990; Black and Black 1992). What role does race
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play today though? More specifically, what role does racial threat voting play in the 
continued growth o f the Republican Party in the contemporary South?
To answer this question, it is necessary to make a distinction between two 
types of realignment. One is critical realignment, which argues that some massive 
divisive issue comes along the political horizon which causes an instantaneous shift 
in support for the two parties. The second type is secular realignment where slow, 
generational replacement leads to a gradual shift between the two parties. W hile 
most of the literature seems to agree that race did lead to a critical realignment at 
the presidential level in 1964, what role has race played since this momentous 
date? Based upon research presented in previous chapters, southern whites below 
the presidential level have undergone secular realignment towards the Republican 
Party. Undoubtedly, race had some role in this although it would be hazardous to 
suggest that such a secular realignment was driven completely by race. 
Undoubtedly, ideology and other issues played some role as well.
Do these findings speak to the impact o f racial threat in the Republican 
realignment of the South? It would seem that the Republican Party has reached a 
ceiling with regards to racial appeal as it relates to their ability to build a majority 
coalition. As it presently stands, a majority of southern whites who have strong 
racial beliefs that are not favorable to blacks are more likely to be Republican 
anyway. Thus, it would seem that Republican candidates have gone as fa r as 
possible in appealing to such white voters. The task of the Republicans then 
becomes to perform a difficult balancing acting between appealing to white voters
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who are not attracted to the Republican Party on the basis o f race, while 
maintaining their basis of support among whites are less racially tolerant.
As some of the findings o f this study suggest, racial threat voting is not a 
secure blanket for the Republican candidate in all cases. When David Beasley won 
election as governor of South Carolina in 1994, he did so with the overwhelming 
support of white voters who lived in the black belt. As we discussed previously, this 
is an example of physical proximity racial threat voting. Beasley’s promise to keep 
the Confederate flag flying over the State Capitol was a message that was 
sufficiently potent enough to attract these white voters, but Beasley’s defeat for 
reelection in 1998 reveals the volatile nature o f racial threat voting.
After Beasley’s failed attempt at removing the Confederate emblem from the 
State Capitol, the lion’s share o f his white support in the black belt abandoned 
Beasley for his Democratic opponent, Jim Hodges. Interestingly, Hodges ran on 
a promise to keep the Confederate flag flying over the State Capitol if he were 
elected. While it would be perilous to make the claim that race was the only factor 
in this shift, it certainly did have some impact. The lesson here is that racial threat 
voting is a dangerous and fleeting phenomenon on which to build a realignment. 
In most cases, southern whites with definite racial attitudes that are hostile or wary 
of blacks are most likely to support Republican candidates. The South Carolina 
example reveals that racial threat is volatile in that these same white voters w ill 
abandon Republican candidates if the political climate is right.
276
A lesson for the Republican Party would be that attempting to build a majority 
coalition on race alone is a road that is fraught with danger at every turn. Race is 
certainly an example of an easy issue which is required for a majority of voters to 
realign to the other party (Carmines and Stimson 1980; 1981; 1989), but race is 
also an extremely emotional issue which can often backfire on the party that 
attempts to seize and control this issue. If the Republicans continue to play with 
this Pandora’s box of racial threat, it could eventually explode in their faces. Racial 
threat voting is generally beneficial to Republican candidates, but exceptions do 
exist.
Coupled with the volatility o f racial threat voting is the fact that Republicans 
are limited in the amount of political capital that they can acquire from the race card. 
Most southern whites, who have discriminatory racial attitudes, are already more 
likely to vote Republican, making any new growth among this segment unlikely. 
This leaves southern whites who have low or moderate levels of racial attitudes to 
which the Republican must appeal if they are to build a long-lasting cohesive 
coalition. As we have seen in the chapters, political context is a necessary 
component to the existence of racial threat voting. If an election has little racial 
charge to it, then racial threat voting tends to be low or nonexistent. When this 
occurs, voters will use other cues in deciding how to vote. In such a scenario, 
Republican candidates may or may not be the beneficiaries.
In any event, trying to appeal to white voters with high racial attitudes is an 
enterprise that Republican candidates should contemplate at length. Due to the
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volatile nature of racial threat voting, it is foolhardy for Republican candidates to run 
campaigns that attempt solely to appeal to whites who have high levels of racism. 
While such a strategy might win some elections, it is hardly the type of issue that 
can lead to a permanent and desirable realignment. Race was the issue that led 
to the Republican Party being viable in the South, but it would appear that the 
Republicans need to move past this issue to become the majority party on the 
southern political landscape below the presidential level.
THE ROLE OF RACIAL THREAT VOTING OUTSIDE OF THE SOUTH
While this dissertation has focused on the role of racial threat voting in 
southern gubernatorial elections, what do the findings say about racial threat 
outside of the region? Again, it depends upon the type of racial threat voting. If 
one is examining the geographic dimension of racial threat voting, then the findings 
do not say amything about politics outside of the South. As we discussed in 
Chapter 4, for physical proximity racial threat voting to exist, high concentrations of 
black voters are needed to activate the fears of white voters in those areas. In the 
southern states where the black belt is present, this requirement, large black 
populations, does exist. Of course, high black populations also exist in 
metropolitan areas of the South, which makes physical proximity racial threat voting 
possible there as well.
Of course, the South is not unique in having high black populations in 
metropolitan areas. Cities outside of the region have large minority populations.
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While it certainly would be possible for geographic racial threat voting to occur 
among white voters in non-southern settings, it seems unlikely that it would occur 
to a high degree, because most non-southern states do not have high minority 
populations outside of urban areas. In this sense, racial threat voting is unique to 
the South.
If one examines racial threat voting in terms of culture, a different answer 
may arise. In cultural racial threat voting, it is not requisite that white voters live in 
close physical space to black populations. Instead, one’s heritage and upbringing 
may lead one to have certain racial attitudes which may manifest themselves on 
occasion through voting behavior. In this case, racial threat voting has the potential 
to exist anywhere in the nation, not just the South. As we have seen, cultural racial 
threat voting in some ways is more powerful than physical proximity racial threat 
voting. Also, the focus of racial animosities outside of the South may not reside 
with blacks alone. For example, a state like California which has high Hispanic and 
Asian populations may provide for racial tensions based upon those ethnic groups 
rather than blacks. While white voters in these regions may have racial attitudes 
about other racial groups besides blacks, the operation of the concept o f racial 
threat voting could potentially operate in the same manner.
Thus, some o f the findings of this dissertation do have applicability outside 
the southern states. While physical proximity racial threat voting may be a peculiar 
occurrence to the South, cultural racial threat voting has the potential to exist 
anywhere in the nation. Further, racial threat voting does not have to involve racial
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attitudes about blacks. Potentially, any minority group could be the focus of animus 
from white voters. Undoubtedly, racial threat voting, both physical and cultural, 
does occur more often in the South, but it would be a distorted view to say that 
racial threat voting is a distinctly southern problem.
THE FUTURE OF RACIAL THREAT VOTING
What does the future hold for racial threat voting? Is racial threat destined 
to die within the next generation, or will it thrive well into the 21^ century? If one 
is asking this question of physical proximity racial threat voting, the answer would 
probably be that racial threat voting will disappear over time due to (1) population 
loss in the black belt region of the South, and (2) due to smaller white populations 
in majority-black areas such as counties or inner-cities. In this case, we could 
possibly proclaim the end of racial threat voting in the South in the next generation 
or two.
As we have seen, racial threat is not solely geographic in nature. It also has 
a cultural dimension to it  If asking this question about cultural racial threat voting, 
the answer is different. As long as racial attitudes hostile to minorities exist in the 
minds of white individuals in this country, the potential for racial threat voting 
remains with us for quite some time. As past research demonstrates, some issue 
or event is all that is needed to trigger the onslaught of cultural racial threat voting. 
While geographic racial threat voting may disappear due to populations shifts and 
migration, the causes of cultural racial threat voting will not vanish so easily. It is
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always difficult to change people’s deeply-held attitudes and opinions. Thus, it is 
possible that cultural racial threat voting could exist not only in the South, but also 
the entire nation for the foreseeable future.
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APPENDIX A 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY NOTES
This appendix further explains the statistical methodology which was utilized 
in Chapter 5 when testing racial threat as a consequence of culture. Two subjects 
need to be addressed. First, a symbolic racism variable was derived using three 
questions in the National Elections Study (NES) data from 1994 and 1998. Two 
options existed for deriving this variable. One way would be to use arithmetic 
averaging of the scores on the questions to arrive at racial score. The other 
method which could be used would involve confirmatory principal-components 
factor analysis. This procedure allows the researcher to identify underlying factors 
that explain the correlations among a set of variables. This method is often used 
to summarize a larger number of variables into one variable. The figure on the 
following page demonstrates the extemely close relationship between the factor 
analysis score for symbolic racism and the arithmetic average score. Since the 
relationship is so close, the arithmetic average score is utilized as the symbolic 
racism score in all of the analysis in Chapter 5.
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Figure A.1
Relationship Between Arithmetic Average and Factor Analysis Score of
Symbolic Racism
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APPENDIX B 
Newspaper Coverage Content Sheet
Newspaper:_______ State:______  Date:_
Headline of A rtic le :__________________________________
Candidate(s) being discussed:.
Partisanship of candidates in article: 
Issues Stressed in Coverage:
1. Social Issues
A. Confederate symbols:
B. Other racial Issues:
0. Affirmative Action:
D. Social welfare reform:
E. Law and order/crime:
F. Other social Issues
(abortion, teen pregnancy, breakdown of family):_____
2. Economic Issues:
ÆStatus of state economy: _____
B. Lower taxes: _____
3. Educational Issues
0. Status of public school education:
D. State lottery/legalized gambling to support education: 
Identifiable media bias?_____
In fovor/against whom?_____________________________________
Overall tone of the article:_____
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Content Analysis Code Sheet
01. Newspaper;
02. State:
03. Date:
04. Headline:
05. Candidates discussed:
06. Partisanship:
07-08.
09. Confederate Symbols:
10. Other Racial Issues
11. Affirmative Action:
12. Social Welfare Reform:
13. Law and order/crime:
14. Other Social issues:
15.
16. Status of state economy:
17. Lower taxes:
MC=Atlanta Journal Constitution 
TAB=77?e Advocate (Baton Rouge) 
NTP=A/ew Orleans Times-Picayune 
CPC=The Post and Couner (Charleston)
GA=Georgia 
l_A=Louisiana 
SC=South Carolina
Date of article
Title of Article
Barnes=Roy Barnes
Beasley=David Beasley
Fields=Cleo Fields
Foster=Mike Foster
Hodges=Jlm Hodges
Millner=Guy Millner
Theodore=Nick Theodore
1 =Republican 2=Democrat
Free
0=No 1=Yes
0=No 1=Yes
0=No 1=Yes
0=No 1=Yes
0=No 1=Yes
0=No 1=Yes
Free
0=No 1=Yes
0=No 1=Yes
299
18.
19. Status of public schools:
20. State lottery/gambling:
21. Identifiable media bias:
22. In favor of whom:
23. Overall tone:
Free
0=No
0=No
0=No
1=Yes
1=Yes
1=Yes 2=UncIear
Bames=Roy Barnes 
Beasley=David Beasley 
FiekJs=CIeo Fields 
Foster=Mlke Foster 
Hodges=Jim Hodges 
Millner=Guy Millner 
Theodore=Nick Theodore
0=Unfavorable
1=Favorable
2=Ambiguous
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